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Abstract
Why do ethnic groups rebel against the state? While there have been various 
efforts to answer this question, existing explanations tend to be static and based 
on the unitary actor assumption. This thesis attempts to make a step forward by 
relaxing the unitary actor assumption and by introducing dynamic elements 
into the explanatory framework. In order to do so, it takes a three-step 
approach, examining (1) the initial intensity of rebellion, (2) the onset of 
rebellion, and (3) the escalation. As for the methodology, this thesis adopts a 
mixed-methods approach: for each step, it conducts both large-N analyses and 
qualitative analyses of ex-Yugoslav countries. This thesis firstly examines the 
determinants of the initial intensity of rebellion. It presents two ideal-types, 
“decisions from above” made by ethnic leaders and “decisions from below” 
made by non-leaders, and will argue that the initial intensity is more likely to 
be higher if ethnic leaders organise the rebellion, because they can mobilise 
more resources. Secondly, this thesis examines the causes of the onset of 
rebellion. It will argue that structural conditions alone do not suffice to explain 
it, and will argue for the importance of dynamic grievances. In other words, 
even when structural conditions do not change, grievances will increase over 
time as the duration of peaceful protests gets longer, because people will be 
increasingly frustrated by the failure to achieve their goals by peaceful means. 
Finally, this thesis examines the dynamics of escalation. It will be argued that 
the low-intensity rebellion is likely to provoke state repression, and that the 
repressive measures taken by the state in turn are likely to cause the escalation 
of rebellion. The concluding chapter explores the theoretical and 
methodological implications for the study of ethnic conflict as well as the 
policy implications for conflict prevention.
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Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, increased attention has been given to 
ethnic conflict and civil war. While such conflicts are not new,1 tragic events 
in such places as ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda surprised many people in the 
West who were in the euphoria of triumph over its rival, and became a 
favoured topic for academic research and media coverage. The ongoing civil 
strife in Iraq shows that such conflicts still constitute one of the main threats to 
peace and security in the world. To examine the causes of ethnic conflict and 
civil war certainly remains an important task for researchers.
Asking why ethnic groups rebel is, therefore, important. This is a 
classic question, however, and merely asking it is hardly innovative. Gurr 
(1970) asked why men rebel already in the 1970s. Horowitz (1985) analysed 
ethnic groups in conflict in the 1980s. Furthermore, since the end of the Cold 
War, there has been a remarkable development in the study of ethnic conflict 
and civil war, and various authors have attempted to build new explanatory 
models and to identify the causes of conflict based on wide ranging large-N 
analyses.
The originality of the present thesis does not lie in the question it asks, 
but in the manner in which it answers the question. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
existing explanations tend to be static and based on the unitary actor 
assumption. This thesis attempts to make a step forward by relaxing the unitary 
actor assumption and introducing dynamic elements into the explanatory 
framework. The unitary actor assumption is relaxed by incorporating the
1 For example, the number of ongoing civil wars reached 25 already by the mid 1980s, the 
same number as in 1999. Between 1945 and 1999, “conservative estimate” of the total 
dead as a direct result of these wars reached 16.2 million, five times larger than that of 
inter-state wars in the same period. See Fearon & Laitin 2003: 75-77.
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intra-ethnic divisions and the presence of different types of decision-makers 
that exist within ethnic groups. Dynamic elements enter the explanatory 
framework (1) by examining the effect of “dynamic grievances,” i.e. a type of 
grievances that increases over time even when structural conditions remain the 
same, and (2) by examining an interaction between the ethnic group and the 
state. Needless to say, this thesis only marks a beginning, rather than an end, of 
the efforts that will be needed to develop a more dynamic theoretical 
framework to explain the occurrence of ethnic conflict and civil war. There is 
much left to be done, and such efforts must be continued further in future 
research.
Methodologically, this thesis adopted a “mixed methods” approach 
that is becoming more and more popular in political science. In short, this 
approach calls for an interaction between the large-N (quantitative) analysis 
and the small-N (qualitative) analysis. In the course of the research for the 
present thesis, there was a constant tension between the large-N analyses and 
the qualitative case studies, though such a tension may not be so visible in the 
present thesis as a final product of the interaction. This tension was not easy to 
overcome, and the author went back and forth between the two kinds of 
analyses to find a middle ground between them. But this tension between the 
large-N analyses and the case studies was useful for the refinement of the 
theoretical framework.
As for the case study, the ex-Yugoslav region is extensively analysed 
in the present thesis, based on the results of the fieldwork in the ex-Yugoslav 
region from August 2005 to October 2006. Besides the fact that I have been 
interested in this region and have some first-hand experiences of it since 2000, 
there are many reasons for the case selection. Firstly, the intra-regional 
comparison often allows us to control for many macro-variables in the
11
comparative qualitative analysis and it is thus a common choice for the “most 
similar systems design” (Przeworski & Teune 1970). In addition, the 
systematic intra-regional comparison has been relatively rare when it comes to 
the analysis of violent conflict in ex-Yugoslavia, which makes it possible to 
make some contribution to the study of ex-Yugoslav conflict. Finally, the 
original theoretical arguments in this thesis are all inspired primarily by the 
analysis of the ex-Yugoslav cases. The analysis of the ex-Yugoslav cases 
enabled me to identify some factors that are not considered in the existing 
literature and yet were important in the ex-Yugoslav cases. This then became a 
starting point for the theory-building and theory-testing by the large-N 
analyses.
This case selection is not meant to choose a representative sample. 
Note that the large-N analyses of this thesis will cover more than 200 ethnic 
groups from all over the world and a long period from 1945 up to 2000. 
Compared to this wide variety of area and period, the qualitative case study 
only analyses the cases from one specific region (ex-Yugoslavia) that occurred 
in the same period (in the 1990s). Therefore, one may question whether 
theoretical arguments derived from the comparative analysis of these cases are 
really generalisable: they may well be biased by some factors specific to the 
area or the period analysed in the case study, and the four cases analysed here 
may simply be outliers or anomalies in the sample. The large-N analysis serves 
to check if these questions or doubts can be dismissed. If the hypotheses 
derived from the case study are supported by the large-N analyses using a 
larger and more representative sample, this means that these hypotheses are not 
necessarily biased by the peculiarities of the ex-Yugoslav cases (for the merits 
of the large-N study, see also Chapter 2).
However, the large-N analysis is not a panacea for the problem of
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generalisability. There may be some factors that cannot be included in the 
large-N analyses for technical or other reasons, and yet these factors may play 
an important role in the ex-Yugoslav cases. The large-N analyses, then, cannot 
estimate the effect of these factors, and consequently, cannot control for these 
factors in order to assess the explanatory power of the variables of one’s 
interest. Indeed, some factors that played a considerable role in explaining the 
rebellion in the ex-Yugoslav region are not included in the large-N analyses of 
this thesis, mainly because it is difficult to quantify them in a methodologically 
convincing manner. These factors imply either the importance of the 
peculiarities of the ex-Yugoslav cases or the limits of the large-N analysis. The 
concluding chapter will elaborate on these implications.
For the case study, the present thesis uses a variety of materials, such 
as newspaper articles and other media reports in local languages and English, 
interviews with local actors and experts, the testimony at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), official documents 
published in the ex-Yugoslav countries, as well as secondary sources (books 
and journal articles both in local languages and English). As for the media 
reports, the testimony at the ICTY and the interviews, full references are given 
in the footnotes. As for the secondary sources, the author’s name and year of 
publication are given either in the text or in the footnotes, with page numbers 
after colon if necessary, and their full references are given in the reference list 
at the end of the thesis. As for the materials taken from websites, the address of 
the website is given either in the footnotes or in the reference list. All materials 
in the Cyrillic alphabet are transformed into the Latin alphabet in the footnotes 
and the reference list for the sake of simplicity.
As is well known, even the name of places is a subject of contention in 
the ex-Yugoslav region, especially between Serbs and Albanians. For example,
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Albanians use the name “Kosova” while Serbs use the name “Kosovo and 
Metohija” or “Kosmet.” The present thesis uses the name “Kosovo” because it 
is common practice in English-speaking countries. All towns and villages in 
Kosovo have two names, one in Albanian and the other in Serbian. Generally 
speaking, in the present thesis, places with Albanian majority population are 
called in Albanian (e.g. Prishtina rather than Pristina), while those with Serb 
majority population are called in Serbian. These rules, however, are not applied 
to the quotes, in which expressions used by the speakers or writers are kept 
without changes.
This thesis consists of four main parts, followed by a concluding 
chapter. Part I presents the theoretical and methodological premises of the 
thesis. Chapter 1 presents the theoretical premises, defines ‘ethnic rebellion,’ 
undertakes a brief but critical review of the existing literature, and finally 
outlines a three-step approach for the analysis of ethnic rebellion which 
advocates a step-by-step analysis of three aspects of rebellion, namely (1) the 
initial level of rebellion, (2) the onset of initial rebellion and (3) the escalation 
of rebellion. Chapter 2 addresses the methodological issues, discussing the 
merits of a “mixed-methods” approach and making a brief description of the 
key dataset used in the large-N analyses as well as four ex-Yugoslav cases 
examined in the qualitative analyses of the thesis.
Part II, III and IV constitute the main body of the thesis and 
correspond to the three steps advocated in Chapter 1. Part II analyses the initial 
level of rebellion. Chapter 3 will present two ideal types, rebellion from above 
and from below: the former is caused by the decisions to take up arms by the 
powerful elites, while the latter is caused by decisions of the non-elites. This 
chapter will argue that the initial level of rebellion is more likely to be higher if 
ethnic leaders or elites (such as politicians who hold public office, military and
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police officials) are involved in the organisation of rebellion. The key causal 
factor that explains the relationship between the type of decision-makers and 
the level of initial intensity is the amount of resources. Following the resource 
mobilisation theory, this thesis argues that the amount of resources available to 
the organizers of rebellion determines the magnitude of initial rebellion. This 
chapter then draws some testable hypotheses, based on the findings of the 
comparative case-study of Chapter 4, and conducts large-N analyses to test 
these hypotheses. Chapter 4 conducts a comparative analysis of Serb and 
Albanian rebellions in the ex-Yugoslav region and will show that the 
involvement of politicians, police and army in the rebellion led to the high 
level of the initial intensity of rebellion in Croatia and Bosnia, while Albanian 
rebellions were “from below,” organised by those who did not have a large 
amount of resources, and consequently the initial level of rebellion was low in 
Kosovo and Macedonia.
Part III will examine the onset of initial rebellion. Chapter 5 will argue 
that structural conditions emphasised in the existing literature may not suffice 
to explain the onset of initial rebellion and argue for the importance of 
“dynamic grievances.” In other words, when members of the ethnic group keep 
making peaceful protests for a long time, people may get increasingly 
frustrated by the fact that they cannot achieve their goals by peaceful means. 
As a result, some people decide to choose a violent option as an alternative to 
change the status quo. This chapter thus hypothesise that a rebellion is more 
likely to occur as the duration of peaceful protest by members of the ethnic 
group gets longer. It will then conduct a series of large-N analyses to test this 
hypothesis, controlling for a number of structural conditions. Chapter 6 
conducts a case study of the four rebellions in the ex-Yugoslav region and will 
show that “dynamic grievances” explain the timing of the onset of rebellion in
15
Kosovo and Macedonia, while other structural conditions, such as the newness 
of the state, better explain the early onset of rebellion in Croatia and Bosnia.
Part IV will examine the escalation of rebellion, focusing on an 
interaction between the ethnic group and the state. Chapter 7 will argue that 
this interaction becomes important when one analyses the escalation of 
rebellion after the onset of initial rebellion. It will hypothesise that the state 
authorities tend to take repressive measures against the rebels when the 
low-intensity rebellion occurs, but these repressive measures in turn tend to 
cause further grievances and incite an escalation of rebellion. The repressive 
measures are thus often counterproductive, as many authors have pointed out in 
analysing the process of ethnic conflict. To test these hypotheses, this chapter 
will conduct some large-N analyses, though they are only preliminary because 
of the limitations of the MAR dataset. Chapter 8 will compare the state 
reactions to the initial rebellion in Serbia and Macedonia and will show that the 
Serbian authorities took repressive measures against the rebels, which led to 
the escalation of rebellion, while the Macedonian authorities took a more 
conciliatory stance, which led to the de-escalation of rebellion. Chapter 9 will 
then show that this difference between Serbia and Macedonia is caused 
primarily by two factors, namely the path dependency of policy position taken 
by key politicians and the nature of the external pressure. The policy position 
taken by Slobodan Milosevic in the 1980s made it impossible for him to take a 
conciliatory stance towards Albanian rebels in the 1990s, even if he wanted to. 
Furthermore, the external actors, especially the US, sent a wrong signal to 
Milosevic by condemning the Kosovo Liberation Army as “terrorists,” that was 
interpreted by the Serbian authorities as “green light” for repression. In the 
case of Macedonia, Boris Trajkovski, the then President of Macedonia, was 
more moderate towards Albanians since his inauguration and thus it was
16
natural for him to take a conciliatory stance, and the external actors put a 
coherent and clear pressure to find a political solution to the conflict.
As a brief overview above shows, the first chapter in each part will 
present the theoretical arguments and conduct a large-N analysis to establish 
some general findings. Then, the next chapters) will conduct an in-depth 
comparative case-study of the ex-Yugoslav cases on the same subject. The 
structure of the main body of the thesis will be discussed further in Chapter 2, 
because it is related to the methodological approach of the thesis. The final 
chapter concludes with a summary of the key findings and a discussion of the 
theoretical and methodological implications for the study of ethnic conflict as 
well as the policy implications for conflict prevention.
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Part I: Theoretical and Methodological Premises
Chapter 1
A Three-Step Approach for the Analysis of Ethnic Rebellion 
Introduction
This chapter presents the theoretical premises of the thesis. Firstly, it 
presents a working definition of ethnic rebellion. It will then critically review 
theoretical works on political violence and ethnic conflict, identifying four 
major problems in the existing literature. Finally, this chapter will present a 
three-step approach for the analysis of ethnic rebellion.
1. Definition of the Ethnic Rebellion
In attempting to analyse the causes and dynamics of ethnic rebellion, 
the first task is to define ethnic rebellion. To “define the domain” is particularly 
important in the study of ethnic conflict, because an extremely vast and diverse 
phenomenon can be studied under the title of ethnic conflict. Even when one 
focuses solely on the violence in ethnic conflict, one still finds such diverse 
themes as pogroms, genocides, riots, xenophobic and anti-immigrant violence, 
state violence, and so on.1 While these different types of inter-ethnic violence 
may well be related to each other in some way (and a systematic inquiry into 
the relationship between different types of inter-ethnic violence has not been
1 See, for example, following works, Klier & Lambroza 1992; Dobkowski & Wallimann 
1992; Grimsahw 1969; Bjorgo & Witte 1993; Van Den Berghe 1990; Horowitz 2001. For 
an excellent review of the works on ethnic and nationalist violence, see Brubaker & Laitin 
1998.
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conducted so far), it would probably turn out to be fruitless if one attempts to 
explain such a wide range of phenomena by a single theory.2 A definition of 
ethnic rebellion demarcates the scope of the analysis and helps clarify what 
will be explained and what will not be explained in the present thesis.
Ethnic rebellion is defined here as violent actions taken by ethnic 
organisations against the state authorities. This definition includes four key 
elements, namely (1) the violence, (2) the presence of some organisation 
behind the violence, (3) the ethnic nature of the organisation, and (4) the state 
authorities as a target of violence. Let us briefly explore each element of the 
definition below.
Firstly, ethnic rebellion must involve some violence, whether its 
intensity is high or low. This is one of the key differences between ethnic 
rebellion and ethnic conflict. A term ethnic conflict often implies violence, but 
not necessarily. When ethnic conflict is analysed, such analysis normally 
examines historical and political backgrounds of inter-ethnic antagonisms and 
tensions before they get violent, as well as the occurrence of violence. A term 
ethnic conflict, therefore, implies much wider context than rebellion, which is a 
more specific, violent outcome that occurs in the broader context of ethnic 
conflict. This distinction is important, as Varshney (2001: 365-366) argues: 
“[o]n the whole, the existing literature has failed to distinguish between ethnic 
violence and ethnic conflict. Such conflation is unhelpful. In any ethnically 
plural society that allows free expression of political demands, some ethnic 
conflict is more or less inevitable, but it may not necessarily lead to violence.”
2 For example, Brown argued as follows: “it is important to recognize that there are many 
different types of internal conflict, each caused by different things. The challenge for 
scholars is to identify these different types of conflicts and the different sets of factors that 
bring them about. The search for a single factor or set of factors that explains everything is 
comparable to the search for the Holy Grail - noble, but futile.” See Brown 1997: 4. 
Brubaker and Laitin also argued that different types of ethnic violence seem to involve 
“sharply opposed mechanisms and dynamics ” See Brubaker & Laitin 1998: 446.
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Secondly, ethnic rebellion must involve some organisation. In other 
words, violent actions must be taken by some members that consciously and 
actively participate in the organisation, whether it is small or large, in order to 
be called a rebellion. There is a difference between rebellion and riot, even 
though both involve violence. A riot can occur due to the spontaneous actions 
by mobs even when there is no organisation behind it. A rebellion, on the other 
hand, cannot occur if there is no organisation. Of course, a distinction between 
the two may not always be easy to make. On the one hand, Brass (1997) 
pointed out that there is often an involvement of the organised gangs, or what 
he calls “institutionalized riot system,” behind the large-scale riots while 
apparently they occur spontaneously. On the other hand, membership of the 
organisation and the distinction between fighters and civilians is not always 
clear when it comes to guerrilla organisations.3 However, a significant 
difference remains between the two. In the case of a riot, a large number of 
citizens can participate in it easily without consciously choosing to be a 
member of the organisation that is behind the violence.4 In the case of a 
rebellion, those who take up arms will not do so without actively choosing to 
be members of the organisation (even if they participate in the rebellion only 
part-time).
The third element is the ethnic nature of the organisation. More 
precisely, the recruitment of members of the organisation must be done 
primarily according to ethnic lines. This is the key difference between ethnic
3 For example, this lack of clear distinction between the civil and the military is one of the 
key aspects of what Kaldor calls “new war” compared to the “old war” (i.e. international 
warfare). See Kaldor 2001.
4 Brubaker and Laitin argued, for example, as follows: “an ethnic riot typically involves at 
one level deliberate manipulation and organisation by a small number of instigators but 
also, at other levels, turbulent currents of crowd behavior governed by powerful emotions 
and compelling collective representations requiring social psychological and cultural 
modes of analysis.” See Brubaker & Laitin 1998: 446.
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rebellion and rebellion made by, for example, communist groups that recruit 
their members along class and ideological lines. This element naturally raises 
one fundamental question: what, then, is ethnicity? This question could lead to 
a host of theoretical and empirical literature on ethnicity itself, particularly on 
the origins of ethnicity, where various schools, such as “primordialist” 
“instrumentalist” and “constructivist” approaches, provide sharply opposing 
explanations.5 An extensive review of these approaches is not presented here. 
For present purposes, it is assumed that the ethnic identities and differences 
already exist in a country when the ethnic rebellion occurs, without asking 
where these ethnic identities come from. As for the definition of ethnicity, this 
thesis follows the “inclusive concept” of ethnicity proposed by Horowitz 
(1985: 17-18), which defines ethnicity “by ascriptive differences, whether the 
indicum is color, appearance, language, religion, some other indicator of 
common origin, or some combination thereof.”
Fourthly, a target of violent actions must be the state authorities, such 
as politicians who hold public offices, government institutions, police or 
military forces. This is the key difference between rebellion and 
inter-communal violence which is conducted against ordinaiy citizens of some 
other ethnic groups within the same state. While the state authorities can be a 
neutral mediator between two ethnic groups in the inter-communal violence, 
the state authorities often become a party to the conflict in the case of rebellion. 
This definition also implies the presence of some political purposes for the 
rebellion, whether they are related to self-determination, such as a greater 
autonomy or an outright secession/independence, or to the improvement of the
5 See, for example, Glazer & Moynihan 1975; De Vos & Romanucci-Ross 1982; Barth 
1969; Despres 1975; Stack 1986. This question leads us also to vast literature in the study 
of nationalism and its origins, which is also divided by similar approaches. See, for 
example, Smith 1986.
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political, economic or social status of the ethnic group, or rather simply to the 
gain of political power in the country, such as the overthrow of the incumbent 
government.
Before the chapter proceeds to the review of the existing literature, a 
few additional notes are made here. The first one is on the usage of the word 
rebellion. This word sometimes entails negative connotations, which imply that 
violent actions that are being taken are illegal, illegitimate, unjustifiable, and so 
on. In analysing the separatism of Malay Muslims in Thailand, for example, 
one scholar noticed that the Thai state tends to refer the actions taken by the 
Malay Muslims as “rebellion,” which implies a conflict involving a 
subordinate group within the state, while Malay-Muslims tend to call the same 
event the “war,” implying that what were in conflict were two distinct states 
(Pojar 2005: 45). When I referred to the Serb actions in Bosnia as “rebellion 
(pobuna)” in an interview, a Croat historian Dr. Baric expressed his reservation 
in doing so because the Serbs were declared as “constituent nation” in Bosnia 
and in that sense they were different from the Serbs in Croatia.6 It must be 
underlined that the word “rebellion” in this thesis does not imply any inference 
about the legality, legitimacy, or justifiability of the actions taken by members 
of ethnic groups in any country. It is used as an objective and descriptive term.
Secondly, the analytic distinction between different types of violence 
does not mean that they are not related to each other. The occurrence of 
inter-communal violence or pogroms may precede the occurrence of rebellion: 
in Sri Lanka, for example, anti-Tamil violence by Sinhalese people occurred
6 Interview with Nikica Baric, Zagreb, 2005/11/08. Baric also told that there were some 
criticisms against the title of his book (Baric 2005) when he used the word “rebellion 
(pobuna)” for the actions of Serbs in Croatia, because it has become a norm in Croatia to 
use the term “Great-Serbian Aggression (Velikosrpska A gresija)In this case, the word 
“rebellion” is disliked by the Croats because it implies the internal/domestic nature of the 
conflict, whereas they tend to view the actions taken by the Serbs in 1991 as an “external” 
aggression.
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before (but also after) the start of anti-state rebellion by the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).7 In this case, the occurrence of inter-communal 
violence may be one of the causes of the occurrence of rebellion, leading to the 
perception by some members of the Tamil people that the current state would 
not protect them and they must establish their own state. Inter-communal 
violence may also occur after the anti-state rebellion. In Kosovo, for example, 
anti-Serb violence by the local Albanians has occurred even after the anti-state 
rebellion ended in 1999.8 The occurrence of rebellion often leaves behind an 
increased level of hostility between ethnic groups, and this may lead to the 
occurrence of inter-communal violence even after the end of rebellion. This 
so-to-speak “spill-over” effect of violence may be seen not only over time but 
also across space: an ethnic rebellion in one country, for example, may lead to 
the occurrence of inter-communal violence in another country. Dynamism 
between different types of violence, both within one country (over time) and 
across countries, is an interesting subject. It is however beyond the scope of the 
present thesis.
2. Four Problems: Critical Review of the Present Theoretical Literature
What are the causes of ethnic rebellion? Why do ethnic groups take up 
arms against the state? Various scholars have attempted to answer these 
questions in the past. However, there are some problems in the existing 
literature. In this section, four problems in the existing literature will be 
identified, namely (1) unitary actor assumption, (2) an unsolved controversy on
7 For the case of Sri Lanka, see for example Wilson 1988; Bose 1994.
8 For example, a large-scale anti-Serb and anti-UN riot occurred on 17 March 2004, which 
led to 19 dead, nearly 900 injured (out of which 700 are Serbs), as well as destruction or 
damage of public buildings and Serbian churches. See, for example, ICG 2004.
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the role of grievances, (3) lack of dynamics, and (4) lack of attention to the 
escalation of violence.
(1) Unitary Actor Assumption
The first problem in the present literature on ethnic rebellion is the 
unitary actor assumption. In many theoretical arguments and models that 
attempt to explain the occurrence of ethnic rebellion (whether they use the term 
“ethnic rebellion” or not), it is assumed that ethnic groups act as unitary actors 
and make collective decisions to take up arms. One can see this assumption 
most vividly in a number of game-theoretic accounts of ethnic rebellion that 
have been developed since the beginning of the 1990s. According to the game 
theoretic accounts, the violence is explained by some strategic dilemmas or 
calculations made by the ethnic groups. While scholars emphasise different 
mechanisms to explain the violence, they all share the fundamental assumption 
that ethnic groups act as unitary actors, make some kind of strategic 
calculations and decide to take up arms at some point as a result of such 
calculations. In order to illustrate this point, let us briefly review some 
theoretical explanations in this field. These include (1) information failures, (2) 
commitment problems, (3) security dilemmas, and (4) signalling games.
According to Lake and Rothchild (1998: 11), information failure 
occurs when individuals and groups possess private information and incentives 
to misrepresent that information because revealing true information undercuts 
the ability of the group to attain its interest. When information failures occur, 
groups cannot acquire or share the information necessary to bridge the 
bargaining gap between them, and ethnic groups will decide to take up arms 
even though negotiation is actually possible. Information failures become more 
acute when the state weakens, since it is often the states that can communicate
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and negotiate successfully between groups and thus help resolve information 
failures.
The concept of a “commitment problem” is proposed by scholars such 
as Fearon and Weingast. According to their explanation, ethnic conflict occurs 
because groups cannot make a credible commitment to uphold mutually 
beneficial agreements. Fearon (1998) argues that commitment problems arise 
from the differences in political power between groups. When one group is 
strong or growing stronger, this group cannot make a credible commitment to 
uphold mutually beneficial agreements since there is nothing to prevent it from 
breaking its promise in the future. As a consequence, a group that is weak or 
growing weaker has no incentive to believe their promises and would choose 
violent conflict over compromise. Weingast (1998) argues that the commitment 
problems arise from the uncertainty over the nature and intentions of other 
groups. According to him, one group may decide to take up arms if that group 
believes that there is even a very small chance that it may become a target of a 
genocidal attack.
Posen (1993) uses the concept of “security dilemma” for the analysis 
of violent ethnic conflict. According to him, the dilemma follows from the 
inability of the parties to know each other’s intentions directly. Therefore, even 
when one party expands its military capabilities strictly for defensive purposes, 
this can be taken as a threat to the other parties who in turn maintain and 
expand their military capacities. Because parties cannot know the intentions of 
others with certainty, what one does to enhance one’s own security causes 
reactions that, in the end, will make one less secure (Posen 1993: 104). When a 
spiralling arms race and hostility occurs as a result of security dilemma, it can 
lead to the pre-emptive attack: incentives to pre-empt arise when offence 
dominates defensive moves and thus the side that attacks first benefits
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significantly from such a move. If there are strong incentives to use force 
pre-emptively, and if there is an uncertainty about the intentions of others, an 
ethnic group will make a decision to start military activities in order to avoid 
possibly worse results.
Finally, Oberg (2002) uses what he calls a “signalling game” to 
explain the occurrence of ethnic war. In his model, the occurrence of ethnic 
war is explained by a sequence of strategic decisions made by the ethnic group 
and the government: firstly, the ethnic group at some point makes a demand 
coupled with a threat of force that challenges government authority; the 
government then decides whether or not to stand firm and take 
countermeasures against the ethnic group; the ethnic group then decides 
whether it should act on its threats and stand up to the government or would 
back down; the government then decides whether to impose its authority with 
force or concede the issue at stake. The outcome of ethnic war occurs only 
when both the ethnic group and the government decide to use force rather than 
give concessions, and thus he argues that the theory must explain not only why 
the group rebels but also why the government resists by force. In his model, 
such factors as the expected value for war, value for the issues at stake, costs of 
backing down (making concessions) explain the decisions made by the ethnic 
group and the government.
As the brief overview above shows, the unitary actor assumption is 
quite common among game theoretic explanations of ethnic conflict. While 
these scholars use different models to explain violent ethnic conflict, they all 
assume (often implicitly) that ethnic groups act as unitary actors, make some 
strategic calculations and decide to take up arms at some point. However, such 
an assumption is problematic, because it is hardly a realistic assumption. There 
are often disagreements between actors within the ethnic group on the actions
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they should take (or, on whether they should take some actions or not at all). 
This may lead to the intra-ethnic competitions among actors, which has been 
analysed by some scholars.9 What is more important than the existence of 
intra-group disagreements itself is the fact that those who advocate a violent 
action, often called “radicals” within the ethnic group, can freely do so without 
any formal decision-making or any intra-ethnic consensus within the ethnic 
group. These radicals may decide to take up arms even though many people in 
the ethnic group think that it does not serve the interest of the group.
Indeed, some authors have pointed out that the unitary actor 
assumption is problematic and that it constitutes a weakness of the theoretical 
arguments mentioned above (e.g. Brubaker & Laitin 1998). What has not been 
argued and explored so far, however, are the consequences of relaxing this 
assumption. After all, assumptions made in theoretical models often contain 
some kind of unrealistic element: theory always entails simplification of the 
reality and thus naturally less complex than the reality itself. If relaxing the 
assumption does not change our view on causes and dynamics of the conflict 
very much, there is no point in relaxing the assumption. What are the 
consequences of relaxing this assumption? What are the implications for the 
study of causes of violent ethnic conflict and for the policy recommendations 
to prevent the occurrence of violent conflict? These questions largely remain 
unanswered so far. This thesis thus attempts to address these questions through 
comparative case study and large-N analysis.
(2) A Controversy -  Do Grievances Matter?
The second problem is related to a controversy in the present literature
9 For example, see a series of analyses on what is called “ethnic outbidding,” e.g. 
Rabushka & Shepsle 1972; Hislope 1996.
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on the role of grievances for the occurrence of ethnic rebellion. On the one 
hand, many scholars have argued that the grievances held by the members of 
ethnic groups are important since the grievances motivate them to take up arms, 
and thus are one of the causes of ethnic rebellion. On the other hand, some 
scholars have presented a controversial argument that “grievances do not 
matter” based on the results of their large-N analyses.
Traditionally, many scholars have argued that the grievances are 
important. This is not limited to the field of political science. In the field of 
social psychology, for example, Tedeschi and Nesler (1993) use “grievances” 
as an intervening variable that explains the violent actions of individuals. 
According to them, the aggrieved individual resorts to aggression or violent 
attacks when he or she fails to settle a “grievance” formed because of some 
negative events which an outside party is blamed for.
Among political scientists, Gurr argues that grievances do matter for 
the occurrence of ethnic rebellion, even though other factors are also important. 
In his recent study, Gurr (2000: 65-95) presented a general framework for 
explaining and analysing ethnopolitical rebellion, which consists of four 
general categories of factors, namely (1) salience of group identity, (2) group 
incentives for collective action, (3) group capacity for collective action, and (4) 
domestic and international opportunities. As for the role of grievances, Gurr 
(2000: 163-164) argued that “collective disadvantages are the root cause of 
ethnopolitical action” and “redress of grievances about invidious treatment and 
the desire to gain advantages are principal sources of group incentives for 
action.” He conducted a large-N analysis using the Minorities at Risk (MAR) 
dataset, which he constructed with his colleagues, to support his argument. 
Dudley and Miller (1998), using the MAR dataset, also found that two types of 
grievances, namely political discrimination and lost autonomy, have a direct
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significant effect on the occurrence of ethnic rebellion.
Contrary to these arguments, however, some scholars have reached to 
the conclusion that “grievances do not matter.” This argument has been 
originally put forward by an economist Collier and his colleague Hoeffler 
(Collier 1999; Collier & Hoeffler 1999; Collier & Hoeffler 2001). Based on the 
results of large-N analysis, he argues that the objective indicators of 
“grievance” do not explain the occurrence of civil war and that indicators 
related to “greed” and “opportunity,” such as primary commodity export, male 
secondary education enrolment, per capita income and growth rate, have a 
significant effect on the onset of civil war. Fearon and Laitin (2003) also 
supported this conclusion, arguing that there is no evidence for “grievances” as 
a cause of civil war. According to Fearon and Laitin, what matters is the 
presence of the “right conditions of insurgency,” such as a weak state, 
mountainous terrain and instability in the centre. While their analyses are on 
the occurrence of civil war in general and not confined to ethnic conflict, the 
cases of civil war analysed by these authors include ethnic civil wars, and thus 
their explanation applies to ethnic rebellion as well.
Which camp is right in this controversy? At least as far as ethnic 
rebellion is concerned, one can argue that the controversy is not fully resolved, 
since both camps have some problems in their research designs and thus one 
cannot draw a definitive conclusion from the existing literature.
Firstly, the results of studies of Gurr and other scholars using the 
MAR data are not totally convincing, since their research design fails to 
include the variables related to the opportunities identified by scholars who 
argue that “the grievances do not matter.” For example, Gurr does not even 
include a variable which shows the most powerful and consistent results, 
namely the level of economic development (GDP per capita). He uses only the
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indicators of political system (democratic polity) and regime instability as 
variables related to domestic opportunity (Gurr 2000). The variables that relate 
to the opportunity structure for ethnic rebellion have not been fully included in 
the analyses using the MAR dataset, and they thus face a potential problem of 
omitted variable bias.10
Secondly, the results of analyses of those who argue that “grievances 
do not matter” are not fully convincing for the students of ethnic conflict for 
several reasons. Firstly, there is an implicit assumption that civil wars are 
homogenous: by treating all types of civil war equally as events that are 
explained by a single set of explanatory variables, these scholars implicitly 
assume that the events coded as an occurrence of “civil war” are homogenous 
and have the same causes. Some scholars criticise this assumption. For instance, 
Sambanis (2001: 265) argues that “the new economic theories of civil war do 
not consider if different war types have different causes, and their research 
designs, which aggregate all civil wars in a single category, implicitly suggest 
that there are no such differences.” The conclusions drawn at the aggregate 
level, therefore, may not be valid when one limits his analysis to the cases of 
ethnic rebellion. The second reason is the unit of analysis. In the large-N 
analyses of the occurrence of civil war, the unit of analysis is a country-year, 
and variables specific to the ethnic groups cannot be included in the statistical 
analyses. The factors that are found significant in the analyses using the MAR 
dataset, therefore, were not included in the analyses conducted by the authors 
who denied the importance of the grievances. While the conclusions drawn by 
the two camps are different, this difference thus might be an artefact of the 
different ways of operationalising “grievances.”
A controversy between the two camps about the role of “grievances”
10 For the problem of omitted variable bias, see King et al 1994:168-182.
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is not solved, and this thesis attempts to find an answer to this controversy. In 
order to do so, it is necessary to conduct a large-N analysis using both the 
MAR dataset and the opportunity-related variables that were found to be 
statistically significant in the earlier works on the onset of civil war.
(3) Lack of Dynamics
The third problem in the present literature is a lack of dynamics. Many 
of the theoretical arguments and models remain static. As Oberg (2002: 14-19) 
pointed out, most explanations for ethnic conflict are structural and focus 
primarily on the objective conditions that affect the decision by ethnic groups 
to take up arms against the government. When it comes to this point, scholars 
mentioned in the previous section, such as Gurr, Collier, Fearon and Laitin, 
share the same premise despite the different conclusions they reach on the role 
of grievances: both camps assume that the structural conditions affect the 
decision by the rebels to take up arms, and there is no dynamic element in their 
theoretical models.
This lack of dynamics is particularly visible in the theoretical 
arguments based on the large-N analyses, even though the tendency to focus on 
the structural conditions can be observed among scholars who do not conduct 
large-N analyses as well.11 It is because the research design of large-N analysis 
is based on the very assumption of structural determination: conditions or 
factors that affect the occurrence of ethnic conflict in the theoretical arguments 
are assumed to be independent from and exogenous to the dependent variable. 
Indeed, one will not be able to conduct a standard large-N analysis (such as 
regression analysis) once one assumes that the explanatory factors are not
11 Brown, for example, pointed out that the literature on internal conflict had primarily 
focused on the underlying factors or permissive conditions. See Brown 1997: 4.
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independent and exogenous.
While this thesis does not deny the validity of the structural 
determination, it will attempt to make a model more dynamic in two ways as a 
remedy to the problem of lack of dynamics. One way to make a model more 
dynamic is to consider an interaction between the rebels and the state 
authorities against which the rebels take up arms. For example, O’Leray and 
Tirman (2007: 12) criticised that the econometric analyses of civil war are 
“analytically one-sided,” asking “why are states -  rather than just insurgents -  
not modelled as suppliers of violent exploitation or predation, a perspective 
that would seem more consistent with the genre of economic theorizing from 
which their work flows?” Oberg’s recipe for the problem of lack of dynamism 
is to “bring the government’s calculations back into the equation, and make the 
argument strategic” (Oberg 2002: 18). Indeed, more than 40 years ago, 
Eckstein (1965: 145) pointed out that it is important to examine the role of the 
state authorities in explaining internal war: “One crucial choice that needs to be 
made is whether to put emphasis upon characteristics of the insurgents or 
incumbents, upon the side that rebels or the side that is rebelled against. Not 
surprisingly, the existing literature concentrates very largely on the rebels... 
This would seem to be only natural: after all, it is the rebels who rebel. At least 
some writings suggest, however, that characteristics of the incumbents ... must 
be considered jointly with characteristics of the insurgents, indeed perhaps 
even emphasized more strongly.” His argument still remains valid and 
applicable to the study of ethnic rebellion. While he presented it as a “crucial 
choice,” it is not an either-or choice: one can, or indeed should, consider both 
sides to fully explain the occurrence of ethnic rebellion. This thesis thus 
attempts to bring the state reactions back in the theoretical arguments, while 
also paying attention to the conditions that motivate and enable the rebels to
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take up arms.
Another way to make a model more dynamic is to take time more 
seriously. Theoretical models based on the idea of structural determination are 
fundamentally static, because it is not assumed that the time (duration of some 
events, for example) affects the occurrence of ethnic rebellion. However, this 
becomes important when one conceptualises “grievances.” In many theoretical 
arguments based on the large-N analyses, the grievances are operationalised by 
some objective indicators (such as gini coefficients that measure the degree of 
economic inequality in the society), and thus it is assumed that the level o f 
grievances will remain constant over time as long as the structural conditions 
do not change. However, such static conceptualisation of grievances may not 
fully capture the dynamic element of grievances: people may become more and 
more frustrated as the time goes by, even if the situation does not change (and 
thus the objective conditions do not change). Indeed, people may be more 
frustrated precisely because the things do not change (and thus things do not 
get better). The following chapters, therefore, will attempt to conceptualise a 
dynamic element of grievances.
(4) Lack of Attention to the Escalation of Violence
The fourth problem in the present literature is the lack of attention to 
the escalation of violence. This is visible both in the game-theoretic accounts 
of ethnic rebellion and the large-N analyses of civil war. In the large-N 
analyses of the occurrence of civil war, for example, the dependent variable is 
binary (0 or 1), and thus the occurrence of violence is conceptualised as 
dichotomous: there is a peace (0), or civil war (1). Under such a research 
design, the occurrence of civil war is inevitably conceptualised as a one-shot 
event. The peace lasts until some year (y=0 while t=0, 1, .... n), and then the
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civil war occurs in the next period (y=l when t=n+l). In a statistical analysis 
where the “occurrence” of civil war is regressed on the explanatory variables, 
therefore, the objective conditions observed in the year of the “occurrence” will 
be associated with the onset of civil war and will thus be judged as “causes” of 
civil war. This conceptualisation of large-scale violence as a one-shot event is 
also seen in the game-theoretic accounts of ethnic rebellion. The unitary actor 
assumption on ethnic groups discussed above affects this conceptualisation. 
Recall that the ethnic group is assumed to be a unitary actor and it is assumed 
to take a collective decision to take up arms at some point. The occurrence of 
large-scale violence is, therefore, a one-shot event, which occurs when the 
ethnic group makes a decision. The peace lasts until the very moment when the 
ethnic group decides to take up arms, and the war occurs once such a decision 
is made by the ethnic group.
This conceptualisation may be less problematic in the case of 
international warfare, because the state normally has a formal decision-making 
body, and a large amount of financial, human and military resources will be 
instantly mobilised once the decision is made by the government to go to war. 
One can thus draw a line between peace and war, and can assume that the 
occurrence of war is a one-shot event, caused by the decision of the 
government to go into war. This conceptualisation becomes more problematic, 
however, when it comes to ethnic rebellion or indeed to internal war in general, 
because the violence can be initiated by a handful of radicals, and can start 
from very low intensity, such as sporadic bombing attacks. If the violence starts 
from a low level, there must be an escalation of violence when a large-scale 
conflict occurs. The theory that attempts to explain the occurrence of 
large-scale violence, therefore, must answer two distinct questions, namely (1) 
why do these radicals take up arms in the first place? and (2) why does a
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low-intensity conflict escalate into a large-scale one? It may well be the case 
that the factors that explain the occurrence of low-intensity rebellion would not 
explain the escalation of violence.
The possibility that the occurrence of large-scale violent conflict can 
be preceded by the occurrence of low-intensity violence is particularly 
problematic for the large-N analyses of civil war, because this possibility 
suggests a potential problem of misidentification of structural causes of the 
conflict. If the occurrence of large-scale conflict is a joint outcome of the 
occurrence of the low-intensity conflict and its escalation into large-scale one, 
the factors that cause the low-level conflict should be considered as part of the 
causes of conflict, but these factors are not captured by the statistical analysis 
that only takes into account the moment when the conflict become a large-scale 
one. In addition, the occurrence of the low-intensity violence may even cause 
the occurrence of escalation: indeed, Part IV of this thesis will argue that the 
occurrence of low-intensity rebellion tends to incite military repressions by the 
state authorities and the repression in turn tends to cause the escalation of 
rebellion. Then, one cannot simply ignore the occurrence of low-intensity 
violence even when one attempts to explain the occurrence of large-scale 
conflict, while scholars conducting large-N analyses of civil war would simply 
assign the value of 0 as long as the violence remains a low-intensity one.
This does not mean, however, that all large-scale conflicts start from 
low-intensity violence. In some cases, a large-scale conflict may well occur 
suddenly without much escalation of violence involved. Indeed, the present 
thesis will show that some ethnic rebellions start from low-intensity violence 
while others are large-scale ones from the outset, and this variance itself is 
interesting and requires a theoretical explanation.
Because of the lack of attention to the escalation of violence, the
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mechanisms that account for the relationship between the low-level violence 
and the high-level one have been mostly ignored in the existing literature. 
Examining such mechanisms, therefore, will be a useful contribution to the 
understanding of the occurrence of large-scale ethnic rebellion.
3. Three-Step Approach for the Analysis of Ethnic Rebellion
The critical review of the existing theoretical literature conducted 
above suggests the necessity to take a three-step approach for the analysis of 
ethnic rebellion. In this section, this three-step approach is discussed.
(1) Initial Level of Rebellion
Firstly, one must identify the initial level of rebellion, because this 
suggests the different tasks for explaining the occurrence of large-scale ethnic 
rebellion. If the ethnic rebellion starts from low-intensity violence, one should 
firstly explain why the low-intensity violence occurs in the first place, and then 
explain why the low-intensity violence escalates, or does not escalate, into a 
large-scale one. If the initial level of rebellion is low, therefore, one should 
explain (1) the onset of low-intensity rebellion, and (2) the escalation of the 
rebellion into a large-scale one. If the ethnic rebellion immediately starts on a 
large-scale, on the other hand, one should explain why the rebellion occurs, 
and this should suffice as an explanation of the occurrence of large-scale ethnic 
rebellion. The relationship between the initial level, onset of the initial 
rebellion, escalation and the final outcome (“onset” of large-scale rebellion) is 
presented in Table 1.1.
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Table 1.1 Initial Level, Onset and Escalation
Initial Level
Onset of Initial 
Rebellion
Escalation
"Onset" of large-scale 
Rebellion
Low Yes Yes Yes (1)
Low Yes No No (0)
Low No - No (0)
High Yes - Yes (1)
High No - No (0)
This table shows how the classic binary coding of “onset” of 
large-scale conflict mixes outcomes of different dynamics into the same 
category. On the one hand, the onset of large-scale conflict (normally coded as 
1) can be either an outcome of the onset of high-intensity rebellion at the first 
place or a joint outcome of the onset of low-intensity rebellion and the 
occurrence of escalation. On the other hand, the non-occurrence of the 
large-scale conflict (coded as 0) can mean either lack of the initial rebellion at 
all (whether it is high or low intensity) or the occurrence of low-intensity 
rebellion which does not experience an escalation. By taking into account the 
initial level of rebellion, therefore, one can conduct a more nuanced analysis of 
the occurrence of ethnic rebellion.
The attention to the initial level of rebellion naturally raises one 
question: why do some ethnic groups experience an onset of low-intensity 
rebellion while others experience an immediate onset of large-scale rebellion? 
Because of the lack of attention to this aspect, this question has been mostly 
ignored in the existing literature. In order to answer this question, one must 
examine who actually decide to take up arms among the ethnic group, and what
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are the resources available to them. This will be the task of Part II.
(2) Onset of the Initial Rebellion
The second step for the analysis of ethnic rebellion is to analyse and 
explain the onset of the initial rebellion. Whether the initial level of rebellion is 
low or high, the large-scale conflict cannot occur without the occurrence of 
initial rebellion. Explaining the occurrence of initial rebellion is, therefore, a 
central task for the explanation of ethnic rebellion. To fulfil this task, one 
should analyse why those who took up arms actually decided to do so. This 
will be the task of Part III. The controversy on the role of “grievances” in the 
existing literature is related to this question, and an answer to this controversy 
will be sought in Part HI as well.
The attention to the initial level of rebellion discussed above raises 
one question related to the second step: do the low-intensity rebellion and 
large-scale rebellion have the same causes or not? Because the issue of initial 
level of rebellion itself has not been addressed much in the existing literature, 
most analyses on the causes of the rebellion ignore the difference between the 
onset of low-intensity rebellion and high-intensity rebellion. Therefore, Part HI 
will attempt to examine whether the onsets of low-intensity rebellions and 
large-scale ones have the different causes or not.
(3) Escalation of the Rebellion
The third step for the analysis of ethnic rebellion is to examine the 
dynamics of escalation of the rebellion from the low-intensity one to the 
large-scale one. The onset of the low-intensity rebellion does not necessarily 
mean that it will escalate into large-scale one: some will do so while others 
remain low-intensity ones or may de-escalate without experiencing an
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escalation into large-scale conflict. What are the causes and determinants of the 
occurrence of escalation? Part IV will attempt to examine the mechanisms of 
escalation and to answer this question. This task is, of course, limited to the 
cases where the rebellion starts from a low-intensity one, because by definition 
one will see the escalation of rebellion only when it starts from a low-intensity 
one.
Examining the mechanisms of escalation is particularly important for 
learning more nuanced lessons for the prevention of large-scale conflict. The 
analysis based on the binary coding of the occurrence of large-scale conflict 
will only suggest how to prevent the occurrence of conflict at all. The 
three-step approach adopted in this thesis will suggest that there are actually 
two steps to prevent the occurrence of large-scale conflict. Firstly, one can 
attempt to prevent the occurrence of the initial rebellion. In addition, however, 
the three-step approach suggests that one can attempt to prevent the escalation 
of rebellion if the initial level of rebellion is low. This latter point cannot be 
learned as long as one adopts the binary conception of the occurrence of 
large-scale rebellion, and this is where the present thesis can possibly make 
some contributions to the study of conflict prevention.
Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to present the theoretical premises for the 
thesis. This chapter firstly defined the key term for the thesis, “ethnic 
rebellion.” It then presented a critical review of the theoretical works in the 
existing literature, identifying four major problems. It finally presented a 
three-step approach for the analysis of ethnic conflict, which would examine
(1) initial level of rebellion, (2) onset of the initial rebellion, and (3) escalation.
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The present thesis will take this three-step approach in analysing the causes and 
mechanisms of ethnic rebellion. Before it embarks on the empirical analysis, 
however, the next chapter will address the methodological premises for the 
present thesis.
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Chapter 2 
Methodological Premises: Large-N analysis and the 
ex-Yugoslav Case Study
Introduction
The present thesis adopts a “mixed methods” approach that combines 
large-N analyses and in-depth case studies. After explaining why it is needed, 
this chapter briefly discusses the MAR dataset which will be the basis for the 
large-N analysis in this thesis. It will then discuss the four cases in the 
ex-Yugoslav region for in-depth case studies. Finally, it will present the 
structure of the rest of the thesis, which reflects the three-step approach 
discussed in Chapter 1 and the mixed methods approach discussed in this 
chapter.
1. Methodology: Why Mixed Methods?
The present thesis adopts a mixed methods approach1 and attempts to 
conduct both relatively intensive case-studies and large-N analyses to support 
the theoretical arguments. A reader may ask, “why mixed methods?” Indeed, 
the usage of the mixed methods has been relatively rare in the study of ethnic 
conflict. On the one hand, a vast volume of studies on ethnic conflict have been 
produced without any statistical analysis. Some studies even mention an 
extremely large number of cases qualitatively without resorting to statistical 
techniques.2 On the other hand, when the large-N studies are conducted, these
1 For the excellent review of the discussion on the mixed methods in political science, see 
Lieberman 2005.
See, for example, Horowitz 2001, which is based on the reports of “approximately 150
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studies often lack a qualitative analysis at all. Oberg (2002: 77), for example, 
decided not to conduct any intensive case study because case study methods 
have difficulties in handling probabilistic propositions. Even when the 
qualitative case study is combined with the large-N analyses, the former is 
often treated as a mere illustration, and thus is not considered as an integral 
part of the original research. Gurr (2000), for example, includes a few pages of 
descriptive “sketches” on a total of 14 communal groups in the world, but these 
sketches are written by different authors (experts on each case) in the MAR 
project and are far too brief to be considered as an original analysis of these 
cases.
In the present thesis, mixed methods are adopted for several reasons. 
As for the large-N analysis, the theoretical aspiration of the thesis requires it. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, this thesis has identified some problems in the 
existing literature, and it attempts to develop theoretical arguments that address 
these problems. In order to generalise in a convincing manner, it is necessary to 
conduct some kind of large-N analysis, due to the potential problem of 
selection bias. As Geddes has rightly pointed out, the question of how far one 
can generalise the argument cannot be answered as long as one sticks to a few 
cases; one can only answer that question when one broadens the scope of the 
analysis sufficiently.3 Another problem with the small-N case study is 
identified by Lijphart (1971: 685) as the problem of “many variables, small 
number of cases.” A strength of the large-N analysis relative to the small-N 
analysis is “its ability to simultaneously estimate the effects of rival
riots in 50 countries” (p. 29). For criticism of Horowitz on methodological grounds, see 
Laitin 2001b.
3 Geddes 1990; Geddes 2003: 89-129. Of course, this does not mean that one cannot make 
a generalised theoretical argument without conducting large-N analyses. One can create or 
propose a general theoretical argument based on single-N or small-N studies and one can 
even test the hypotheses with a qualitative case study. See, e.g., Van Evera 1997: 55-67; 
Lieberman 2005: 442-443.
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explanations and/or control variables on an outcome of interest” (Lieberman 
2005: 438).
Case studies are useful, however, because large-N methods also have 
some weaknesses. As is often pointed out, correlation and causation are not the 
same. Goldthorpe (2001: 2) pointed out, for example, that it is “widely 
recognized in both philosophy and statistics” that “correlation -  or, more 
generally, association -  does not imply causation” even though “causation must 
in some way or other imply association.” The statistical methods do confirm 
the existence of correlation, but not necessarily causation. It is the theory which 
clarifies the causal mechanisms that (are assumed to) underlie the association. 
Let us quote Goldthorpe (2001: 14) again: “Causal explanations cannot be 
arrived at through statistical methodology alone: a subject-matter input is also 
required in the form of background knowledge and, crucially, theory.” The 
crucial task is, therefore, to make a theory convincing. Here, the case study can 
play a significant role. One of the strengths of the case study is that one can 
conduct “process-tracing,” i.e. exploring “the chain of events or the 
decision-making process by which initial case conditions are translated into 
case outcomes” (Van Evera 1997: 54-55, 64-67), and thus can unwrap the 
cause-effect link in the real cases. Intensive case-studies thus can make 
generalised arguments empirically more convincing. As Van Evera argued, 
“large-/? methods tell us more about whether hypotheses hold than why they 
hold. Case studies say more about why they hold.”4
4 Van Evera 1997: 55 (emphasis added). Of course, not all scholars would conduct a 
case-study to make a theory more convincing. Others would say that they can use formal 
modelling to make a theory logically convincing and internally consistent. See, for 
example, Laitin’s “tripartite methodology” which consists of statistics, formalization and 
narrative (Laitin 2002). The strength of the formal modelling is its ability to provide “an 
internally consistent logic that accounts for the stipulated relationships among abstract 
variables” and assure us that “our causal stories are coherent and noncontradictory.” See 
Laitin 2002: 631. One may still argue, however, that the assurance of the internal 
consistency does not guarantee that it is empirically convincing.
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This thesis also aspires to make some contribution to the accumulation 
of knowledge in the area study of the ex-Yugoslav region by conducting a 
theory-driven “controlled” comparative analysis. As some scholars have 
pointed out, “controlled comparisons” have been relatively few in the study of 
ethnic conflict in general. For example, Varshney (2001, 2002) argues that 
there has been too much attention on the cases of serious ethnic conflict and 
that analysts have not explored the factors, conditions or variables that explain 
both the occurrence and non-occurrence of the conflict. Brubaker and Laitin 
(1998: 435) also pointed out that “controlled comparisons have been relatively 
few, especially those comparing regions suffering from ethnic violence with 
regions in which similar ethnic conflicts have not issued in violence.” As for 
the ex-Yugoslav region, Brubaker and Laitin (1998: 436) suggested that the 
“breakup of Yugoslavia has most often been treated as a single complex 
interconnected case, but if we had adequately disaggregated data, it could be 
studied as a set of cases.” The present thesis is indeed an attempt to move 
toward this direction, i.e. to treat cases of ethnic rebellion in the ex-Yugoslav 
region separately and to explore commonalities and differences between the 
cases. By doing so, this thesis attempts to contribute to the further and clearer 
understanding of the dynamics of ethnic conflict in the ex-Yugoslav region.
2. The MAR Dataset
This section briefly discusses the MAR dataset, which will be used for 
the large-N analyses in this thesis. According to the codebook of the MAR 
dataset, the MAR Project is “an independent, university-based research project 
that monitors and analyses the status and conflicts of politically-active 
communal groups in all countries in the world with a current population of at
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least 500,000” and it is “designed to provide information in a standardized 
format that will aid comparative research and contribute to the understanding 
and peaceful accommodation of conflicts involving communal groups.”5 The 
MAR dataset contains various kinds of information on over 270 ethnic groups 
in the world that are judged as being “minorities at risk.” According to the 
codebook of the MAR dataset, a “minority at risk” refers to “an ethnopolitical 
group (non-state communal group) that (1) collectively suffers, or benefits 
from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-a-vis other groups in a society;
(2) and/or - collectively mobilizes in defence or promotion of its self-defined 
interests.”6 Since the MAR project was initiated by Ted Robert Gurr in 1986, 
some ethnic groups have been added and others have been eliminated from the 
dataset, based on the judgments made by the group of scholars of the MAR 
project.
One should pay attention to the presence of this selection process, 
because there are some questions that one cannot address by using the MAR 
dataset due to the selection process. For example, it is assumed that the 
communal groups included in the MAR dataset have already developed their 
communal or ethnic identity. This assumption in turn prohibits us from 
addressing some questions such as the following: why and how do some 
groups develop their own ethnic identity while others fail to do so? Note that 
this is one of the most important questions asked in the study of nationalism 
and ethnicity. Since it is methodologically assumed that the communal or
5 The codebook of the MAR dataset, as well as the qualitative and quantitative data 
constructed by the MAR project team, can be downloaded from the website of the MAR 
project at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) 
and the University of Maryland at: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/index.htm.
6 See the codebook of the MAR, “Minorities at Risk: Dataset Users Manual, 030703” 
available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/index.htm. See also Gurr 2000: 7-13, on 
the definition of ethnopolitical groups “at risk” and the operational rules for the inclusion 
of the groups in the dataset.
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ethnic identities already exist, one simply cannot address the question of the 
origin of communal and ethnic identity by using the MAR dataset.
One should also pay attention to the way the variables are coded. The 
overwhelming majority of the variables included in the MAR dataset are coded 
as binary or ordinal categorical variables. Furthermore, the coding of the 
variables is far from easy and automatic, requiring careful qualitative judgment 
by the specialists on the area. Let us take one example: a variable ECPOV, 
“Severity of economic disadvantages (1990-95)” is coded according to the 
following scale: 0 - No disadvantages; 1 - Slightly disadvantaged; 2 - 
Substantially disadvantaged; 3 - Very seriously disadvantaged; 99 - No basis 
for judgment.7 What is the difference between “substantially” disadvantaged 
and “very seriously” disadvantaged? The criteria are not very clear from the 
codebook, and the same fact (presence of a certain level of disadvantage) can 
be coded as 1, 2, or 3 according to the qualitative judgment of the person(s) 
who code specific cases. Even when the absolute number is the basis of 
judgment, the coding can be equally difficult, because it is sometimes difficult 
to establish a “fact” itself in a conflict situation. Let us take an example of a 
REBEL variable (Rebellion Index). According to the codebook, the rebels must 
have more than 1,000 armed fighters to be coded “6” of the rebellion score. But 
it is sometimes difficult to obtain correct information, since rebels often tend to 
exaggerate the strength of their forces. In some cases, the reliable data on the 
number of fighters may not be found at all.
Indeed, the MAR project group admitted that they have “not yet 
assessed inter-coder reliability nor have its indicators been systematically 
screened for internal consistency.”8 They claim that coders are “well-trained”
7 See the codebook of the MAR: 39.
8 See the codebook of the MAR: 8.
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students who “undergo a rigorous training period,” that all coding is reviewed 
by senior personnel and that “overall the assessment of coding reliability and 
validity is satisfactory.” 9 They however admitted that “tests of internal 
consistency by Matthew Kocher of the University of Chicago in spring 1999 
identified some problems with coding,” even though “the MAR staff 
immediately moved to address these concerns.”10 Since the coding of the data 
relies heavily on the qualitative judgment, which would be extremely difficult 
at least in some cases, one should note that the problem of measurement error 
could be potentially serious when one uses the MAR dataset.
To address the potential problems of the MAR dataset, some authors 
have made alterations when they use the MAR dataset for their analysis. Oberg 
(2002: 94), for example, added a large number o f ethnic groups to the MAR 
dataset to address “potential problems with sample selection bias built into the 
Minorities at Risk data set” and to increase a number of ethnic groups from 285 
to 653. Metz (2005: 6) used the MAR dataset to select cases when he made a 
list of rebellion episodes, but then he conducted an extensive “content 
analysis,” using six secondary sources, to (a) confirm that the cases in the 
dataset represent actual rebellions, and (b) to confirm that the rebellions were 
indeed ethnic. After a content analysis, he indeed found that 24 cases that were 
originally in the MAR dataset were discarded either because of the absence of 
evidence that any rebellion had taken place or because they were anti-colonial 
rebellions (Metz 2005: 13). The present thesis also conducted a survey on the 
organisations that were behind the first onset o f rebellion activities (see 
Chapter 3 for the details) and indeed found that a  few cases are difficult to 
regard as an episode of “rebellion” as defined in the previous chapter. Let us
9 See the codebook of the MAR: 8.
10 See the codebook of the MAR: 8.
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take an example of the Vietnamese in Cambodia. For this ethnic group, a 
rebellion score (REBEL) takes a value of 1 in the year 2000. What happened in 
2000 in Cambodia, as far as the author could discover, was that “a group of 
over 20 ethnic Vietnamese fisherman [sic] killed 3 government fisheries 
officials in Kandal province and wounded 3 others during a late-night 
government raid on illegal fishing practices on the Tonle Sap river” (BDHRL 
2001). While it was indeed committed by members of the ethnic group against 
the government officials, this act does not seem to have been committed by an 
ethnic organisation with a political purpose, and seems rather a spontaneous 
reaction against the threat of arrest. If this is true and there was no other 
episode of violence in the same year, it cannot be regarded as “rebellion” at 
least according to the definition in the present thesis.
In the present thesis, however, an adjustment or re-coding of the MAR 
dataset is not conducted. As for the issue of sample selection, what is important 
is the method of sample selection rather than the number of cases. Therefore, 
simply adding more cases to the dataset does not solve the question of the 
selection bias caused by the sampling method (if any) unless the addition of the 
cases is conducted in such a way that it can remedy the problem. Otherwise, 
the addition of more cases can be even problematic, since this may indeed 
favour the argument of the person who adds the cases. Without identifying a 
problem in the sampling method and a remedy to solve the problem, therefore, 
one should not simply add cases to the original dataset. As far as the present 
thesis is concerned, the sampling method does not particularly favour the 
argument made in the thesis, and thus does not pose a serious challenge against 
the inferences made based on the MAR dataset.
A check on the validity of the coding was not conducted for a rather 
practical reason. If a validity check should be conducted, it should be
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systematic, based on clear criteria, and comprehensive, covering all relevant 
observations, since a partial and chaotic correction of the dataset would simply 
compound the problem of the inter-coder reliability. Note that the present thesis 
deals with the onset as well as escalation of the rebellion of all ethnic groups 
included in the dataset in the period from 1945 to 2000. An attempt to check 
the validity of the coding of the key dependent variable, a rebellion index 
(REBEL), would involve checking the validity of the coding of 1442 instances 
across space and time. It is practically impossible to conduct such a large-scale 
survey alone in a reasonable time. The MAR project can mobilise far more 
financial and human resources for the coding.
It was thus decided to use the MAR dataset as it is. The large-N 
analysis conducted in the present thesis, therefore, depends on the MAR 
dataset, even though it also uses some variables constructed by the author from 
scratch (Chapter 3) and some variables taken from other sources. If the 
theoretical arguments are supported by some large-N analysis, therefore, this 
suggests that the theoretical arguments are valid as far as the ethnic groups and 
countries covered by the MAR dataset are concerned, assuming that the 
perception and the qualitative judgments of the scholars (coders) in the MAR 
project are right and consistent across space and time.
3. The ex-Yugoslav Cases: Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia and Macedonia
The present thesis will analyse four cases of recent ethnic rebellions in 
the ex-Yugoslav region, namely the Serb rebellions in Croatia (1991-) and 
Bosnia (1992-) and the Albanian rebellions in Kosovo (Serbia, 1996-) and 
Macedonia (2001). In addition to the fact that the controlled comparisons that 
treat these cases separately have been relatively few as Brubaker and Laitin
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observed (see p. 44 of this thesis), there is one strong reason for conducing 
comparative analyses of these four cases: while these four cases all occurred in 
the overall context of the dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia, these cases show 
remarkable differences when it comes to the subject of the present thesis. 
Firstly, one can observe a difference in the initial level of rebellion: the initial 
level of rebellion was very high in the case of the Serb rebellions in both 
Croatia and Bosnia, while it was quite low in the case of the Albanian 
rebellions in both Kosovo and Macedonia. Secondly, when one compares the 
two Albanian rebellions in Kosovo and Macedonia, one also finds a difference 
between these two cases: while the Albanian rebellion in Kosovo escalated into 
a large-scale one, the Albanian rebellion in Macedonia remained a relatively 
low-intensity one and then de-escalated after a peace agreement. For the 
present thesis, therefore, there is a variance in the dependent variables among 
these four cases, which make it possible and interesting to conduct in-depth 
comparative analyses. In this section, a brief overview of the four cases is 
presented as an introduction to the case studies.
In Croatia, the Serbs constituted a sizeable minority of the population 
(12% in 1991), while the Croats constituted an absolute majority of the 
population (78% in 1991).11 Croatia had its first democratic elections in April- 
May 1990, and the opposition party led by Franjo Tudjman won the absolute 
majority of the seats in the parliament and established a new government 
(Tudjman was elected as the new President of the Republic by the 
newly-constituted parliament). 12 After its inauguration, the Tudjman 
government started implementing a series of nationalistic policies, such as the 
introduction of a new national flag, coat of arms and police uniform, the
11 For the census results in Croatia from 1961 to 1991, see Woodward 1995: 33.
12 For the details of the first democratic elections in Croatia, see Grde§i6 et al 1991.
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constitutional amendment that made the usage of Latin script obligatory, and 
the adoption of a new constitution that defined Croatia as “the national state of 
the Croatian nation.”13 At the same time, the Tudjman government, together 
with the Slovenian government, pursued the policy of independence from the 
Yugoslav Federation. Against these policies, the Serb politicians started to 
organise the Serbs in Croatia, to create a Serb territorial unit within Croatia and 
to claim its secession from Croatia. They started preparing for the rebellion 
against the Croatian government, and the full-scale rebellion was started after 
the declaration of sovereignty by the Croatian government on 25 June 1991.
In 1991, Bosnia was a multi-ethnic republic with three “constituent 
nations,” namely Muslims (43.7% in 1991), Serbs (31.4%) and Croats 
(17.3%).14 Bosnia had its first democratic elections in November-December 
1990, and the three newly-established nationalist parties that represent three 
ethnic groups won the elections.15 These three parties formed a coalition 
government and established a power-sharing regime after the elections. This 
coalition government, however, collapsed in October 1991, when a 
“memorandum on the sovereignty of Bosnia” was adopted in the parliament 
while the Serb politicians opposed it and left the parliament before the voting.16 
After this event, the Serb politicians started its centrifugal actions, establishing 
its own institutions (such as the Serb Parliament and the Bosnian Serb 
Republic) and conducting a Serb referendum on the decision to remain in the 
Yugoslav Federation. At the same time, the Serb politicians started preparing
1 For the details of the political developments after the elections in Croatia, see e.g. 
Silber & Little 1996; Cohen 1993; Glenny 1996.
14 For the census results in Bosnia from 1961 to 1991, see Woodward 1995: 33.
15 For the details of the first democratic elections in Bosnia, see Amautovic 1996.
16 For the details of the adoption of “memorandum” and the political developments after 
that, see e.g. Burg & Shoup 1999: 76-127. A full text of the “memorandum” as well as the 
counter proposals by the other parties in the Bosnian Parliament can be found in Borba, 
1991/10/16.
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for the rebellion, and the full-scale civil war started after the Bosnian 
parliament declared the independence of Bosnia on 3 March 1992 based on the 
results of the national referendum on the independence of Bosnia.
Under the constitutional arrangement of the communist regime, Serbia 
had two “autonomous provinces,” Vojvodina and Kosovo, within its territory. 
While the Serbs constituted an absolute majority of the total population of the 
republic of Serbia (65.8% in 1991) and the Albanians constituted a significant 
minority (17.2%), the Albanians constituted an absolute majority within the 
autonomous province of Kosovo (about 90% in 1991) and the Serbs constituted
17a minority within Kosovo (about 10%). Large demonstrations by the Kosovo 
Albanians occurred in 1968, after the downfall of a conservative leader 
Rankovid in 1966 who had firmly rejected their request for autonomy (Lampe 
1996: 296). The Yugoslav federal authorities made a series of concessions to 
the Albanians after 1968, including the increase of the Albanian officials in the 
provincial authorities, right to raise the Albanian flag, permission to establish a 
university with instruction in the Albanian language, and so on (Pipa 1989). 
Republics and Autonomous Provinces became almost fully equal under the 
1974 Federal Constitution, according to which the two autonomous provinces 
gained full autonomy over their parliaments, budgets and judicial systems, and 
the governments of the provinces could veto any policy of the Republic of 
Serbia while the Serbian government did not have equivalent powers over 
decisions made by the provincial governments.18 The Kosovo Albanians, 
however, again waged demonstrations in 1981 after the death of Tito, after 
which the radical Albanians were purged from the party or arrested by the 
authorities.19 The inter-ethnic relations in Kosovo started to deteriorate
17 For the census results in Serbia from 1961 to 1991, see Woodward 1995: 34.
18 Woodward 1995: 40,65. See also Vickers 1998: 178-181.
19 As for the 1981 demonstrations and their aftermath, see e.g. Vickers 1998: 197-217.
52
seriously after the rise of Milosevic to the power in the Republic of Serbia in 
1987, who started implementing radical policies against the Albanians in 
Kosovo, such as the purge of Albanians from the workplaces and the effective 
annulment of the autonomous status of Kosovo. Against the Milosevic regime, 
the Albanians organised themselves under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, 
but he chose a policy of peaceful resistance, and thus it did not lead to the 
armed conflict. However, an underground guerrilla organisation established 
mainly by the Albanian diaspora in the Western Europe emerged and started its 
violent activities in 1996. The rebellion escalated into a large-scale conflict in 
1998, which culminated in the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999.
In Macedonia, the Macedonians constituted an absolute majority of 
the population (66.5% in 1994), while the Albanians constituted a minority 
(22.9% in 1994).20 Macedonia had its first democratic elections in November 
1990. No party won the majority of the seats in the parliament, which led to the 
election of Kiro Gligorov as President of Macedonia and the establishment of 
non-party “expert cabinet” led by Nikola Kljusev, including three Albanian 
ministers.21 Since the transition to multi-party system in 1990, Macedonia 
maintained a power-sharing coalition government between Macedonian and 
Albanian parties, despite the change of party composition of the government. 
Macedonia thus did not see a serious deterioration of the inter-ethnic relations 
as Serbia did, even though there were several incidents in the 1990s.22 
Macedonia also remained calm when it faced a serious challenge posed by the 
massive influx of the Albanian refugees from Kosovo in 1998 and 1999. In 
2001, however, an underground guerrilla organisation appeared in the
20 For the census results in Macedonia from 1961 to 1991, see Woodward 1995: 33. For 
the census results in 1994, see Peny 1997: 226.
21 As for the results of the elections in 1990, see Perry 1997.
52 For a good overview of the events in the 1990s in Macedonia, see Daskalovski 2005: 
51-79.
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north-western part of Macedonia and started its rebellion activities. The 
rebellion remained a relatively low-intensity one, however, and was 
de-escalated after the Ohrid peace agreement in August 2001.
While this thesis treats these four cases separately, this does not mean 
that they were not connected to each other. On the contrary, one can instantly 
notice a number of linkages between the cases. First of all, the Yugoslav and 
Serbian authorities, particularly the Yugoslav military leadership and the 
Serbian elite led by Milosevic, were deeply involved in the organisation of the 
Serb rebellions in Croatia and Bosnia. Given that the Milosevic regime also 
played a central role in the escalation of rebellion in Kosovo, one can argue 
that the same actors, most notably Milosevic and his associates, were involved 
in three out of the four cases examined here. Indeed, Gow (2003) argues that 
the primary and defining element in the wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo 
was the Serbian state project to create a new equation of territory and 
inhabitants, i.e. to establish the new borders of a set of territories linked to 
Serbia, which would be “for” the Serbs and would mostly be ethnically pure.
Secondly, actors in these four cases seem to have learned considerably 
from the experience of other countries. For example, the organisers of rebellion 
in Croatia were the politicians from the Serb Democratic Party {Srpska 
Demokratska Stranka, SDS), and they were helping their fellows in Bosnia to 
establish a political party with the same name, the Serb Democratic Party in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDS-BiH), which was far more successful in the first 
elections in 1990 (see Chapter 4). When the SDS-BiH politicians started to 
prepare for the rebellion, they almost completely imitated what their fellows 
did in Croatia, who started to rebel a year earlier (see Chapter 4 for the details). 
In a similar vein, the organisers of rebellion in Macedonia were veterans of the 
Albanian rebellion in Kosovo (see Chapter 4). Indeed, the rebel organisations
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in Kosovo and Macedonia had the same acronym in Albanian (UQK). The 
learning process may explain not only the similarity between the cases but also 
the difference. For example, the Macedonian state authorities took a 
conciliatory stance towards the Albanian rebels while the Serbian authorities 
took repressive measures (see Chapter 8 and 9). One may well argue that 
Trajkovski, then President of Macedonia, learned from the Serbian experience 
that the repressive measures can be counterproductive. The international 
community was also more careful not to use the term “terrorist” in the case of 
Macedonia while it denounced the Albanian rebels in Kosovo as “terrorists” 
many times, which was interpreted as a “green-light” for repression by the 
Serbian authorities (see Chapter 9). This difference may also be a product of 
the learning process.
There are thus a number of linkages between the cases. It would seem 
only natural: after all, these four countries constituted one country for more 
than 40 years until 1991 (or more than 70 years if the inter-war period is 
included). Indeed, as discussed above in this chapter, it has been more common 
for the scholars to treat the dissolution of Yugoslavia and a series of wars in the 
region as a single, inter-connected case. This thesis treats the four cases of 
rebellion in the ex-Yugoslav region separately only to “disaggregate the data 
adequately” and to study it “as a set of cases,” as proposed by Brubaker and 
Laitin (see Section 1 of this chapter). Such a treatment serves to clarify the 
commonalities and differences between the cases and to build a theory through 
the comparative method.
As the brief overview of the four cases shows, these four cases present 
a considerable difference in terms of the initial level of rebellion (between the 
Serb rebellions and the Albanian rebellions) and the escalation of the rebellion 
(between the Albanian rebellions in Serbia and Macedonia). The present thesis
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will attempt to explain these differences between the four cases in the 
comparative case study.
4. Structure of the Thesis: Connection between Theory, Large-N analyses 
and Case Studies
Finally, this section briefly presents the structure of the rest of the 
thesis, which is related to the mixed methods approach discussed in this chapter. 
The rest of the thesis is divided into three main parts. Each part aims to 
examine each step of the three-step approach discussed in Chapter 1. In each 
part, the first chapter (theory and large-N) is followed by chapters) that will 
conduct an in-depth comparative case-study of the ex-Yugoslav cases on the 
same subject. The purposes of the case-study are twofold: firstly to conduct a 
“controlled comparison” to provide a clear explanation to what happened in the 
ex-Yugoslav region and to contribute to the better and clearer understanding of 
these cases; and secondly to evaluate the theoretical argument and the general 
findings presented in the preceding chapter and to show convincingly that the 
processes and findings uncovered in the theoretical and statistical analyses 
have some “real-world” relevance. By adopting such a structure, the present 
thesis attempts to show a connection between the theory, large-N analyses and 
in-depth case studies.
The order of the chapters in each part can be a matter of debate. On 
the one hand, as discussed in Introduction, the present study primarily used the 
comparative analysis of the ex-Yugoslav cases to develop a theory and then 
used the large-N analysis to test it. One may thus argue that it would be more 
natural if the small-N analyses are presented prior to the corresponding large-N 
analyses. One the other hand, however, the theory and the research design of
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large-N analysis inform the corresponding case-study as well. For example, 
Chapter 6 examines the effect of structural conditions, such as the level of 
economic development (GDP per capita) and the mountainous terrain, which 
are used as control variables in the large-N analyses in Chapter 5. A reader will 
certainly be able to better understand why these factors are examined in the 
case study if he or she has already read the corresponding theoretical / large-N 
chapter. In Part IV, Chapter 9 uses two explanatory variables that are not 
included in the corresponding large-N analyses in Chapter 7, since both of 
these are extremely difficult to quantify in a convincing manner. Here, the 
comparative small-N analysis is not used to generate a theory but to 
compliment the large-N analysis, because variables used in the large-N analysis 
cannot fully explain the difference between Serbia and Macedonia. In this case, 
it would be more straightforward to present the large-N analyses prior to the 
case-study. Due to these merits listed above, it was decided that the theory and 
the large-N analyses are presented prior to the corresponding small-N analyses.
Part II has two chapters. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical discussion 
inspired by the resource mobilisation theories, and to conduct large-N analyses 
using the MAR dataset and some variables constructed by the author. Chapter 4 
then conducts a comparative case study of four ex-Yugoslav cases, the Serb 
rebellions in Croatia and Bosnia and the Albanian rebellions in Serbia and 
Macedonia.
Part III also has two chapters. Chapter 5 presents theoretical 
arguments on the “dynamic” grievances and some model to incorporate both 
dynamic grievances and structural conditions for the explanation of the onset 
of initial rebellion. It then conducts large-N analyses using the MAR dataset 
and other variables taken from earlier studies on the onset of civil war. Chapter 
6 conducts a comparative case study of the four ex-Yugoslav cases, focusing on
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the reasons for the rebels to take up arms. It will take into consideration both 
the objective and structural conditions and dynamic grievances that motivated 
the rebels to take up arms in these cases.
Part IV consists of three chapters. Chapter 7 presents theoretical 
arguments on the mechanisms of the escalation of rebellion and the role of 
state reactions to the initial rebellion. It then conducts a series of large-N 
analyses to test the hypotheses drawn from the theoretical arguments. Chapters 
8 and 9 will conduct in-depth case studies of two ex-Yugoslav cases, namely 
the Albanian rebellions in Serbia and Macedonia. Because this part examines 
the escalation of the rebellion from a low-intensity one to a high-intensity one, 
two cases of Serb rebellions in Croatia and Bosnia are excluded from the 
case-study, since their initial level of rebellion was very high. Chapter 8 
conducts a comparative analysis on the state reactions and their effects on the 
course of rebellion in Serbia and Macedonia. It will show that the state 
authorities made different reactions to the initial rebellion, which in turn 
affected the courses of the rebellion in these two countries. Chapter 9 then 
conducts an additional comparative analysis on the determinants of the state 
reactions, attempting to answer the question why the state reactions to the 
initial rebellion were different in these two countries.
Conclusion
This chapter has laid down the methodological premises for the 
present thesis. It firstly discussed why the mixed methods approach is adopted 
in the present thesis. It then discussed the cases for the analysis. Firstly, it 
discussed the MAR dataset, which will be used as a key dataset in the large-N 
analyses of the thesis. Secondly, it discussed the four cases of ethnic rebellions
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in the ex-Yugoslav region, presenting a brief overview of the cases, and why 
the comparison of these four cases is useful for the purpose of the present 
thesis. Finally, it briefly presented the structure of the rest of the thesis, which 
reflects the three-step approach and the mixed methods. Having set the 
theoretical and methodological premises for the thesis, the thesis will now 
embark on the empirical analyses in the following chapter.
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Part II: Initial Level of Rebellion
Chapter 3 
Intra-ethnic Division, Decision-Makers and the Rebellion: 
Quantitative Analysis of the Initial Level of Rebellion
Introduction
Who among the ethnic group actually make a decision to take up arms 
against the state? This question has not been addressed very much so far, 
particularly in the game theoretic explanations of ethnic conflict. As discussed 
in Chapter 1, this is partly a result of the pervasiveness of the unitary actor 
assumption: when the rebellion occurs, it is assumed that the ethnic group is a 
cohesive group and somehow reaches the collective decision to take up arms. 
But how they do this remains a “black box,” exogenous to the theory being 
developed. This assumption also methodologically underpins many large-N 
studies on the occurrence of civil war, which treat the “onset” of civil war as a 
one-shot event.
However, this unitary actor assumption is problematic, because the 
ethnic group as such does not necessarily have a clear decision-making system. 
This is one of the specific features of domestic ethnic conflict when compared 
to international war. In the case of international war, the answer to the question 
“who makes a decision?” is more obvious: it is the head of the state who makes 
a final and formal decision to mobilise the national army. International war 
normally starts with the declaration of war by one country against some 
other(s), which makes it easy for observers to identify an exact date of 
commencement of the war. In domestic ethnic conflict, on the other hand, the
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answer to this question is not necessarily straightforward. Laitin (1998: 331) 
thus argues that “while it is useful and often powerful to assume that states are 
unitary actors; it is equally powerful but misleading to assume that nations (or 
putative nations) are.” Brubaker and Laitin (1998: 438) point out that ethnic 
conflict differs sharply from interstate conflict, because “[rjarely is a single 
leader recognized as authoritatively entitled to speak in the name of the group” 
and thus “ethnic groups generally lack what states ordinarily possess, namely, a 
leader or leaders capable of negotiating and enforcing settlements.” Fearon 
(2004: 407) also argues that the unitary actor assumption is “rarely a plausible 
assumption” and points out that “instead, nationalist insurgencies are 
frequently initiated by small minorities within an ethnic group.”
Given this feature of domestic ethnic rebellions, it is important to relax 
the unitary actor assumption. The present chapter consists of three sections. 
The first section presents two ideal types of decision-making within ethnic 
groups, namely the “decision from above” and the “decision from below,” and 
their theoretical implications. The second section will present a set of testable 
hypotheses drawn from the theoretical argument. The following section then 
conducts a large-N analysis to test these hypotheses.
1. Two Ideal Types: Decisions From Above and Decisions From Below
While a precise answer to the question posed at the beginning of this 
chapter may vary enormously from one case to another, two ideal types are 
presented in the present thesis. The first is the decisions made by powerful 
ethnic leaders, the “decisions from above.” The second is the decisions made 
by non-leaders within the ethnic group, the “decisions from below.” These two 
ideal types are based on the vertical intra-ethnic division between leaders and
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non-leaders.
This vertical intra-ethnic division is important because of the 
characteristics of domestic ethnic conflict discussed above. As for the interstate 
war, the decision to go to war can be made only by the political leaders who 
have competence to do so. On the other hand, in domestic ethnic conflict, 
anybody in the ethnic group can decide to take up arms against the state, 
whether they are leaders or non-leaders. One must consider this fact in order to 
understand the diversity within the category of ethnic rebellion, while few 
scholars have paid attention to it.
The first type is the decisions made by the ethnic leaders who have 
significant financial, military, human or other kind of resources that can be 
utilised for rebellion. Such ethnic leaders can be found in the political and 
administrative organisations (for example, members of the national parliament, 
regional governors, or prestigious leaders of the large-scale political 
movements), military forces (generals, colonels, and so on) and traditional 
tribes (elderly leaders of tribes, powerful clan leaders, etc). These leaders have 
either de jure or de facto powers to mobilise resources necessary for the 
rebellion, such as financial, military, or human resources. These leaders 
sometimes can make a decision that is binding on a large number, if not all, of 
members of the ethnic group. If the decision to take up arms is made by these 
powerful leaders, it is labelled as a decision “from above” in the present thesis.
The second type is the decisions made by non-leaders within the 
ethnic group who do not possess so significant financial, military or human 
resources for the rebellion. Such people can be found in the groups of radical 
students or workers, clandestine or underground radical organisations, 
self-proclaimed political “party” that does not hold any public office in the 
state, etc. In such situation, people who make a decision to take up arms are not
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very powerful in terms of the resources at their disposal. A decision made by 
such non-leaders may not necessarily be supported by the other members of the 
ethnic group. It may be opposed and denounced by the ethnic leaders who are 
prestigious within the ethnic group. These non-leaders might want to replace 
the incumbent leaders and to take over the political power by taking up arms: 
indeed, in the post-conflict society, former rebel leaders often become 
politicians and (try to) replace the old political elite of the ethnic group. In any 
case, if the decision to take up arms against the state is made by these 
non-leaders within the ethnic group, it is called a decision “from below.”
These two ideal types correspond to the opposing observations made 
by different scholars. On the one hand, some have argued for the importance of 
elites in the occurrence of ethnic violence. For example, by analysing 
nationalist violence in the former Soviet Union, Beissinger (1998: 418) 
concluded that the “waves of nationalist violence are disproportionately 
associated with groups well-connected to the state, not marginalized 
communities, and violence is more often a strategy for institutionalizing 
control than for challenging authority.” Mueller has suggested that what is 
required for the occurrence of ethnic conflict and killings such as those in 
Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia is “the breakdown of police order and the 
mobilization by politicians with their own agenda of small numbers of 
murderous and opportunistic thugs” (Simons & Mueller 2001: 191, emphasis 
added). Gagnon (1994) argues that it was a conservative coalition of party 
leaders, local and regional elites, nationalist intellectuals and segments of the 
military leadership who provoked violent ethnic confrontation. These 
observations largely correspond to what is termed a “decision from above”: it 
is powerful ethnic elites or politicians who tend to lead, organise and realise the 
violent conflict.
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On the other hand, other scholars pointed out that the rank-and-file 
members of the gangs, terrorist groups or guerrilla armies are more often 
poorly educated and from lower or working class backgrounds, while ethnic 
leaders are well educated and from middle-class backgrounds.1 In advanced 
industrial democracies, nationalised violence usually assumes the form of 
marginalised terrorist activity rather than large-scale mobilisation or interethnic 
war (Gurr 1993: 98-99). In these cases, the decision to take up arms is not 
made by the powerful and mainstream ethnic leaders but by a rather marginal 
segment of the society. These observations correspond to what is termed a 
“decision from below.”
Of course, the distinction between elite-driven (“from above”) and 
grass-roots-driven (“from below”) dynamics itself is far from novel in the 
study of ethnic conflict. Indeed, many scholars have used this distinction, 
explicitly or implicitly, in analysing ethnic or internal conflict. For example, 
Brown (1997: 15-16) argues that the internal conflicts can be categorised 
according to whether they are triggered by elite-level or mass-level factors. In 
analysing the nationalist and regional conflicts in the process of 
democratisation, Laitin (1995) distinguished “regional elite” and “vigilantes” 
within the minority group as distinct players in the four-player game (“state” 
and “people” constitute the other two players) and argued that “policing the 
vigilantes” who might resort to terrorism is a key concern in the making of 
credible promises by regional leaders. In two separate monographs, Petersen 
addressed the puzzle of “how the less powerful manage to sustain rebellion 
against the more powerful” (Petersen 2001) and the question of “why and when 
the more powerful commit violence and discrimination against the less 
powerful” (Petersen 2002). Bourne (2007) made a distinction between the
1 See, for example, Clark 1984. It is cited in Brubaker & Laitin 1998: 434.
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top-down mode and the bottom-up mode in the arming process of warring 
factions in the internal conflict. These authors distinguish elite-driven from 
grass-roots-driven dynamics, even though definitions of “elite” (or “the 
powerful”) and “grass-roots” (“mass”, “vigilantes” or “the less powerful”) 
differ from author to author.
The novelty of the present chapter does not lie in the distinction 
between two ideal types per se, but lies in connecting it to an under-researched 
aspect of the ethnic conflict, namely the initial level of rebellion. As discussed 
in Chapter 1, the initial level of rebellion has rarely been systematically studied 
in the existing literature, partly due to the unitaiy actor assumption and the 
conceptualisation of the “onset” of large-scale rebellion as a one-shot event: 
when one assumes that the ethnic group decides to take up arms en masse, and 
the occurrence of large-scale rebellion is a one-shot event, the initial level of 
rebellion will be always high by assumption. In reality, however, the initial 
level of rebellion made by members of the ethnic group is not always high. 
Indeed, as the large-N analysis of this chapter will show, the high level of 
initial intensity occurs relatively rarely. If the initial intensity of rebellion varies 
from case to case, a theory of ethnic rebellion must explain why it becomes 
high in some cases while it becomes low in other cases.
How is this distinction between the two ideal types connected to the 
initial intensity of rebellion? This chapter hypothesises that the initial rebellion 
tends to be higher when a rebellion is directed by the decisions from above, 
while it tends to be lower when a rebellion is directed by the decisions from 
below. The causal factor that explains this connection is the amount o f  
resources available to the decision-makers. As the resource-mobilisation 
theorists emphasised, resources are of particular importance for collective 
action: recruitment and logistics for collective action require a considerable
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amount of time, money and effort, and various kinds of resources such as 
financial, technological, human resources must be utilised (e.g. Oberschall 
1973; McCarthy & Zald 1977; Jenkins 1983). The resources available to the 
organisers of the collective action, therefore, will affect the course and the 
outcome of the action.
This logic of the resource-mobilisation theory is applicable to ethnic 
rebellion. If the rebellion is directed by a “decision from above,” those who 
make a decision to take up arms possess significant financial, military or 
human resources for the rebellion. As a result, their decision to take up arms is 
more likely to lead to the occurrence of large-scale rebellion. After such an 
occurrence, the state authorities are practically drawn into the civil war whether 
they want to or not, and they are forced to take all necessary measures to fight 
against the rebels and to maintain order in the country. If the rebellion is due to 
a “decision from below,” those who make a decision to take up arms do not 
possess sufficient resources for large-scale rebellion. As a result, it is more 
likely that their decision to take up arms will lead to the occurrence of rebellion 
of a relatively low-level intensity, and would not necessarily lead immediately 
to the occurrence of the large-scale rebellion. This argument can be 
summarised as presented in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Type of Decision-makers and the Initial Level of Rebellion
Type of decision-makers Initial level of the rebellion
Powerful ethnic leaders 
(Decision from above)
High
Non-leaders 
(Decision from below)
Low
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Needless to say, this argument does not mean that this intra-ethnic 
factor is the sole determinant of the initial level of rebellion. There are other 
factors that may also affect the initial level of rebellion. Among them, 
inter-ethnic factors deserve special attention because of their direct relevance to 
the intra-ethnic factor. The position and status of the ethnic groups within the 
state and their relationship to the state authorities vary considerably across 
ethnic groups. Some ethnic groups may have easy access to a large amount of 
resources while others may not. Some ethnic group may be in such 
unfavourable conditions that they cannot have powerful political elite at all. 
The status of the ethnic group vis-a-vis other ethnic groups within the state 
may limit the amount of resources available to the ethnic leaders, and thus the 
initial level of rebellion may differ across ethnic groups even when the 
rebellion is directed by the ethnic leaders. Table 3.2 summarises this 
inter-ethnic factor. By combining these two arguments above, one may make a 
2 by 2 table, which is presented in Table 3.3.
Table 3.2 Status of the Ethnic Group within the State and the Initial 
Level of Rebellion
Status of the Ethnic Group Initial level of the rebellion
Powerful Ethnic Group High
Weak Ethnic Group Low
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Table 3.3 Type of Decision-makers, the Status of the Ethnic Group and 
the Initial Level of Rebellion
Powerful Ethnic Group Weak Ethnic Group
Leaders Initial Level: Very High Initial Level: Relatively High
Non-leaders Initial Level: Relatively High Initial Level: Low
Of course, this 2 by 2 table cannot be so precise: for example, it 
cannot specify whether the initial level of rebellion led by non-leaders of 
powerful ethnic groups will be higher or lower than that of rebellion directed 
by leaders of weak ethnic groups. By making such a table, however, one can 
explicitly differentiate the intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic factors and avoid 
confusing these two factors.
In any case, the intra-ethnic factor discussed above is of the key 
interest of the present chapter because of its relevance to the critique of the 
unitary actor assumption. In order to evaluate the validity of the argument, the 
following sections will attempt to make testable hypotheses and to conduct 
large-N analyses to test them.
2. Drawing Testable Hypotheses
This section will draw a set of testable hypotheses based on the 
argument developed above. To recapitulate, it was argued that a rebellion is 
more likely to be large-scale at the outset if the powerful ethnic leaders decide 
to take up arms, while it is more likely to be small-scale if the non-leaders 
decide to do so. The key task in making testable hypotheses based on this
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argument is to draw a clear line between the “powerful ethnic leaders” and 
“non-leaders.” One must be careful not to make vague criteria for drawing this 
line, especially because of the possibility that knowing the results can affect the 
judgment. If criteria for drawing the line are vague, one may categorise the 
decision-makers as “powerful elite” precisely because the initial level of 
rebellion was high, and may consider them to be “non-leader” because the 
initial level of rebellion was low. In this case, one will surely observe the 
connection between the type of decision maker and the initial level of rebellion, 
but it is not because the theory is true but simply because the judgment on the 
type of decision maker is affected by the knowledge of the results. In order to 
avoid such a mistake, criteria for drawing line should be clear and totally 
independent from the response variable.
This chapter uses the findings in the comparative case-study, which 
will be presented in the next chapter, to draw testable hypotheses with clear 
criteria for drawing the line between leaders and non-leaders. Therefore, while 
the hypotheses and the large-N analyses are presented here before the 
comparative case-study, these hypotheses and the research design of the 
large-N analyses result from the feedback from the qualitative case-study. In 
this chapter, two testable hypotheses are drawn from the comparative 
case-study.
Firstly, one specific feature of the Serb rebellions in Croatia and 
Bosnia was that the rebellion was planned, organised and realised by the 
politicians who held public offices in the countries. In the case of Croatian 
Serbs, the important figures who led the rebellion held public offices at the 
local level, such as Milan Babi6 (mayor of Knin municipality) and Milan 
Martic (an inspector of the police force in Knin). The leading figures among 
the Bosnian Serbs held public offices at the republic level, such as Radovan
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Karadzic (a member of the Bosnian national parliament), Biljana PlavSic (a 
member of the seven-member presidency of Bosnia), Momcilo Krajisnik 
(president of the Bosnian national parliament), and the SDS also controlled a 
significant share of the national and local institutions. In both cases, the SDS 
politicians could use a significant amount of resources to prepare, organise and 
realise the rebellion. If one generalises this observation on the Serb rebellions, 
one can expect that the initial level of intensity of the rebellion will be higher if 
the rebellion is led by the politicians who hold public office in the state, 
because it is highly likely that these politicians can use various kinds of 
resources to plan and organise a large-scale rebellion. One can thus draw the 
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: If the rebellion is directly led by the politicians who hold public 
office, whether at national or local level, it is more likely that the initial 
level of intensity of rebellion would be higher.
Another feature of the Serb rebellions was that members of the local 
police force and a part of the regular national army took sides with the rebels 
and directly participated in the rebellion. The police force and the national 
army are the key institutions for the monopoly of violence within the state. The 
participation of these two institutions in the rebellion thus means not only that 
the rebels have more military and human resources for the rebellion but also 
that there is less policing against the rebel activities. In the case of Serbs in 
Croatia and Bosnia, the participation of the police force and the national army 
with a large amount of heavy weapons led to an occurrence of rebellion of high 
intensity, while the amount and the size of the weapons available to organisers 
of the rebellions were much more limited the in case of Albanians in Serbia and
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Macedonia, where no police or regular national army participated in the 
rebellion. By generalising this observation, therefore, one can expect that the 
initial level of intensity of the rebellion would be higher if members of police 
force or the regular national army participate in the rebellion from the outset of 
the rebellion. Thus:
Hypothesis 2: If members of the police force or the national army participate in 
the rebellion from the outset, the initial level of intensity of rebellion 
would be higher.
Of course, politicians who hold public office and members of the 
police force / national army are not the only type of ethnic leaders that would 
make a decision to take up arms. In many cases, ethnic leaders that make a 
decision to rebel include clannish/tribal leaders (who do not hold any public 
office) or leaders of the large militia that do not belong to the national army. 
The two hypotheses presented here cannot capture these types of leaders and 
thus they would only explain a part, not the whole, of the rebellions of high 
initial intensity. The advantage of these two hypotheses is, however, that 
criteria are clear and judgment would not be affected by the knowledge of the 
results. For example, whether the initial level of rebellion was high or not 
cannot affect the judgment on whether leaders who led the rebellion held 
public office at that time or not. On the contrary, when it comes to clan/tribe or 
militia, the definition of “clan” or “militia” could be diverse and judgment 
could be more subjective. By excluding these ambiguous cases, therefore, one 
could avoid the danger of being affected by the knowledge of the response 
variable in drawing lines between leaders and non-leaders.
As discussed above, the intra-ethnic factor is not the sole factor that
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would affect the initial intensity of rebellion. One important control variable 
that should be taken into consideration is the inter-ethnic factor. In addition, 
one can derive more control variables from some key findings in the existing 
literature on ethnic conflict and civil war. In order to avoid the danger of the 
omitted variable bias, one must take into consideration these control variables 
that would also affect the initial level of rebellion.
It is extremely difficult to measure quantitatively the resources 
available to the ethnic group within the state. One indicator that can be used -  
and relatively easily measured quantitatively -  is the relative size of the ethnic 
group within the state. For a number of reasons, one can argue that the relative 
size of the ethnic group would affect the resources available for rebellion. 
Firstly, the relative size of the ethnic group will primarily determine the 
maximum human resources available for the rebellion: if the group is relatively 
small, it would be harder to recruit sufficient number of fighters against the 
state. Secondly, the relative size of the ethnic group will determine the balance 
between that ethnic group and other group(s) that control the state authorities. 
As the relative size of the ethnic group gets larger, the size of this group and 
that of other group(s) controlling the state authorities will get closer and thus 
the state authorities may not be so powerful vis-a-vis that ethnic group. These 
arguments suggest that it is more likely that the initial level of rebellion would 
be higher as the relative size of the ethnic group gets higher.
In addition to the inter-ethnic factor, some more control variables will 
be included in the analysis below. In the present analysis, the following 
variables are included as control variables: (1) the level of economic 
development, (2) political regime of the country, (3) newness of the state, (4) 
political instability, and (5) the terrain of the country. These control variables 
are derived from some key findings of earlier research.
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According to some large-N analyses, the level of economic 
development is one of the strongest predictors of the onset of “civil war” 
(Fearon & Laitin 2003; Collier & Hoeffler 1998). These scholars have 
identified several mechanisms that can be behind the strong association 
between low levels of economic development and the onset of civil war. For 
example, Collier and Hoeffler (1998: 565-567) argue that this factor represents 
the “opportunity cost” of rebellion for individuals: the higher economic 
development is, the higher the opportunity cost is for individuals to stop 
economic activities (i.e. give up earnings from normal economic activities) and 
to take up arms. Fearon and Laitin (2003: 80) argued that GDP per capita can 
be a proxy for three mechanisms: (1) overall financial, administrative, police, 
and military capabilities of the state, (2) the degree of penetration into rural 
society by the central administration, (3) the possibility of recruiting young 
men to the life of guerrilla. Unfortunately, as Humphreys (2005: 533) pointed 
out on the relations between natural resources and civil war, the scholars have 
“focused on correlations without constructing tests to identify particular 
mechanisms that may underlie those correlations” and has “arbitrarily favored 
one mechanism to the exclusion of others” and it is still not clear which 
mechanism, or a combination of mechanisms, is working behind the 
association between the level of economic development and the onset of civil 
war. Whichever mechanism is working, however, one can assume that this 
variable would also affect the initial level of rebellion by the same logic. If the 
low level of economic development means low opportunity cost for potential 
rebels, it would be easier for organisers of rebellion to recruit more fighters if 
the level of economic development is low, and thus the initial level of rebellion 
would be higher. If the low level of economic development means weaker 
police and military capabilities of the state, it would be easier to organise a
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rebellion of a higher level of intensity if the level of economic development is 
low. In any case, therefore, one would expect that it is more likely that the 
initial level of rebellion will be higher as economic development gets lower.
Secondly, the political regime of the country would also affect the 
initial level of rebellion. If the political regime in the country is democratic, 
there are some institutional channels for the expressions of individual and 
collective preferences and greater prospect of peaceful change of the status quo. 
While it may not always prevent the emergence of a small number of extreme 
radicals, the presence of a democratic political regime in the country would 
make it harder for the organisers of the rebellion to persuade other members 
among the ethnic group to take up arms against the state. On the contrary, if the 
political regime is undemocratic, the prospect for the peaceful change of the 
status quo is much bleaker. It would thus be easier for the organisers of the 
rebellion to persuade other people to take up arms with them. Gurr (2000), for 
example, finds that the presence of democratic institutions is associated with 
peaceful demonstrations while the authoritarian regime is associated with 
violent rebellions. Thus, one would expect that it is less likely that the initial 
level of rebellion would be higher as the political regime gets more democratic.
Finally, three factors associated with the “right conditions of 
insurgency” identified by Fearon and Laitin will be used here, namely the 
newness of the state, political instability, and the geographic terrain of the 
country. Firstly, Fearon and Laitin (2003: 81) argue that it is easier for the 
potential rebels to organise a rebellion in a newly independent state, since it 
often loses suddenly the coercive backing of the former imperial power and its 
military capabilities are new and untested. The same logic can be applied to the 
explanation of the initial level of rebellion. Technically, it would be easier for 
the potential rebel leaders to organise a large-scale rebellion if the police and
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military capabilities are not established in the country. In addition, it would be 
easier to persuade members of the ethnic group to take up arms if the police 
and military capabilities are not established, since it is less likely that they 
would face harsh punishment and retaliation by the police and military of the 
state authorities. Politically, it would be easier for the organisers to persuade 
people to take up arms if the legitimacy of the new state is not yet established. 
Secondly, by the similar logic, political instability is also considered to favour 
insurgency, since the political instability at the centre indicates disorganisation 
and weakness of the central authorities and thus an opportunity for a rebellion 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003: 81). Thirdly, Fearon and Laitin argue that a rough 
terrain would also favour insurgency since it would be easier for the rebels to 
hide from the government forces and to sustain the insurgency. By the same 
logic, it would be easier to organise a rebellion if the terrain is rough, since the 
rough terrain would deter the governments from effectively policing potential 
rebels. Their findings suggest that it is more likely that the initial level of 
rebellion would be higher (1) if a country is a newly independent state, (2) if a 
country is experiencing political instability at the centre, or (3) in a country 
where the terrain is rougher.
3. Testing Hypotheses: Large-N Analyses
This section will conduct large-N analyses to test the hypotheses 
drawn in the previous section. Firstly, it will conduct a bi-variate analysis to 
examine the relationship between the intra-ethnic factor and the initial level of 
rebellion. It will then conduct a multi-variate analysis to consider the effect of 
the control variables.
The MAR dataset is used for the case selection. The MAR dataset
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contains ordinal data on conflict behaviour of more than 300 ethnic groups 
from 1945 to 2000 (for five-year period from 1945 to 1984 and for each year 
from 1985 to 2000). For the present analysis, an ordinal measure of 
“anti-regime rebellion” will be used, which is coded with the scale presented in 
Appendix 1. This variable enables us to identify (1) which ethnic groups were 
engaged in rebellion activities and (2) what was the initial level of the intensity 
of rebellion.
From the MAR dataset, the author identified all ethnic groups that had 
been engaged in some level of rebellion during the period from 1945 to 2000, 
and checked what was the level of intensity of the rebellion when they started 
being involved in the rebellion activities for the first time during this period (i.e. 
the initial level of intensity of rebellion). Out of more than 300 ethnic groups 
included in the MAR dataset, 177 ethnic groups were engaged in rebellion at 
some time during the period, and the initial level of rebellion of these ethnic 
groups varied from 1 (sporadic terrorism) to 7 (protracted civil war). These 177 
ethnic groups are the cases in the large-N analyses conducted below (the unit of 
analysis is the ethnic group).
(1) Bi-variate analysis
This section firstly conducts bi-variate analysis to test the two key 
hypotheses discussed above (HI and H2). In order to do so, one must know (1) 
whether these rebellions were led by the politicians who held public office at 
the time of commencement of the rebellion, and (2) whether members of the 
police force or the national military participated in the rebellion when the 
rebellion started. While the MAR dataset contains more than 400 variables, 
there is unfortunately no variable that enables us to check these two points for 
the cases of rebellion. The present study, therefore, surveyed (1) what was the
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organisation behind the rebellion at the initial stage, (2) whether the 
organisation was led by the politicians who held some kind of public office, 
and (3) whether members of the police force or national military participated in 
the rebellion at the initial stage, for all 177 ethnic groups. The resources used 
for the judgment are primarily the MAR qualitative data2 but also various 
other secondary resources, such as the human rights reports of the US 
Department of State, the reports published by prominent NGOs like Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch, academic articles, journalistic accounts 
on the events, interviews of the leaders of the rebels, and in some cases, the 
website of the organisations that were behind the rebellion, since the MAR 
qualitative data often lacks specific information on the organisation that was 
behind the rebellion when it started. The results of this survey are presented in 
Appendix 7. Based on the results of the survey, two dummy variables are 
created. The first is the POLTCIAN, which takes a value of 1 if the 
organisation that started the rebellion was led by the politicians who held some 
kind of public office. The second is the POLARM, which takes a value of 1 if 
members of the police or national army participated in the rebellion when it 
started.
To test the first two hypotheses of our theoretical interest (HI and H2), 
a bi-variate analysis will be conducted by making a cross-tabulation. If 
hypotheses above are right, a higher level of rebellion must be more frequent 
when the dummy variables take the value of 1. The Pearson's chi-square 
statistic will be used to judge whether there is any association between the two 
variables.
2 MAR qualitative data contains a brief summary of the history and the situation of each 
ethnic group as well as the chronology of key events related to the ethnic group. The data 
can be obtained via the website of the MAR project: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/ 
mar/index.htm.
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Let us firstly examine the relations between the initial level of 
rebellion and the engagement of politicians in the rebellion. The 
cross-tabulation of the two variables is presented in Table 3.4. This table 
supports hypothesis 1 discussed above: while the lowest intensity of rebellion 
(REB=1) constitutes 34 percent of all cases when politicians are not involved 
in the rebellion (POLTCIAN = 0), there is absolutely no case of the lowest 
intensity of rebellion when politicians are involved (POLTCIAN =1); while the 
largest intensity of rebellion (REB=7) constitutes only 8 percent of all cases 
when politicians are not involved in the rebellion, it constitutes 50 percent of 
all cases when politicians are involved. One can argue therefore that the initial 
level of rebellion is skewed toward the higher level when politicians are 
involved in the rebellion. The Pearson’s chi-square statistic for this table is 34.6, 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Therefore, one can reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no association between these two variables.
Table 3.4 Initial Level of Rebellion and Involvement of 
Politicians, 177 ethnic groups from 1945 to 2000
Initial Level Involvement of the Politicians0 Total
of Rebellion No (0) Yes (1)
1
54 0 54
(34.4%) (0 %)
16 18
( 1 0 .2 %) ( 1 0 .0 %)
3 25 4 29
(15.9%) (2 0 .0 %)
4 25 1 26
(15.9° o) (5.0%)
5
4 1 5
(2.5° o) (5.0%)
6
2 1 -> 23
(13.4%) (1 0 .0 %)
7 1 2 1 0
(7.6%) (50.0%)
Total 157 2 0 177
Pearson chi2(6) = 34.6 P < 0.001
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It should be noted that the involvement of politicians is observed in a 
relatively small number of cases of rebellion in the MAR dataset: in total, it 
numbers only 20 cases (11%) out of 177 ethnic rebellions observed in the 
period. This shows that, generally speaking, the involvement of politicians in 
the organisation of ethnic rebellion is relatively rare. It seems that there are two 
major reasons for this. Firstly, in some cases, ethnic groups are so 
disadvantaged in the country that they lack political elites who can hold some 
kind of public office in the country at all. This seems the case, for example, for 
African-Americans in the USA until the 1960s, some (but not all) indigenous 
peoples in Southern America, and some ethnic minorities under harsh 
dictatorships in Sub-Saharan Africa. Secondly, in other cases, ethnic groups did 
have political elites who held some kind of public office, but they were not 
involved in the ethnic rebellion because they were more moderate than those 
who actually took up arms. The qualitative analysis in the following chapter 
will show, for example, that the Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia fall into 
this category. In the case of Sri Lanka, Tamil political parties held some seats 
in the Sri Lankan parliament, but these Tamil political elites were against 
violence and did not organise the rebellion.
The fact that the involvement of politicians in the organisation of 
ethnic rebellion is relatively rare naturally raises one question: if it is rare, does 
this variable really explain the variance observed in the response variable? An 
answer to this question will be explored in the multi-variate analysis conducted 
below.
Let us now examine the relations between the initial level of rebellion 
and the engagement of the police force or national army in the rebellion. The 
cross-tabulation of the two variables is presented in Table 3.5. The association
3 For a detailed analysis on the case of Sri Lankan Tamils, see e.g. Bose 1994.
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between the two variables is weaker compared to Table 3.4, but the initial level 
of rebellion is still skewed toward the higher level when members of the police 
or army were involved in the rebellion: while the lowest intensity of rebellion 
(REB=1) constitutes 32 percent of all cases when members of police or army 
are not involved in the rebellion (POLARM = 0), it constitutes 20 percent if 
they are involved in the rebellion (POLARM =1); while the largest intensity of 
rebellion (REB=7) constitutes 9.6% of all cases when members of police or 
army are not involved in the rebellion, it constitutes 35% of all cases when they 
are involved. The Pearson’s chi-square statistic for this table is 14.4, which is 
much smaller than that for Table 3.4, but is still statistically significant at the 
0.05 level. Therefore, one can reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
association between these two variables.
Table 3.5 Initial Level of Rebellion and Involvement of 
Police or Army, 177 ethnic groups from 1945 to 2000
Initial Level Involvement of the Police or Army? Total
of Rebellion No (0) Yes (1)
1
50 4 54
(31.8%) (2 0 .0 %)
o 18 0 18
(11.5%) (0 %)
3
25 4 29
(15.9%) (2 0 .0 %)
4 25 1 26
(15.9%) (5.0%)
C 4 1 5
(2.5%) (5.0%)
6
2 0 3
23
(12.7%) (15.0%)
15 /i
(9.6%) (35.0%)
Total 157 2 0 177
Pearson chi2(6) = 14.4 P < 0.05
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Why is the level of rebellion low even when members of the police or 
national army participate in the rebellion? A closer look into the cases suggests 
the importance of the number of those who participated in the rebellion. 
Among the cases where the POLARM is coded 1, the low-intensity rebellion is 
coded primarily when the actual coup or coup-attempt occurred and thus only a 
few soldiers participated in the activity. Even when they have some weapons at 
their disposal, their participation cannot lead to a large-scale rebellion if the 
number of participants is so small. On the contrary, the high-intensity rebellion 
is coded when some units or groups of soldiers participate in the rebellion en 
masse, as the police force and the JNA did for the Serb rebellion in the case of 
ex-Yugoslavia. This suggest that finer coding is necessary to test hypothesis 2 
presented above, which distinguishes the participation of only a few 
individuals that belong to the police or military and the participation of units or 
groups of those who have some weapons. This, however, raises a number of 
practical problems. Firstly, it is difficult to establish an objective and 
convincing criteria for the distinction between a “group” and “a few” 
individuals -  the criteria could be 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, or higher number of 
individuals and it is difficult to judge which is adequate and which is not. 
Secondly, it is extremely difficult to acquire information on exactly how many 
individuals of the police or military actually took part in a rebellion. For these 
reasons, further disaggregation is not conducted and the variable of POLARM 
is used in the multi-variate analysis despite these reservations.
(2) Multi-variate analysis
Bi-variate analyses conducted above appear to support the two key 
hypotheses of this chapter (HI and H2). In order to adequately evaluate the 
explanatory power of the key variables of interest, however, one must conduct
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a multi-variate analysis that includes control variables that may affect the initial 
level of rebellion. The variables of the theoretical interest here are POLTCIAN 
and POLARM discussed above. If the two key hypotheses of this chapter are 
true, these variables should be associated with the higher level of initial 
rebellion even when other control variables are controlled for. This part will 
firstly present the operationalisation of the control variables, secondly the 
estimation method, and thirdly the empirical results and interpretations.
As for the relative size of ethnic groups within the state, a variable 
GPRO in the MAR dataset will be used. This is a continuous variable, ranging 
from 0 to 1, which shows the proportion of the estimated group population in 
the country population in the 1990s. This variable thus captures the relative 
size of ethnic groups within the state. The drawback of this variable is that the 
data is available only for the 1990s. If one simply plugs in this variable in the 
dataset, therefore, data will be missing for 137 ethnic groups (77 percent) out 
of total 177, which will be dropped from the analysis when one conducts the 
large-N analysis. It is obvious that one cannot evaluate the explanatory power 
of the variables adequately if more than three-fourths of total cases are dropped 
from the analysis. In order to avoid this, the average value of GPRO for the 
period when data is available is applied to the whole period of the dataset in the 
present analysis (this variable will be called GPROAV hereafter) and is used in 
the present analysis. This manipulation of the data is of course not ideal, 
especially if the population of the ethnic group changes drastically during the 
period when the GPRO data is not available. Given the lack of comprehensive 
data, however, this is the only way to control for the relative size of the ethnic 
group within the state, and GPROAV is used below despite these drawbacks.
As for the other control variables, the present analysis will follow the 
operationalisations of earlier research. As a proxy of the level of economic
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development, it uses GDP per capita of the country in which the ethnic group 
live, taken from the Penn World Tables, following the large-N analyses 
conducted by Collier & Hoeffler and Fearon & Laitin mentioned above (this 
variable will be called GDP hereafter). As a proxy of the degree of the 
democratic nature of the political regime, the “polity2” variable in the PolityIV 
dataset will be used (POLITY2 hereafter). This variable takes the value ranging 
from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic)4 and is used 
widely for large-N analyses as a proxy of the degree of democracy of the 
political regime in the country. As for the newness of the state and the 
instability in the centre, the present analysis uses dummy variables created by 
Fearon and Laitin (2003): the new state dummy (NEWST hereafter) takes the 
value of 1 in the first and second year of independence of the state, and the 
political instability dummy (INSTAB hereafter) takes the value of 1 when the 
country had a three-or-greater change on the Polity IV regime index in any of 
the three years prior to the year in question. These four variables change their 
values over time, and the present analysis will use their values at the time o f 
occurrence o f initial rebellion. As for the rough terrain, the variable of 
“mountainous terrain” used by Fearon and Laitin is used in the present analysis 
(MONT hereafter).5 The response variable is naturally the initial level of the 
rebellion (REB hereafter), which takes a value from 1 to 7.
As for the estimation method, the ordered logit model is used because 
of the ordinal nature of the response variable. While some people use the 
Ordinary Least Square regression for the ordinal response variable, as if it is a 
continuous interval variable, it is better to use models specifically designed for
4 For detailed description of the variable and the coding procedure, see the “dataset user’s 
manual of the Polity IV project,” available online at: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/ 
inscr/politv
5 This variable is based on the codings of geographer A.J. Gerard and was expanded by 
Fearon and Laitin. See Fearon & Laitin 2003: 81.
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ordinal variables, given the risk that the OLS regression of an ordinal outcome 
provides misleading results (Long 1997: 115). Using the most appropriate 
estimation method will reduce the risk of drawing a wrong conclusion.
Based on the construction of the ordered logit model as a latent 
variable model,6 the fitted model of the present analysis can be summarised as 
follows:
1 1
Pr (REB, = m | x) = ------
1 . (-rm + x i) 1 , (-Tm-j+xb)l + exp l + exp
where
Pr (REB/ = m) = probability that the level of initial rebellion by ethnic 
group / takes the value of m (m = l to 7)
xj3 = (/^POLTCIAN/ + /?2POLARM/ + /^GPROAVz + faGDFi + 
J&POLITY2/ + ANEWST/ + #INSTAB/ + /W ONT/)
The cut points7 and the coefficients for the independent variables are estimated 
by STATAver. 8.
Results of the ordered logit analysis are presented in Table 3.6. Among 
the eight independent variables, the effect of five variables is statistically 
significant at least at the 0.1 level, while the effect of the variable POLARM, 
NEWST and GPROAV is not statistically significant. This suggests that, at 
least based on the dataset analysed here and the coding for the participation of 
members of police and army employed in the dataset, there is no statistical
6 For the explanation of the ordered logit model as a latent variable model, see Long & 
Freese 2003: 151-155; Agresti 2002: 277-279.
7 The cut points are represented by r in the formula. For J ordinal categories, it is assumed 
that T0 -  -o o , Tj =  oo, and y< = m if rm_/ < (x , |3+ £ , ) <  ^  for m =  l to J. See Long & Freese 
2003: 151-155; Agresti 2002: 277-279.
84
evidence that the participation of members of police or army has a significant 
effect on the initial level of rebellion. As discussed above, this result for the 
POLARM seems to be partly due to the coding procedure that treats the 
participation of a few members in coup attempts and the participation of groups 
or units of police and army in the rebellion as equal. However, since it is 
difficult to disaggregate the data further in a convincing manner, the effect of 
the participation of police and army is not explored further here.
Table 3.6 Ordered Logit Analysis of the Initial Level of 
Rebellion, 177 Ethnic Groups________________________
Variables Coef. Std. Eit.
Involvement o f Politicians (POLTCIAN) 1 9 4 *** 0.57
Involvement o f  Police/Army (POLARM) 0.33 0.51
Group Proportion in Population (GPROAV) -1.40 0 8 7
Economic Development (GDP) -0.16** 0.06
Political Regime (POLITY2) -0.09*** 0 0 2
New States (NEWST) 0.76 0.50
Political Instability (INSTAB) 0.71* 0.40
Mountainous Terrain (MONT) 0.30** 0  1 2
Cut Point (1) -0.40 0 4 4
Cut Point (2) 0.19 0.44
Cut Point (3) 1.07 0.44
Cut Point (4) 1.91 0.46
Cut Point (5) 2 . 1 1 0 4 7
Cut Point (6 ) 3.25 0.51
Number of obs = 165; LR clii2(7) = 58.13, Prob > chi2 = 0.01 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05, ***p<0.01.
Note, however, that the other variable of theoretical interest, namely 
POLTCIAN, is statistically highly significant at the 0.01 level, even when other 
variables are controlled for. The sign of the coefficient is positive and thus 
supports hypothesis 1 presented above: the participation of politicians in the 
organisation of rebellion increases the probability that the initial level of
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rebellion would take a higher value, other conditions being equal. Note that the 
effects of all control variables that are statistically significant are in accordance 
with the theoretical expectations stated above. The signs of the coefficients of 
GDP and POLITY2 are negative, which means that the probability that the 
initial level of rebellion would take a higher value decreases as the level of 
economic development increases and the political regime of the country 
becomes more democratic, other conditions being equal. The signs of the 
coefficients of INSTAB and MTNEST are positive, which means that the 
probability that the initial level of rebellion would take a higher value increases 
if a country is experiencing political instability, and as the terrain of the country 
becomes more mountainous. Based on these empirical results, one can reject 
the null hypothesis that the participation of the politicians does not have any 
effect on the initial level of rebellion.
Going beyond sign and significance, one can estimate the magnitude 
of the effect of our key variable. Firstly, one can calculate the marginal change 
in the predicted probability and see what the effect of the change in the values 
of the variable is. As for the variable POLTCIAN, the change in the predicted 
probability is -0.28 for the value 1 of the rebellion, -0.09 for the value 2, -0.08 
for the value 3, 0.05 for the value 4, 0.03 for the value 5, 0.18 for the value 6, 
0.20 for the value 7, holding four continuous variables (GPROAV, GDP, 
POLITY2, MONT) at the mean and assuming that the other dichotomous 
variables (POLARM, NWSTATE, INSTAB) takes the value of 0.8 These 
numbers indicate how much the predicted probability changes when the value 
of the variable POLTCIAN changes from 0 to 1 while other variables are held 
constant. For example, the change in the predicted probability is 0.20 for the
o
These values are calculated by STATA ver. 8 , using prchange command. For the details 
of the procedure, see Long & Freese 2003: 178-181.
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value of 7. This means that the predicted probability that the initial level of 
rebellion takes the level 7 increases by 20 percent when the value of variable 
POLTCIAN changes from 0 to 1 (i.e., when the politicians are involved in the 
rebellion), holding other variables at the value stated above. When the change 
in predicted probability takes negative value, this means that the predicted 
probability will decrease. For example, the change in the predicted probability 
is -0.28 for the value 1 of the rebellion. This means that the predicted 
probability that the initial level of rebellion takes the level 1 will decrease by 
28 percent when the value of variable POLTCIAN changes from 0 to 1, 
holding other variables at the value stated above.
Secondly, one can also calculate the change of the odds in order to see 
the effect of the variables.9 As for the variable POLTCIAN, the results 
presented in Table 3.6 mean that the odds of having a higher level of rebellion 
become seven times higher if the politicians are involved in the rebellion, 
holding all other variables constant. These post-estimation analyses show that 
the effect of the variable POLTCIAN is fairly strong compared to the effect of 
other variables. For example, the odds of having a higher level of rebellion 
become only twice higher if the value of the variable INSTAB changes from 0 
to 1 (i.e. when the country experiences political instability). One can conclude, 
therefore, that the multi-variate analysis strongly supports hypothesis 1 of the 
present chapter.
9 “Odds” can be calculated as follows: p  / (1 -p) ,  where p  is the probability of occurrence. 
If the odds take a value of 1, this means that p  is equal to 0.5, meaning that the chance of 
the occurrence and non-occurrence is even-even. If the odds takes a value larger than 1, 
this means that p  is larger than 0.5, meaning that the chance of occurrence is larger than 
non-occurrence. On the contrary, if the odds take a value less than 1, this means that p  is 
smaller than 0.5, meaning that the chance of occurrence is smaller than non-occurrence.
87
Conclusion
This chapter argued for the importance of intra-ethnic factor in 
explaining the variance in the initial level of rebellion. It firstly presented two 
ideal types, (1) rebellion from above, led by powerful ethnic leaders, and (2) 
rebellion from below, directed by non-leaders. After a brief discussion of their 
relationship with the inter-ethnic factor, this chapter made two key hypotheses 
from the theoretical argument. It then conducted large-N analyses using the 
MAR dataset and some dummy variables constructed by the author specifically 
for the present analysis. This chapter has found that, while the second 
hypothesis was not supported by the statistical analysis, results of both 
bi-variate and multi-variate analyses support the first hypothesis. When 
politicians who hold the public office participate in the organisation of ethnic 
rebellion, the initial level of rebellion is more likely to be higher than 
otherwise.
The theoretical and methodological implications of the findings in this 
chapter will be discussed in the concluding chapter. In the following chapter, 
the theoretical arguments of the present chapter will be applied to the cases of 
ex-Yugoslav region to examine the causal mechanisms in the real-life 
situations.
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Chapter 4 
Decisions from Above and from Below: Comparative Analysis 
of the Serb and Albanian Rebellions
Introduction
This chapter conducts a case study of the four cases of rebellions in 
the ex-Yugoslav countries, namely in Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia (Kosovo) and 
Macedonia. It aims primarily to show that the theoretical arguments made in 
the previous chapter are based on some real cases and to make generalised 
arguments empirically more convincing.
Chapter 3 argued that a rebellion is more likely to be large-scale at the 
outset if the ethnic leaders decide to take up arms, while it is more likely to be 
small-scale if the non-leaders decide to do so. In line with that argument, this 
chapter will show that the level of initial intensity of the rebellion was high 
when the ethnic leaders decided to rebel (the case of Serbs in Croatia and 
Bosnia) while it was low when non-leaders decided to take up arms (the case of 
Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia). The key factor that connects the type of 
decision-maker with the level of initial intensity of rebellion is the amount of 
resources available to the decision-maker. When the leaders make a decision to 
go to rebellion, they can mobilise a large amount of resources and thus can 
make a large-scale rebellion from the outset. When non-leaders make a 
decision to go to rebellion, the amount of resources they can mobilise is far 
more limited, and they could only make a relatively small-scale rebellion at the 
beginning.
This comparison of the four cases can make an important contribution 
in the field of ex-Yugoslav studies, because scholars tend to put more emphasis
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on the top-down nature of the conflict in this region based on the findings 
mainly from Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia. As discussed in Chapter 2 (p. 54), Gow 
(2003) insists upon the Serbian state project as the primary and defining 
element in the war in this region. While he analyses the case of Kosovo, he 
only examines the actions made by the Serbian authorities without making 
equal efforts to analyse and explain the actions made by the Albanian rebels. 
Gagnon (2004) argues that the war in the ex-Yugoslav region was caused by 
the conservative elite such as Milosevic in Serbia and Tudjman in Croatia who 
wanted to demobilise the opposition against the regime. In his reply to the 
critique of his book, he argued that “the violence did not happen in a vacuum, 
nor was it a spontaneous eruption from below. It was the result of conscious 
strategic planning from above” (Gagnon 2007: 217). His analysis, however, 
does not include the case of Kosovo or Macedonia. Given this lack of equal 
attention to the cases of Kosovo and Macedonia, it would be legitimate to 
question whether the arguments in the existing literature are generalisable even 
within the region o f ex-Yugoslavia.
Gagnon does not seem to be troubled by this question. In his reply to 
the critique mentioned above, he stated as follows: “Based on what I know 
from the events in the 1980s as well as anecdotal evidence... I do believe that 
while in many ways Kosovo was a very different place than Croatia and Bosnia, 
the outlines of the story there were strikingly similar” (Gagnon 2007: 223). The 
present chapter challenges such an argument. It will argue that the dynamics of 
conflict in Kosovo and Macedonia were indeed quite different from other cases 
such as Croatia or Bosnia, because the Albanian rebellions in Kosovo and 
Macedonia were directed by the “decisions from below,” and they cannot be 
explained by the Albanian elite’s desire to demobilise the opposition. On the 
contrary, as discussed below, the Albanian political elite both in Kosovo and
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Macedonia were strongly opposing to the violence. The present thesis agrees 
with Gagnon on the top-down nature of the violence regarding the Serb 
rebellions in Croatia (and Bosnia, though Gagnon does not analyse it). This 
does not mean, however, that his argument is equally applicable to the cases of 
Kosovo and Macedonia.
In order to achieve the aims stated above, this chapter will 
systematically examine each case. As for the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, it 
will examine who actually made a decision to take up arms, what kind of 
resources they had at their disposal, and how they used them to organise and 
realise the rebellion. It will finally point out that the initial level of intensity 
was quite high in these two cases. As for the Albanians in Kosovo and 
Macedonia, it will firstly examine why the Albanian elite did not choose to take 
up arms. It will then examine who actually made a decision to take up arms, 
and will show that the resources available to them were fairly limited. It will 
finally show that the initial level of intensity of rebellions was low in these two 
cases, as expected by the theoretical arguments made in Chapter 3.
1. Serbs in Croatia
(1) Involvement of Politicians and Police Forces in the Rebellion
As outlined in Chapter 2, inter-ethnic relations deteriorated rapidly 
after the first multi-party elections in 1990, when the Croatian Democratic 
Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ hereafter), an opposition party 
led by Franjo Tudjman, won a landslide victory. In this context of post-election 
politics, it was Serb politicians from the Serb Democratic Party {Srpska 
demokratska stranka, SDS hereafter) who led the rebellion of Serbs against 
Croatian authorities. The Serb elite from the SDS exploited the political and
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military resources available to them. They especially utilised their political 
positions at the local (municipality) level to mobilise and organise Serbs. At the 
republic level, the SDS only got five seats in the Croatian national parliament 
and it withdrew its members from the Croatian parliament soon after the 
elections. The resources available to the SDS politicians at the republic level, 
therefore, were very limited. However, the SDS politicians could still use 
resources available at the local (municipality) level, especially where Serbs 
constituted a majority of the population.1
What kind of resources were available to the SDS politicians, and how 
did they use them to organise a rebellion? Three points can be made in this 
regard. Firstly, they could make a political decision in the municipal parliament 
(iSkupstina opcina, SO hereafter) where they control a majority of the seats. 
This enabled the SDS politicians to implement their platform as official 
policies of the municipality and give a democratic legitimacy to their actions. 
The SDS politicians used this power to create a territorial basis of the rebellion. 
For example, Milan Babic, one of the leaders of the SDS who was elected as a 
mayor of Knin after the 1990 local elections, proposed an establishment of a 
new association of municipalities, and the SO of Knin authorised it.2 When the 
“Serb Autonomous Region Krajina” (Srpska autonomna oblast Krajina, SAO 
Krajina hereafter) was established at the end of 1990, the SO of the eight 
municipalities around Knin approved the Statute of the SAO Krajina.3 This
1 In the 1990 local elections in Croatia, the SDS gained a majority of the seats in the 
parliament only in three municipalities. However, the SDS expanded quickly to other 
municipalities after the elections and gained a control of the municipal parliament in many 
of the municipalities with the Serb majority population. The results of the local elections 
and the expansion of the SDS after the elections are analysed in detail by the author 
elsewhere. See Kubo 2007.
Barid 2005: 65. The SO of Knin, Gradac and Donji Lapac decided to belong to it, which 
led to the declaration of the establishment of the “Association of Municipalities of 
Northern Dalmatia and Lika” on 1 July 1990. See Baric 2005: 6 6 .
3 Eight municipalities that decided to belong to the SAO Krajina were Benkovac, Donji 
Lapac, Gracac, Knin, Obrovac, Vojnic, Titova Korenica and Dvor na Uni. See Baric 2005:
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organisation constituted the territorial basis of the rebellion against Croatian 
authorities. In this regard, therefore, the political power available to Serb 
politicians at the municipality level played an important role in the organisation 
of the rebellion of Serbs in Croatia.
Secondly, the control of the SO also provided the SDS politicians with 
an access to arms and personnel necessary for rebellion, because the Serb 
politicians could control the local police force through the Secretary of Internal 
Affairs (the head of the local police administration) of the municipalities.4 The 
local police held some weapons, and the Serb leaders could use these weapons 
and local policemen for a rebellion. The key figure responsible for the 
organisation of the Serb police force was Milan Martic, an inspector of the 
Knin police. The weapons held by local police concerned the Croatian 
authorities,5 and they attempted to take weapons from the police station in 
Serb-dominated municipalities, but this action rather provoked angry reactions 
from Serbs, including local policemen, who armed with the weapons of reserve 
police and barricaded the road and railways.6 By the end of 1990, there were 
several thousand Serbs armed with rifles and pistols in Knin area (Baric 2005: 
83). In January 1991, the Secretariat of the Internal Affairs of SAO Krajina was 
established and Martic was named as a Secretary of Internal Affairs.7 At the
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4 This was important because Serbs constituted a large segment of the police force in 
Croatia: according to the information from the Secretariat of the Internal Affairs of the 
Socialist Republic of Croatia in 1984, 49.9 % of the total employees were Serbs by 
nationality. See Barid 2005: 126. Note that Serbs constituted only around 10% of the entire 
population in Croatia (1 1 .6 % in the 1981 census and 12.2% in the 1991 census) and thus 
Serbs were clearly over-represented in the police force in Croatia.
5 Alarmed by the organisation of the Serb referendum on autonomy, the Minister of the 
Internal Affairs of Croatia, Josip Boljkovac, held a meeting with the secretaries of internal 
affairs from some municipalities near Knin. They concluded that there was a possibility 
that the Serb extremists could take weapons from the reserve police in the region. See 
Baric 2005: 78.
6 Baric 2005: 78-79. This event is often called “Log Revolution” due to the blockade of 
roads by logs.
7 Baric 2005: 105. The executive committee of the SAO Krajina sent a letter to
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end of May 1991, Martic claimed that almost 20,000 military personnel were
a
under his control. The organisation of police force was an “institutionalisation 
of the rebellion” (Baric 2005: 126). The control of the SO at the municipality 
level, therefore, provided the Serb leaders with some military and human 
resources for the rebellion.
Thirdly, the Serb politicians also used their positions to mobilise 
armed forces through the Territorial Defence (Teritorijalna odbrana, TO 
hereafter) system of the ex-Yugoslavia. The TO forces were designed to present 
a systematically organised guerrilla resistance to a foreign invader and were 
under the control of republics and municipalities, and local authorities were 
obliged to maintain stockpiles of weapons and supplies (Woodward 1995: 
26-27). Due to this system, a significant number of small arms and light 
weapons were kept in each municipality.9 The Serb politicians mobilised these 
military resources stockpiled at each locality for their rebellion. In August 1991, 
the TO forces were established under the command of the government of SAO 
Krajina with three operative zones (Marijan 2002: 13-14). The police force 
organised by Martic was eventually incorporated into this defence system.
In the case of Serbs in Croatia, therefore, the Serb politicians could 
use the resources available to them in three ways, (1) controlling 
decision-making in the municipal parliaments to create the territorial basis of 
the rebellion, (2) mobilising the human and military resources for the rebellion
Presidency of the SFRJ, Federal Secretary of the Internal Affairs, Ministry of Internal 
Affairs of Croatia and others to notify the establishment of the autonomous secretariat for 
the internal affairs in Knin, to which 10 municipality police stations had entered, namely 
Obrovac, Benkovac, Grafiac, Titova Korenica, Donji Lapac, Dvor na Uni, Glina, 
Kostajnica, Vojnic and Knin. As for the text of the letter, see Letica & Nobilo 1991: 94.
8 Baric 2005: 120. Baric believes, however, that this figure is clearly exaggerated.
9 In 1989, a total of 250,000 pistols, 1,200,000 rifles and 105,000 machine guns were 
under die TO system. This was almost equal to the number of weapons under the control 
of the regular army (the JNA), which had 270,000 pistols, 1,120,000 rifles and 170,000 
machine guns. See Davis 2002: 50.
94
by controlling the local police force, and (3) controlling the TO system.
(2) Involvement of the Regular Military Force in the Rebellion
Another important aspect of the preparation of the Serb rebellion was 
a participation of the Yugoslav National Army (.Jugoslovenska narodna armija, 
JNA hereafter). This factor also contributed to the high level of the initial 
intensity of rebellion. The JNA took sides with the Serbs because it was hostile 
to the non-Communist and “anti-Yugoslav” government in Croatia (as well as 
in Slovenia). It thus raided the TO stations in Croatia to seize arms stored for 
the Croatian TO forces immediately after the first multi-party elections in 1990 
(Spegelj 2001b: 120; Silber & Little 1996: 105-118). It also started providing 
tacit support to Serbs in Croatia as early as in the summer of 1990: when the 
Croatian authorities sent special police force to Knin by helicopters in order to 
de-blockade the roads, the leader of the General Headquarters of the JNA 
called Zagreb and warned, without knowledge of the Federal Presidency nor 
the Federal Prime Minister, that the army airplanes would destroy the Croatian 
helicopters if they proceed towards Knin (Dekanic 2004: 62; Spegelj 2001b: 
127). It was also observed that the JNA provided arms to the Serb population 
(Marijan 2004: 42). According to Spegelj, a number of JNA generals visited the 
Serb villages in Croatia before the outbreak of the war as “emissaries and 
instigators of the armed insurrections in Croatia” and revived old traumas of 
the Second World War (Spegelj 2001a: 26).
Furthermore, the JNA actively participated in the rebellion once the 
Serbs decided to take up arms. When the Serb rebels in Croatia started their 
military actions at the end of June 1991 onwards, the JNA openly stood on the 
Serb side and started to be involved in the war.
Let us take a closer look at the size and extent of the engagement of
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JNA forces in the war in Croatia. Firstly, the JNA mobilised the best and 
strongest “elite” force for the operations in Eastern Slavonia, as Veljko 
Kadijevic, the then Federal Minister of Defence, explains.10 For example, in 
June and July 1991, a number of elite brigades were sent from Serbia to 
Vukovar area, which brought 10,000 soldiers, 450 armour vehicles and about 
100 heavy weapons (Marijan 2004: 24). In July and August 1991, the forces 
from the 17th corps (Tuzla in Bosnia) were brought in, reinforced by the units 
from the 14th corps (Ljubljana in Slovenia) after its withdrawal from Slovenia 
(Tus 2001: 54). The all-out offensive against Vukovar began on 24 August with 
air and artillery strikes (Tus 2001: 54). Secondly, as for the Western Slavonia 
region, the JNA forces in Bosnia (the Banja Luka Corps) were sent in and 
attacked OkuSani, Nova Gradiska and other places (Barid 2005: 121; Marijan 
2002: 15). Thirdly, in the northern Dalmatia and Lika region, the JNA forces 
stationed in Knin area (9th Knin Corps led by Colonel Ratko Mladid) were 
deployed and attacked Zadar, Sibenik and other Dalmatian cities.11 Fourthly, 
the JNA navy imposed the naval blockade of the Croatian ports on 15 
September 1991, even though it was relaxed after only one week due to the 
lack of sufficient resources (Gow 2003: 156). Finally, the JNA forces that were 
sent from Trebinje (Bosnia) and Herceg Novi (Montenegro) attacked the 
southern Dalmatian region and bombarded the old town of Dubrovnik.12
10 In explaining the plans of the JNA operations in Croatia, Kadijevid wrote as follows: 
“with the strongest formation of armoured-mechanized forces (we planned to) liberate the 
Eastern Slavonia, and then quickly continue the action toward the west, join the forces in 
the Western Slavonia and go on to Zagreb and Varazdin”. See Kadijevic 1993: 135.
11 Dekanic 2004: 6 6 . As for the detailed description of the events in this region, see Kaleb
1999; Simac 2001.12 For the discussion on the nature of the operations against Dubrovnik, see Gow 2003: 
164-165.
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(3) High Level of the Initial Intensity of Rebellion
As discussed above, the Serb politicians in Croatia could mobilise 
various human and military resources to prepare, organise and realise a 
rebellion. In addition, a large number of the Yugoslav regular army supported 
the Serbs and took part in the military operations against the Croatian 
government. With these enormous resources at their disposal, the Serb leaders 
in Croatia could easily make a large-scale rebellion when they decided to take 
up arms. While there were some skirmishes between the local Serb units and 
the Croatian police force after January 1991, the key moment for their decision 
to take up arms was the declaration of independence by the Parliament of 
Croatia on 25 June 1991. After that, the government of SAO Krajina issued an 
ultimatum for the unconditional and immediate withdrawal of all Croatian 
police and military forces from the territory of SAO Krajina (Baric 2005: 120), 
and clashes between the Serb police force and the Croatian forces started. After 
July 1991, as described above, the JNA forces also started their military 
operations.
Facing such a large-scale military action, the Croatian authorities were 
forced to react by military means, even though the Croatian political leaders 
did not consider the military option as the principal one at the beginning of the 
armed conflict (Tus 2001: 47). In July, the Croatian government issued several 
decrees to prepare for military operations and the General Headquarter of the 
Croatian Army was finally formed on 3 August 1991 (Tus 2001: 47). The 
armed conflict between the Croatian forces and Serb forces including JNA 
units continued until January 1992 when the Sarajevo ceasefire came into force 
and UN peacekeeping forces arrived in March 1992. More than 6,000 people 
died during the war in Croatia, and another 13,700 were “missing,” the
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majority of whom are believed to be dead.13 About 210,000 houses were 
destroyed and more than 300,000 people were displaced by the end of 1991 
(Tanner 2001: 278; Baric 2005: 125).
2. Serbs in Bosnia
(1) Involvement of Politicians in the Rebellion
In the case of the Serbs in Bosnia, it was also the politicians, from the 
party of the same name as in Croatia, the Serb Democratic Party of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina {Srpska demokratska stranka BiH, SDS-BiH hereafter), who 
organised the rebellion and decided to take up arms. Compared to their 
counterparts in Croatia, the Serb politicians in Bosnia were even more 
powerful because of their electoral success and their participation in the 
coalition government. In the first multi-party elections in 1990, the three 
nationalist parties made a landslide victory, and the SDS-BiH formed a 
coalition government with the other two parties, namely the Party for 
Democratic Action {Stranka demokratske akcije, SDA hereafter) and the Croat 
Democratic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina {Hrvatska demokratska 
zajednica BiH, HDZ-BiH hereafter). At the republic level, the SDS-BiH won 
both of the two seats allocated to Serbs in the seven-member Bosnian 
presidency, as well as 71 out of 240 seats in the Bosnian parliament. The 
electoral success of the three nationalist parties was equally striking at the local 
level, where they won total 4774 out of the 6299 seats (75.8%) in 110 
municipalities (Amautovic 1996: 118). As for the SDS-BiH, it won the 
absolute majority in the SO in 28 municipalities and won the largest number of
13 Tanner 2001: 278. Bari6  gives an estimation that around 16,000 Croatian soldiers, 
police and civilians died during the war. See Baric 2005:124-125.
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seats among three nationalist parties in additional 10 municipalities 
(Amautovic 1996:118-120).
After the elections, the SDS-BiH, together with the coalition partners, 
started the process of “purging the old cadres” (Goati 1992: 58) of the former 
communist party in order to control the administrative organs and the resources 
both at the national and the local level. The division of positions and resources 
occurred everywhere in Bosnia. In the field of internal affairs (police), for 
example, it occurred as follows: in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the SDA 
took 9, the HDZ-BiH took 4, and the SDS-BiH took 5 out of 18 top posts in the 
ministry; at the regional level, the SDS-BiH took the top positions of the 
regional Centre of Public Security at 3 out of 9 centres, while the other two 
parties took the rest (Nilsen 2004: 287-288). The SDS-BiH politicians also 
started to oust former communists and control the assets of the community at 
the local level. The success of the nationalist parties in ousting the former 
communists from the local government was incredible: while the leftist parties 
and smaller parties occupied 1364 (21.7%) out of 6299 seats in 110 
municipalities (Amautovic 1996: 118), the leftist parties managed to form a 
local government only in two municipalities, namely Tuzla and Vare§ (Andjelic 
2003: 189).
Through the electoral victory at the end of 1990, the SDS-BiH 
politicians gained a significant amount of resources. How did they use these 
resources for the organisation and preparation of the rebellion? The method 
used by the SDS-BiH politicians in Bosnia was strikingly similar to that of the 
Serb politicians in Croatia. Given the strong connection between SDS 
politicians in Croatia and Bosnia, it is certain that the SDS-BiH politicians in 
Bosnia followed the example of the Serbs in Croatia to mobilise and utilise 
their resources.
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Firstly, the SDS-BiH politicians in Bosnia used their resources to 
create a territorial and institutional basis for the rebellion. After September 
1991, the SDS-BiH politicians started establishing separate institutions both at 
the republic and the local level. At the republic level, the SDS-BiH politicians 
withdrew from the parliament in October 1991 as a protest against an adoption 
of the document “Memorandum on the Sovereignty of the Bosnia” in the 
Bosnian parliament. After that, the SDS-BiH politicians established the “Serb 
Parliament of Bosnia” on 24 October 1991. In December 1991, this “Serb 
Parliament” elected the government (Nilsen 2004: 300). At the local level, the 
Serb politicians started creating the SAOs as they did in Croatia.14 The 
SDS-BiH politicians used their positions and resources available at the local 
level to a maximal extent: out of the 28 municipalities where the SDS-BiH 
took the majority of seats in the SO, all but one decided to participate in some 
SAO formed in this period.15 In January 1992, the SDS-BiH leaders declared 
an establishment of the “Serb Republic of Bosnia” by unifying all SAOs. The 
political power they gained at the republic and the local level, therefore, was 
used to create the institutional and territorial basis for the rebellion.
Secondly, the SDS-BiH politicians mobilised the human and military 
resources available to them to prepare for the rebellion. They started 
preparations in the latter half of the year 1991, and used the local police force 
and the TO system as their counterparts did in Croatia. In October 1991, for 
example, there were some reports in the Bosnian Ministry of the Interior 
Affairs that the Serbs in the Ministry secretly attempt to supply arms and help 
forming the SAO (Nilsen 2004: 296). In December 1991, the SDS-BiH issued
14 From September through November 1991, the SDS politicians established six SAOs, 
namely the SAO Hercegovina, the SAO Bosanska Krajina, the SAO Romanja, the SAO 
Sjeveroisto&ia Bosna, the SAO Sjevema Bosna, and the SAO Bira£. See Begic 1997: 
58-59; Gow 2003: 127.
15 According to the author’s calculation, based on Amautovic 1996.
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the “Instruction for the organisation and the activity of the organs of Serb 
nation in Bosnia in the extraordinary circumstances,” which envisioned the 
formation of the “crisis headquarters” (Nilsen 2004: 301). These crisis 
headquarters were formed as “para-governmental structures” (Gow 2003: 122) 
which made preparations for political and military aspects of the takeover. For 
example, the SDS-BiH headquarters in Konjic distributed around 400 weapons 
to local Serbs (Gow 2003: 123). The preparations made by these crisis 
headquarters also included ensuring the readiness of active and reserve 
members of the police forces, the TO and Civil Defence units. These local 
crisis headquarters, working closely with the military, took over the police and 
civil administration later (Gow 2003: 130).
(2) Involvement of the Regular Military Force in the Rebellion
In the preparations for the armed rebellion in Bosnia, the JNA also 
played an important role. According to Divjak, the arming of Serbs had begun 
in some areas as early as in 1990, and the JNA had distributed about 51,900 
firearms to Serb volunteer units and 23,298 firearms to members of the 
SDS-BiH by March 1991 (Divjak 2001: 154). The JNA started mobilising 
Bosnian Serbs when it started participating in the war in Croatia. For example, 
General Nikola Uzelac, commander of the Banja Luka corps, ordered the 
general mobilisation of the population of northwest Bosnia.16 According to 
General Kadijevid, the mobilisation of Bosnian Serbs was quite successful and 
helped make up for the failure in mobilising Serbs elsewhere for the war in 
Croatia (Kadijevid 1993: 147).
The JNA not only helped arm and mobilise Bosnian Serbs but also
16 The Bosnian government announced that such an order of the general mobilisation was 
“illegal” and President Izetbegovic called upon the Bosnian citizens not to respond to the 
call-up. See Burg & Shoup 1999: 83; Boji6  2001: 318-319; Tus 2001: 57.
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was actively involved in the armed conflict in Bosnia and started fighting on 
the Serb side. The Serbs thus acquired an enormous amount of arms and 
personnel, since a large number of JNA forces were deployed to Bosnia, 
without an agreement of the Presidency of Bosnia Herzegovina, after the end 
of the war in Croatia: in April 1992, the 4th, 5th, 13th and 17th corps and the 
5th air force corps were all stationed in Bosnia; the Zadar artillery training 
centre was moved to Sarajevo; a part of the Knin corps arrived in Bihac 
(Divjak 2001: 155). General Ratko Mladic took over the Sarajevo Command in 
January 1992 (Gow 2003: 77) and was appointed the commanding officer of 
the Army of Republika Srpska (Vojska Republike Srpske, VRS hereafter) in 
May 1992 (Tus 2001: 155). According to the estimates of Gow, the VRS 
inherited 60,000-80,000 strong force as well as 300 tanks, 200-300 armoured 
vehicles and 500-600 artillery pieces.17 The VRS also inherited an air capacity 
of 5000 personnel and 35 aircrafts, even though the imposition of an “air 
exclusion zone” by the UN restricted use of this air capacity (Gow 2003: 77). 
These military resources were fully used by the Serbs when the war started in 
March-April 1992.
(3) High Level of the Initial Intensity of Rebellion
As discussed above, the Serb leaders in Bosnia had vast political and 
military resources at their disposal, which enabled them to start a large-scale 
rebellion when they decided to take up arms. The key moment for their 
decision was the declaration of independence by the Bosnian government. On 3 
March, based on the result of the referendum in Bosnia, Izetbegovic declared 
the independence of Bosnia (Burg & Shoup 1999: 118). Three days later,
17 Gow 2003: 77. Divjak gives even higher estimate of the 90,000-100,000 well armed 
men, cadets and officers as well as 750 to 800 tanks, about 1,000 armoured vehicles and 
more than 4,000 mortars and artillery weapons. See Divjak 2001: 155.
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Karadzic called for an army takeover and warned that there would be civil war 
if the EC were to recognise Bosnia-Herzegovina (Burg & Shoup 1999: 118). In 
March 1992, armed confrontations occurred in many places in Bosnia, such as 
Bosanski Brod, Sijekovac, Doboj region and Derventa, particularly between 
Croat paramilitaries and JNA reservists or Serb paramilitaries (Burg & Shoup 
1999: 119). On 4 April, the JNA and Serb paramilitaries started shelling the 
suburbs of Sarajevo and the city itself (Divjak 2001: 157). On 6 April, when 
the EC granted recognition to Bosnia, the JNA forces and the Serb 
paramilitaries attacked Foca and began the mass killings and expulsions of 
Muslim population (Divjak 2001: 157).
Facing such actions taken by the Serb side, the Bosnian government 
was forced to take necessary measures urgently, since the Muslims politicians 
from the SDA “neither believed war would break out, nor prepared their 
constituents in any way for its possibility” (Hoare 2004: 43). On 3-4 April, in 
response to the flight of Muslim refugees and under pressure from other 
members of the Presidency, Izetbegovid permitted the municipalities to 
mobilise their TO forces (Hoare 2004: 50). On 8 April, the Presidency of 
Bosnia decided to form the Territorial Defence of the Republic of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was put into effect rapidly (Divjak 2001: 158). 
Since April 1992, Bosnia was plunged into a full-brown civil war, which lasted 
for three years until the Dayton agreement. While the number of casualties is a 
matter of debate, most recent research of the Research and Documentation 
Centre in Bosnia suggests that approximately 100,000 deaths were caused by 
the military activities, torture or detention during the war in Bosnia, of which 
more than 45,000 (46%) occurred in the initial year (1992) alone.18 The
18 The details of the research conducted by the Research and Documentation Centre can 
be obtained from their website at: http ://www. idc. org.ba/presentation/content.htm.
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estimates of the total number of displaced persons range from one-third to 
two-thirds of the total pre-war population in Bosnia, or from over 1.4 million to 
2.5 million people (Burg & Shoup 1999: 171-172).
3. Albanians in Kosovo
(1) Path Chosen by the Albanian Elite in Kosovo: Peaceful Resistance
Albanians in Kosovo started mobilising themselves against the 
Serbian government in the late 1980s, primarily as a response to the repressive 
policies implemented by Milosevic. Before the rise of Milosevic in 1987, 
Serbian nationalism was suppressed by the Serbian Communist authorities led 
by Ivan Stambolic.19 The situation, however, was drastically changed by 
Milosevic’s visit to Kosovo in 1987, when he turned into a nationalist.20 After 
his victory in the internal conflict within the Serbian communist party, 
MiloSevid began introducing a series of repressive policies. The exclusion of 
Albanians from the political and economic life was conducted “legally,” based 
on the amendments of the Serbian constitution in 1989, a number of laws 
enacted by the Serbian parliament after 1989, and the new constitution of the 
Republic of Serbia introduced in 1990 21 While Albanians made a number of 
protests against these policies,22 the Serbian authorities took a tough stance
19 For example, when the “memorandum” which carried Serbian nationalist claims was 
reported in the newspaper “VeCemje Novosti” in 1986, the Serbian authorities severely 
criticised these nationalist claims. The media in Serbia also criticised them so severely that 
the media in Slovenia praised the anti-nationalist stance taken by the Serbian media. See
Silber & Little 1996: 33.
20 When thousands of angry Serbs were clashing with the Albanian police and throwing 
stones at them, MiloSevid came out of the building and said “No one should dare to beat 
you!” The clip of Milosevic saying this phrase was shown by the Beograde Television over 
and over again.
21 For the analysis of these legal documents and the discrimination based on these laws, 
see HCHRS 1997; HCHRS 1998.
22 For example, in 1988, when Albanian leaders were forced to resign, two thousand 
Albanian miners from Trepca marched to Prishtina, where tens of thousands of students
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against these demonstrations. In March 1989, for example, Serbian authorities 
issued the state of emergency and mobilised security forces to repress 
demonstrations, leading to the casualties of 24 lives. In January 1990, clashes 
between demonstrators and the Serbian security forces culminated in the death 
of 28 people and the injuries of 94 people.
Facing such a tough stance of the Serbian authorities, Albanian elite 
started making more secessionist demands. In July 1990, for example, the 
Albanian MPs of the Parliament of Kosovo unilaterally declared that Kosovo 
become a republic and independent from Serbia, even though it still remains a 
part of Yugoslav federation.23 At the end of September 1991, they organised a 
referendum on “sovereignty and independence of Kosovo,” where the voter 
turnout was 87% and 99.87% of those who voted supported it. In May 1992, 
Albanians organised their own presidential and parliamentary elections, and the 
Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja demokratike e Kosoves, LDK hereafter) 
won the overwhelming majority (76.44%) and its leader, Ibrahim Rugova, 
became president of Kosovo. Led by these elite, Albanians in Kosovo began 
building a “parallel society” (e.g. Kostovidova 1996). For example, Albanians 
established a “parallel” system of education in the Albanian language. In order 
to sustain their parallel system, the Albanian elite established their own “tax” 
system, in which not only local Albanians but also diaspora communities in the 
Western Europe paid some money to finance these activities. Albanians were 
thus very well mobilised and organised under the leadership of the LDK by the 
end of 1992.
and others joined them, to protest in front of the party headquarters. In February 1989, 
more than one thousand Trepca miners began a hunger strike, and demonstrations spread 
across Kosovo. When constitutional amendments were approved by the Kosovo 
parliament controlled by Milosevic in March 1989, huge demonstrations occurred 
throughout the province.
23 For the English translation of the text of “Constitutional Declaration of the Assembly of 
Kosova (Prishtina, July 2,1990)”, see ASRA1993: 331.
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This situation, however, did not lead to a “decision from above” to 
take up arms in Kosovo, because the LDK adopted non-violent strategies and 
did not choose to organise an armed rebellion. Even when Croats and later 
Bosnian Muslims encouraged Albanians to take up arms and open the 
“southern front” against Serbia, Albanian leaders rejected their request (Judah 
2000a: 113-115). Why did they choose peaceful protest rather than violent 
means? There are several factors that affected their decision. Firstly, there was 
an influence of the ideas of democratic opposition in Eastern Europe: the idea 
of a parallel system or a “shadow” government was influenced by the notions 
of autonomy and self-organisation developed among Central European 
intellectuals, particularly Polish Solidarity (IICK 2000: 44-45). Secondly, there 
was a move among ordinary Albanians to counter the “primitive and 
uncivilized” stereotype portrayed by the Serbs: Albanians decided to abolish 
the traditional practice of blood feud, establishing a “Council of 
Reconciliation” which tracked down Albanian families and brought them 
together for mass reconciliation (IICK 2000: 44-45). Thirdly, there was a 
pragmatic judgment as well: the Serbian armed forces were too strong to fight 
against. In 1992, for example, Rugova made the following remark: “we would 
have no chance of successfully resisting the army... in fact the Serbs only wait 
for a pretext to attack the Albanian population and wipe it out. We believe it is 
better to do nothing and stay alive than be massacred” (Vickers 1998: 264). 
Fourthly, the attitude of external actors was also important. Albanian president 
Sali Berisha did not support an openly violent course because he was not 
willing to jeopardise the economic assistance from abroad and to jeopardise the 
security of Albania by inviting Serbian reprisals (Judah 2000a: 115). He also 
openly opposed the idea of unification of Albania and Kosovo: for example, 
Berisha stated in 1993 that “the idea of a Greater Albania is not considered in
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serious Albanian political circles” (Vickers 1998: 270). Due to these factors, 
the non-violent movements led by the LDK had been predominant among 
Albanians up to 1997 and “as late as the autumn of 1997, few foresaw the 
threat of an imminent and major guerrilla-led uprising in Kosovo” (Judah 
2000a: 119).
(2) Decision from Below: the KLA and Its Limited Resources
While the Albanian elite in Kosovo had chosen a non-violent strategy, 
a small resistance group named the Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria 
qlirimtare e Kosov es, KLA hereafter) emerged and started an armed rebellion 
against the Serbian authorities in Kosovo. The KLA was founded in 1993 and 
grew out of the Popular Movement for Kosovo (Levizja popullore per Kosoves, 
LPK hereafter), a Marxist underground party formed in the early 1980s.24 
Those who organised the KLA were mainly the activists or students who went 
abroad after being punished in Serbia. For example, Hashim Tha$i, who later 
became a head of the KLA political directorate during the war and the Prime 
Minister of Kosovo provisional government after the war, was a head of the 
students’ union in 1991, lived in Switzerland studying politics and international 
relations in Zurich in 1994-5, and worked on meetings with the Albanian 
diaspora (Judah 2000a: 117). Bardhyl Mahmuti, who later became a 
francophone spokesman of the KLA in Switzerland and a foreign minister of 
the Kosovo provisional government after the war, was imprisoned from 1981 
to 1988 after 1981 demonstrations and lived in Switzerland from 1990 and 
studied political science at Lausanne (ICG 1999: 15). Pleurat Sejdiu, an 
orthopedist and a member of the LPK in Llap, was punished for taking part in
24 For the LPK and other Maxist-Enverist underground parties, see Judah 2000a: 102-120; 
£eku 2003; £eku 2004.
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the demonstrations in 1981 and left for Bucharest to be a student there, and 
then was working as a mini-cab driver in London, where he emerged as a 
KLA’s spokesman (Judah 2000a: 117-118; ICG 1999: 16). Xhavit Haliti, who 
was one of the four men who began building a network of secret cells for the 
rebellion, also left Kosovo in the 1980s and had been in Switzerland before he 
started working as a logistics and finance man for the KLA (ICG 1999: 14). 
Jashar Salihu, who worked as a chairman of the Homeland Calling fund of the 
KLA, was imprisoned for four years for distributing leaflets in 1981 and 
moved to Switzerland after that (Judah 2000a: 104-107). In a nutshell, the KLA 
was organised and led by radical activists, former demonstrators and students 
who went abroad in the 1980s or later. In Kosovo, therefore, the rebellion was 
led not by the political elite, such as the LDK and Rugova, but by the members 
of small underground organisation, and thus came from the “decision from 
below.”
Because the organisers of rebellion were members of a small 
underground organisation, the resources at their disposal were very limited 
when they started their rebellion activities. For example, up to 1997, the KLA 
had only about 150 active men, according to Mahmuti (Judah 2000a: 118): 
According to the Independent International Commission on Kosovo (IICK 
hereafter), “until late 1997, active armed resistance groups in Kosovo were 
very small and without permanent bases in the province” (IICK 2000: 52). The 
military hardware which the KLA had at its disposal was limited to small 
weapons that “a mule can carry,” since all its weaponry had to enter the 
country illegally, mainly from Albania but also sometimes via Montenegro or 
Macedonia (ICG 1998c: 6). Because the LDK had already organised the 
Albanian diaspora communities in the Western countries for financial support 
(according to the then Prime Minister of the govemment-in-exile of the
108
Republic of Kosova, Bujar Bukoshi, their fund had mobilised a total of 265 
million DM by the end of the war in Kosovo25), the KLA members could not 
get much financial support from the diaspora communities, and thus financial 
resources were also fairly limited. According to Ibrahim Kelmendi, the LPK 
members contacted Bukoshi in 1992, but Bukoshi and the LDK people rejected 
to support the LPK members financially from their fund26 While Rugova and 
the LDK people thus controlled a large amount of financial resources, they did 
not use them for violent activities, and the KLA did not have significant 
financial resources at their disposal during their preparation of the rebellion.
(3) Low Level of the Initial Intensity of Rebellion
As a result of the limited resources available to the organisers of 
rebellion, the initial intensity of rebellion was not very high in Kosovo. The 
first violent action allegedly taken by the KLA was the killing of a Serbian 
policeman in 1995, but it was not until 1996 that an organisation calling itself 
the KLA claimed responsibility for the attacks (IICK 2000: 51). The first 
“planned” assaults took place on 22 April 1996, when four almost simultaneous 
attacks were launched in separate locations that killed two policemen (ICG 
1998c: 2). Since then, there were some sporadic KLA attacks on Serbian 
policemen but the intensity of rebellion remained quite low. It was on 15 
October 1997 that the first KLA man “in uniform” died while attacking a 
police station at KliSina (Judah 2000a: 117). On 28 November, some KLA 
members appeared in public for the first time at the funeral of Halit Gecaj, an
25 Interview with Bujar Bukoshi, Prishtina, 2006/05/05.
26 Interview with Ibrahim Kelmendi, Tetovo, 2006/05/30. Kelmendi went into exile in 
Germany in 1976 and was one of the core founders of the LPK. He is currently the 
political advisor of Ali Ahmeti, former leader of the NLA and currently the president of the 
Albanian political party in Macedonia.
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Albanian killed in the crossfire of the KLA attack on Serbian police.27 While 
the number of attacks was increasing (31 in 1996, 55 in 1997, and 66 in 
January and February 1998 alone), the death toll remained relatively low in this 
period: according to Ljubiska Cvetic, who was then a spokesman for the 
Ministry of Internal affairs (Ministarstvo unutrasnjih poslova, MUP hereafter) 
of Serbia, these attacks from 1996 to February 1998 led to 10 deaths of Serbian 
policemen and 24 deaths of civilians28 One can conclude, therefore, that the 
KLA started its activities from quite a low level of intensity and this 
low-intensity activity continued until the beginning of 1998.
Since 1998, the conflict escalated into a full-brown fight between the 
KLA and the Serbian security forces, which led to the intervention by NATO in 
1999 and eventually led to the large number of deaths: while the exact number 
of killings during the conflict is unknown, it is estimated that the number of 
killings was around 10,000, with the vast majority of the victims being Kosovo 
Albanians killed by the Yugoslav forces and furthermore, some 3,000 are 
missing, many of which are estimated to be dead (IICK 2000: 91). Despite the 
eventual serious casualties and the high intensity of the conflict, the KLA could 
start its rebellion only from a quite low level of intensity, due to the limited 
resources available to them.
4. Albanians in Macedonia
(1) Path Chosen by the Albanian Elite: Moderation and Participation
Like their fellows in Kosovo, Albanians in Macedonia had been
27 ICG 1998a: 29. Now, 28 November is a date observed by Albanians everywhere as Flag 
Day, a holiday of great patriotic significance. See ICG 1998c: 3.
28 ICG 1998a: 30. As for the list of the date and place of the attacks associated with the 
KLA during this period, both on the Serbs and Albanian “collaborators,” see Kresovic et al 
1998:40-49.
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experiencing various kinds of repressions, though to a different extent. During 
the socialist era, Albanian communities in western Macedonia faced harsh 
political and cultural repression under Rankovic and also after the death of Tito. 
After the Albanian demonstrations occurred in Kosovo in 1981, the 
Macedonian Assembly took measures to crack down on Albanian 
nationalism. 29 Albanian civil servants were sacked from the state 
administration in 1987, and some ethnic Albanian army officers were 
disciplined for participating in Albanian weddings where Albanian nationalist 
songs were chanted (Phillips 2004: 45). Once the Albanians in Kosovo 
achieved a considerable degree of autonomy under the decentralized system of 
the 1974 constitution, the chief objective of the Albanian nationalist activists 
was to improve the status of the Albanians in Macedonia by securing the 
recognition of their collective rights (Qosja 1990).
While the situation improved on certain issues in the 1990s, such as 
secondary education,30 Albanians in Macedonia remained dissatisfied on 
several issues after the transition to the multi-party political system. The first 
issue was the census results: Albanians claimed that the results of the 1991 
census underestimated the number of Albanians because many Albanians 
boycotted the census. This issue was resolved to some extent by the census 
under the observation of the Council of Europe in 1994, but many observers 
believe that the number of Albanians is still underestimated due to many not 
being recognised under the harsh citizenship requirements (Poulton 2000: 186).
29 For example, school curricula and textbooks were revised and Albanian-language 
schools were ordered to teach more Macedonian. See Phillips 2004: 45; Roudometof 
2002: 167.
30 See Poulton 2000: 185. The number of regular secondary schools with instruction in the 
Albanian language increased from 6  in 1991/92 school year to 19 in 95/96 year, and the 
number of Albanian pupils increased from 2875 in 91/92 year (4.1% of the total) to 8687 
(11.2%) in 95/96 year. For the details of the statistics, see Milosavlevski & Tomovski 
1997: 329-345.
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The second issue was the higher education (university level) in the 
Albanian language. In the socialist era, many Albanian students attended 
Prishtina University in Kosovo, which was almost entirely Albanian in intake 
(Poulton 2000: 132). Since the access to Prishtina University was lost due to 
the suppressions by the Serbian authorities, Albanians in Macedonia demanded 
an official approval of the university in the Albanian language and unilaterally 
set up “Albanian University” in Tetovo, which started to function illegally in 
1995 (Poulton 2000: 185). The Macedonian authorities, however, kept refusing 
demands for the official approval of Tetovo University.
Thirdly, the display of the Albanian national symbols was also a 
contentious issue. When newly-elected mayors of some municipalities raised 
the Albanian flag over the municipal offices, the Macedonian authorities ruled 
that it was illegal and the police moved in to enforce the removal of the flag, 
which led to three deaths of protesters and the arrest of the mayor of Gostivar 
and 400 others (Poulton 2000:189).
Finally, the lack of equal opportunity for employment, especially in 
the public sector, was also an important issue. Albanians claimed that they 
were underrepresented in the public sector: in the police and the army, for 
example, Macedonians constituted 93.9% whereas Albanians constituted only 
3.1% (ICG 2000: 17-18). In 1993, a leader of the Albanian party in Macedonia 
pointed out that there were no courts presided over by Albanians, no ethnic 
Albanians in the Macedonian Army General Staff or in the Interior and Foreign 
Ministries (Poulton 2000: 188). Overall, Albanians claimed that they were 
reduced to second-class citizens and they demanded to be recognised as a 
“constituent nation” of Macedonia.
These grievances among Albanians, however, did not lead to the 
“decision from above” to take up arms in Macedonia, because the Albanian
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politicians did not choose to rebel. For example, when some local Albanian 
politicians announced the establishment of a self-proclaimed Albanian 
autonomous republic in April 1992, the leaders of the major Albanian party 
severely criticised this move (Bugajski 1994: 116-117). When the Kosovo 
crisis broke out in 1998, an influx of Albanian refugees into Macedonia 
occurred and the Macedonians were on alert, but the Albanian elite did not take 
any opportunistic action to destabilise the country.31 This moderate attitude 
continued even after the revolts of the Albanian rebels in Macedonia in 2001: 
leaders of the Albanian parties criticised the armed rebellion and called for the 
rebels to put down arms.32
This relatively moderate attitude of the Albanian politicians was partly 
due to the willingness of the Macedonian parties to form a power-sharing 
coalition government with Albanian parties: since 1990, Macedonian parties 
that won the elections always offered some Albanian party to be a member of 
the coalition government and to take some ministerial posts. Such attitudes 
of the Macedonian parties certainly contributed to the moderation of the 
Albanian politicians in Macedonia. In addition, international factors also 
played an important role. Since the Albanians in neighbouring Kosovo had 
chosen a non-violent path, they did not encourage the Albanians in Macedonia 
to take up arms. As discussed above, Albania also did not encourage fellow 
Albanians in the former Yugoslavia to take up arms.
31 RFE/RL Balkan Report, 3-30,1999/08/03.
32 IWPR'S Balkan Crisis Report, 224, 2001/03/07; IWPR'S Balkan Crisis Report, 227, 
2001/03/16.
33 The author examined elsewhere the continuation of the power-sharing coalition 
government in Macedonia since 1990, comparing it with the establishment of the 
exclusive one-party government in Croatia in 1990. See Kubo 2004.
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(2) Decision from Below: The NLA and Its Limited Resources
While the Albanian political elite thus did not choose to take up arms, 
a small guerrilla group named the National Liberation Army (Ushtria 
glirimtare kombetare, NLA hereafter) emerged and started its rebellion in 2001. 
The leader of the NLA, Ali Ahmeti, was one of four men who prepared to set 
up the KLA in Kosovo, known by his pseudonym “Abaz Xhuka” at that time.34 
Ahmeti was a member of the radical Marxist-Leninist group and involved in 
the demonstrations in Kosovo in 1981, and sentenced to six months 
imprisonment, after which he fled to Switzerland (Phillips 2004: 8). Another 
leader of the NLA who emerged at the early phase of the rebellion, Fazli Veliu, 
was his uncle and a former high-school teacher (Phillips 2004: 8). Veliu was 
wanted by the authorities in Skopje in connection with terrorist bombing attack 
in his home town of Krcevo in 1998, while he denied the charge.35 The NLA 
was thus organised by a small number of members of an underground 
organisation. In other words, the rebellion by the NLA in Macedonia was 
directed by the “decision from below,” rather than the “decision from above.” 
Just like their counterparts in Kosovo, the organisers of the rebellion had fairly 
limited resources at their disposal. By May 2001, for example, it was estimated 
that the NLA had 800 men under arms (Phillips 2004: 111). The NLA 
commander in one region stated that his units had no mortars above 82mm 
(Phillips 2004: 106).
An important factor that limited the resources available to the NLA 
was the lack of systematic support from the Albanians in Kosovo. Certainly, 
Ahmeti and Veliu were heavily involved in the KLA activities. This does not 
mean, however, that the KLA or the LPK people systematically decided to
34 Philips 2004: 8 . As for the four-man branch of the LPK, see also Judah 2000a: 115-116.
35 IWPR'S Balkan Crisis Report, 227,2001/3/16.
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organise another “liberation struggle” in Macedonia. On the contrary, the LPK 
held a convention in Prizren in August 1999 and decided to dissolve itself now 
that its mission had been completed.36 For the Albanians outside Kosovo, this 
meant that they needed to organise their own movement again.37 While 
Ahmeti later decided to establish the NLA with his friends from Macedonia 
and started gathering arms that remained in Kosovo, “even the best friends 
from the KLA, such as Thagi and Mahmuti, were against such action and they 
argued that it was wrong to make another rebellion.”38 Due to the lack of 
systematic support from the Albanians in Kosovo, the organisers of the 
rebellion in Macedonia could not mobilise the resources as much as they could 
have done if they had enjoyed full support from the Albanians in Kosovo.
(3) Low Level of the Initial Intensity of Rebellion
Since the resources available to the rebels were fairly limited, the NLA 
could start its rebel activities only at the low level of intensity. The first NLA 
actions occurred in January 2001, when a police station in the predominantly 
Albanian village of Tearce was attacked by grenade and one policeman was 
killed (Rusi 2004: 2). In February, there were gun-battles between government 
forces and the rebels near the village called Tanusevci (Churcher 2002: 17). In 
March 2002, battles between rebels and government forces occurred around 
Tetovo (Phillips 2004: 85-98). The armed conflict between NLA and the 
Macedonian forces continued since the end of February until August 2001 
when the “Framework Agreement” for constitutional changes (so-called “Ohrid 
Agreement”) was signed by two Macedonian and two Albanian parties. While 
fighting did not stop immediately, armed insurrection by the NLA largely
36 Interview with Ibrahim Kelmendi, Tetovo, 2006/05/30.
37 Interview with Ibrahim Kelmendi, Tetovo, 2006/05/30.
38 Interview with Ibrahim Kelmendi, Tetovo, 2006/05/30.
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ceased after the agreement. During six months of conflict, the level of intensity 
of rebellion remained relatively low, never reaching to the level of protracted 
civil war. In six months of fighting between the Macedonian security forces 
and ethnic Albanian guerrillas, it is estimated that between 150 and 250 people 
were killed (Phillips 2004: 161). The armed conflict in Macedonia was far 
short of the level of severity of other conflicts in the ex-Yugoslav region, at 
least in terms of the death casualties. Indeed, if one applies the common 
operationalisation of “civil war” in the large-N studies which takes 1,000 
deaths as the threshold of the “onset” of civil war, the Macedonian conflict 
would not be classified as a “civil war.”
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the relationship between the type of 
decision-maker and the initial intensity of rebellion in four ex-Yugoslav 
countries. The Serb rebellions in Croatia and Bosnia were directed by 
“decisions from above” and the initial intensity of rebellion was very high. On 
the contrary, the Albanian rebellions in Serbia and Macedonia were caused by 
“decisions from below” and the initial intensity of rebellion was fairly low. The 
amount of resources available to the organisers of rebellion was the key factor 
that explains the causal mechanism: the Serb organisers of rebellion had a large 
amount of resources at their disposal, while the Albanian organisers only had a 
limited amount of resources for rebellion.
As was pointed out in Chapter 3, this argument does not mean that the 
type of decision-maker is the only factor that determines the initial intensity of 
rebellion. Another important factor is the inter-ethnic factor. It was argued in 
Chapter 3 that the initial level of intensity would be higher if the ethnic group
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is powerful, while it would be lower if the ethnic group is less powerful within 
the state. This seems to be an important factor that explains the difference 
between the Serb rebellions and the Albanian ones: Serbs were much more 
powerful in the former Yugoslavia than Albanians, occupying a large share of 
the top cadres in the JNA and having the largest Republic (Republic of Serbia) 
under their control. One can surely argue that this inter-ethnic difference also 
explains different outcomes in the initial intensity of rebellion among the cases 
of ex-Yugoslav countries.
The present chapter cannot examine which factor was more important. 
In any case, the large-N analysis in Chapter 3 has shown that the intra-ethnic 
factor remains significant even when one controls for the inter-ethnic factor 
and other conditions. This conclusion seems to be valid for the cases of 
ex-Yugoslavia as well. For example, while it is true that Albanians in general 
had much less resources at their disposal compared to Serbs, it is also true that 
the Albanian political elite in Kosovo and Macedonia had much more financial 
and human resources than those who actually organised rebellions. Therefore, 
one can make a counterfactual argument39 that the initial level of intensity of 
rebellion would have been higher than it actually was if the Albanian political 
elite had decided to go to rebellion. The intra-ethnic factor thus constitutes an 
important part of the explanation of different outcomes in the initial intensity of 
rebellion.
The present thesis now proceeds to the next step of the three-step 
approach, namely the analysis of the causes and determinants of the initial 
occurrence of rebellion. This will be the task of Part III.
■5Q
For the method of counterfactual argument, see Fearon 1991.
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Part El: Onset of Initial Rebellion
Chapter 5 
Etiology of Ethnic Rebellion: Quantitative Analysis of the Effect 
of Dynamic Grievances
Introduction
This chapter addresses a fundamental question regarding the 
occurrence of ethnic rebellions -  why do people decide to take up arms? In 
order to do so, it will firstly present a model for the explanation of the 
decisions by some members of the ethnic group to take up arms. This model 
takes into consideration both structural conditions and the dynamic element of 
grievances discussed in Chapter 1. The present chapter then conducts a large-N 
analysis based on the MAR dataset. A research design is firstly discussed and 
then the results will be presented and discussed.
1. Theoretical Model: Dynamic Grievances and Structural Conditions
A model presented here is based on some basic assumptions. Firstly, 
this model considers violence (rebellion) as an instrument to change the status 
quo. Secondly, this model assumes that there are other options to take for the 
potential organisers of the rebellion, and that they will assess other options they 
could take before they actually start preparing and organising rebellion. Given 
the organisational nature of the violence, these assumptions seem reasonable. 
Normally, rebellion is not a spontaneous and irrational reaction: in order to 
make a rebellion into reality, one has to spend significant resources in terms of
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preparation and organisation. Therefore, it will be realistic to assume that the 
potential organisers of the rebellion will assess other options they can take 
before they actually start preparing and organising a rebellion.
As for the other options they can take, one can think of two other 
fundamental options. The first is peaceful means to change the status quo. 
When one attempts to change the status quo, whether one should take peaceful 
means or violent means is a critical choice. Peaceful means to change the status 
quo therefore constitute an important alternative to violent means such as 
rebellions. The second is to accept the continuation of the status quo and not to 
take any action to change it. When one decides to take any action whether it is 
violent or peaceful, there must be a judgment that taking an action in order to 
change the status quo is better than simply accepting the status quo. The model 
thus assumes that there are basically three options for the potential organisers 
of collective action, namely (1) to accept the status quo and to do nothing, (2) 
to take peaceful means to change the status quo, and (3) to take violent means 
to change the status quo.
How do they compare and assess these three options they could take? 
One can make a model with some simple mathematical expressions to simplify 
the assessment process. Firstly, let us express the perceived value o f the 
continuation o f status quo in the eyes of potential organisers of collective 
action by SQ. Secondly, let us express the perceived and expected value of the 
change of status quo by SQ2. This SQ2 thus stands for the improvement from 
the status quo, such as the elimination of discriminations or the restoration of 
autonomy. By definition, therefore, one can express the relationship between 
SQ and SQ2 mathematically as SQ2 > SQ. Any collective action to change the 
status quo could occur only when such SQ2 is conceivable. In other words, if 
the status quo is so good for the members of the ethnic group that one cannot
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conceive any SQ2 which is higher than SQ, no collective action will be made 
by the members of the ethnic group.
When one decides to take an action to change the status quo, one 
considers the cost of action. Let us thus express the perceived and expected 
cost of the peaceful protest option by CPROT and the perceived and expected 
cost of the violent rebellion option by CREB. As long as the cost of at least one 
type of action is smaller than the difference in the value between SQ and SQ2, 
one would take a less costly option to achieve SQ2. On the other hand, if the 
cost of both types of action is larger than the difference in the value between 
SQ and SQ2, one would not take an action even when such SQ2 is indeed 
conceivable. In this case, people do not take any action not because they are 
fully satisfied with the status quo but because they think that taking an action 
to change the status quo is too costly and that it is better off not to take any 
action even though such SQ2 is theoretically conceivable.
As long as SQ2 is conceivable, therefore, three different decisions 
made by the potential organisers of the rebellion can be predicted according to 
the relative values of four factors in the following manner. One would make:
(1) No action if SQ > (SQ2 -  CPROT) and SQ > (SQ2 -  CREB)
(2) Peaceful protest if CPROT < CREB and (SQ2 -  CPROT) > SQ
(3) Violent rebellion if CREB < CPROT and (SQ2 -  CREB) > SQ
An equation (1) stands for the situation where both types of actions are 
perceived as too costly given the improvement one can expect by making such 
an action. This situation could occur either because the cost is perceived to be 
very high or because the improvement one can make (SQ2 -  SQ) is not so 
large. An equation (2) stands for the situation where it is perceived that the 
peaceful protest is less costly than the violent rebellion and that the cost of 
peaceful protest is not too high given the improvement one can expect by
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making such an action. An equation (3) stands for the situation where it is 
perceived that the violent rebellion is less costly than the peaceful protest and 
that the cost of violent rebellion is not too high given the improvement one can 
expect by making such an action. Based on this simple model, the following 
part will try to develop theoretical arguments and draw hypotheses to explain 
the onset of the rebellion.
(1) Structural Conditions
Let us firstly examine a set of structural conditions that would 
determine the onset of rebellion. Chapter 1 argued that an overwhelming 
majority of the existing literature on the causes of the occurrence of rebellion 
remain static, focusing on the structural conditions. The model presented above 
does not deny the importance of structural conditions. On the contrary, one can 
incorporate a variety of structural conditions into the explanatory framework. 
The model discussed above implies two general principles related to the 
structural conditions. Firstly, if the structural conditions lower the perceived 
value of the status quo in the eyes of members of the ethnic group, they will 
increase the probability that some members of the ethnic group will decide to 
go to rebellion, other conditions being equal (the lower the value of SQ, the 
higher the probability of occurrence of ethnic rebellion). Secondly, if the 
structural conditions lower the perceived cost of rebellion, they will increase 
the probability that some members of the ethnic group will decide to rebel, 
other conditions being equal (the lower the value of CREB, the higher the 
probability of occurrence of ethnic rebellion). One can call the former 
“motivating conditions” and the latter “enabling conditions.” In the present 
analysis, these two types of structural conditions are considered, mostly based 
on the key findings in the existing literature.
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Contrasting the motivations and enabling conditions as causes of 
conflict is not new. Indeed, a large class of theories of ethnic conflict explains 
war as a product of motivating and enabling conditions (Oberg 2002: 15). 
However, some scholars tend to see these two types of conditions as mutually 
exclusive and argue that only one type is important for the occurrence of 
internal conflict. On the contrary, the model presented in this thesis suggests 
the complementary nature of these two types and the possibility of different 
combinations of factors for the explanation of ethnic rebellion. The model 
presented above suggests that, in some cases, ethnic rebellion may occur even 
when there are no enabling conditions if the status quo is so bad. The model 
also suggests that, in other cases, ethnic rebellion may occur even when the 
status quo is not so bad if opportunities for rebellion are so manifest. According 
to this model, what is important is the relationship between the status quo and 
the opportunities for change.
Motivating Conditions
Motivating conditions relate to the motives of the potential rebels. 
Clearly, there would be no rebellion if there are no conditions that motivate 
members of ethnic groups to take up arms. In the model presented above, this 
logic could be expressed as follows: the higher the SQ, the more likely that the 
members of ethnic groups are satisfied with the SQ; and the lower the SQ, the 
more likely that the members of ethnic groups will find a change of the status 
quo (SQ2) more desirable even when the cost of the action is taken into 
account. In other words, conditions that lower the value of SQ can be regarded 
as motivating conditions.
What conditions are likely to lower the perceived value of SQ for the 
members of ethnic groups? There are at least two such factors. The first factor
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is the presence of discrimination against the ethnic group. In the literature on 
ethnic conflict, discrimination is often cited as a source of grievances that 
motivate members of the ethnic group to take up arms. Analysing ethnic 
secessionist conflict, for example, many authors have argued that 
discrimination against ethnic groups provide a strong incentive. Sterling argues 
that the motive of separatism is almost invariably the conviction that the 
population involved is the victim of discrimination (Sterling 1979). Heraclides 
(1991: 17), who examined various secessionist conflicts in the world, argues 
that “[f]or separatism to be bom there should exist some kind of disadvantage.” 
As discussed in Chapter 1, Gurr (2000: 105) also argues that, for disadvantaged 
groups, “invidious treatment and repression are primary incentives for 
ethnopolitical action.” Brown (1997) argues that discriminatory political 
institutions and discriminatory economic systems are often identified as one of 
the underlying causes of internal conflict. One can expect, therefore, that the 
presence of discrimination against the ethnic group would lower the value of 
SQ for this ethnic group and thus increase the probability of the occurrence of 
rebellion.
The second factor is the loss of autonomy. The statehood or autonomy 
is often of primary importance both practically and symbolically for the ethnic 
group, and the loss of the statehood or autonomy can cause widely-held 
grievances among members of the ethnic group. Coakley (1994: 1) points out 
that the prominence of territorial demands in the rhetoric of ethnic activists is 
an extremely common phenomenon, such as demands for autonomy within a 
state, for separation from it, or for unification with another state. Conflicts in 
which groups claim exclusive title of territory for control or access are 
generally perceived to be more intractable, since conflict over territory is 
usually zero-sum, especially when territory is associated with symbolic or
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cultural aspects of group solidarity (Sisk 1996: 18). Bose (2002, 2003) also 
argues that the most intractable ethnic conflicts are often caused by the 
conflicting claims of self-determination held by the ethnic groups. Therefore, 
the loss of independence or autonomy, caused by the forced annexation or 
other reasons, can lower the value of SQ and motivate members of the ethnic 
group to take up arms.
Enabling Conditions
Enabling conditions are related to what have often been termed 
“opportunities.” The fundamental reasoning here is that the rebellion would be 
impossible, even if the potential rebels are motivated, if there are no conditions 
that enable the rebellion. In the model presented above, this logic can be 
expressed as follows: even if the value of SQ is low, making a rebellion to 
change the status quo would not be a desirable option for members of the 
ethnic group if it is so costly. What conditions are, then, likely to affect 
(increase or decrease) the perceived cost of rebellion? Five such factors are 
considered, namely (1) type of the political regime, (2) strength of the 
government authority, (3) the level of economic development, (4) geographic 
terrain of the state, and (5) regional concentration of the ethnic group.
The first factor is the nature of the political regime. If the political 
regime is a harsh authoritarian one, one would expect a harsher response by the 
state authorities to violent collective action. If a state is under such a political 
regime, furthermore, associational and organisational activities of the people 
are often severely restricted by the political regime and thus it would be more 
difficult for the potential rebels to organise rebellion activities. One could 
expect, therefore, that the cost of rebellion would be higher under the harsh 
authoritarian regime.
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The second factor is the weakening of government authority. This may 
decrease the cost of rebellion (perceived by the potential rebels) because one 
would expect weaker and less harsh responses by the state authorities if 
government authority is weak or weakening. As discussed in Chapter 3, this 
argument has been supported by statistical analysis of the onset of civil war 
conducted by Fearon and Laitin (2003). Following them, two indicators of the 
weakening of the government authority will be considered in the present 
analysis again, namely the political transition and the newness of the state.
The third factor is the level of economic development. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, it has been shown by a number of studies that the level of economic 
development has a significant effect on the occurrence of civil wars. Collier 
and Hoeffler believe that this factor represents the “opportunity cost” of 
rebellion for individuals. Fearon and Laitin argue that this factor represents the 
weakness of the state: the lower the economic development is, the smaller the 
economic resources that the state can use against the rebels. In either way, 
higher level of economic development is regarded as a higher cost for the 
rebellion. One would thus expect that it would be less likely that members of 
the ethnic group in the country decide to take up arms as the level of the 
economic development in the country becomes higher.
The fourth factor is the geographic conditions of the state. Fearon and 
Laitin have emphasised the importance of the “technology of insurgency” and 
shown that the mountainous terrain is related to the occurrence of civil war: the 
mountainous terrain helps the rebels to hide from the government forces and 
makes it easier for them to conduct guerrilla-insurgency warfare against the 
state. One would expect, therefore, that the perceived cost of rebellion is lower 
for the members of the ethnic group if a country is more mountainous.
The fifth factor is the regional concentration of the ethnic group in the
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state. If the ethnic group is concentrated in the region, this means that the 
potential rebels could have a regional and territorial basis for the rebellion. On 
the other hand, if the group is primarily urban or dispersed throughout the 
country, the potential rebels cannot have such a regional and territorial basis for 
the rebellion. If they do not have any regional and territorial basis for the 
rebellion, it would be difficult for them to fight against the government forces 
effectively or to protect them from the attacks of the government forces. One 
could thus expect that the perceived cost of rebellion is lower for the members 
of the ethnic group that is regionally more concentrated within the state. Toft 
was the first to stress the association between the group concentration and the 
rebellion in the MAR dataset (Fearon & Laitin 1999: 16), and Fearon and 
Laitin (1999: 16) also found empirically that this factor is “powerful and 
robust” and “minorities that have a rural base are far more likely to see 
large-scale ethnic violence than urban and widely dispersed minorities.” 
Therefore, one would expect that it is more likely that members of the ethnic 
group decide to take up arms if the ethnic group is regionally concentrated.
(2) Dynamic Grievances: Importance of the Time Dimension
The preceding section discussed a set of structural conditions that may 
affect the occurrence of ethnic rebellion, based on the key findings and 
arguments in the literature. Now, let us assume for the moment that the values 
of SQ, SQ2, CPROT and CREB will be determined by these structural 
conditions discussed above. If one does not take into account the time 
dimension, the predicted outcome will be the same as far as the conditions that 
determine the value of these factors remain unchanged. In other words, if one 
chooses to take one option at some time, t=0, the model without time 
dimension will predict that one will also choose to take the same option at the
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next period, t=l, as long as the conditions that affect the value of these factors 
remain the same.
This prediction is, however, not plausible. Let us examine a 
hypothetical situation where some members of the ethnic group decide to go to 
peaceful protest in order to change the status quo at some time, say t=0. For the 
discussion here, it is assumed that the ethnic group cannot change the status 
quo alone and the state authorities must decide whether they will change the 
status quo according to the demands of the ethnic group. If the state authorities 
do change the status quo, this move creates a new status quo at the next 
moment, t=T. However, if the state authorities ignore the ethnic group’s 
demands and decide to maintain the status quo, the status quo remains at the 
next moment, t=l, and the organisers of collective action will have to consider 
what to do again under the exactly same conditions as the previous moment. As 
discussed above, if one does not consider the time dimension, the prediction 
will be the same for the next moment, t=l, since all factors remain the same: 
they will make a peaceful protest at t=l again. If the state authorities keep 
ignoring their demands, therefore, there will be an endless repetition of 
peaceful protests by the ethnic group and their rejection by the state authorities.
This endless repetition of peaceful protests and their rejection, 
however, is not a realistic prediction because members of the ethnic group 
would gradually learn that peaceful protests are not effective. As time goes by, 
members of the ethnic group will get frustrated by the fact that peaceful 
protests failed to achieve a change of the status quo, and will look for other 
options to achieve their goal. In order to incorporate this dynamism into the 
model, let us introduce the discounting factor p  and assume that the expected 
and perceived value of the SQ2 achieved by peaceful protests will be 
discounted by this factor p  (where 0 <p  < 1) at t=l if people were involved in
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peaceful protests in the previous period (t=0). The expected total benefit by 
making peaceful protests at t= l would be as follows: p  * SQ2 -  CPROT.
This discounting factor may not be sufficient for members o f the 
ethnic group to make a decision to take up arms at t= l. In other words, the 
expected value achieved by peaceful protest may remain larger than that o f  
violent rebellion: (p*SQ2 -  CPROT) > (SQ2 -  CREB). Then, members o f the 
ethnic group will again choose peaceful protest at t= l despite some frustrations. 
If peaceful protests continue for longer period without achieving their goals, 
however, the expected value o f the change o f status quo by peaceful protest 
will become smaller than the expected value o f the change o f status quo by 
violent means at some moment, t=m: (pm*SQ2 -  CPROT) < (SQ2 -  CREB). 
This effect o f the discounting factor is illustrated in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1 Effect of the Discounting Factor 
Value
SQ 2-CPRO T
SQ 2-CREB
SQ
-\ —  --------
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At such moment t=m, the accumulated frustrations among members of 
the ethnic group are so large that the organisers o f collective action become 
disillusioned with peaceful protest as a means to successfully change an 
unfavourable status quo. As a result o f such disillusionment, some members o f  
the ethnic group will take the other option, namely violent rebellion, even 
though the violent option is more costly than the peaceful option. Put simply, 
they choose a more costly option because they know from their own
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experiences that the less costly option did not, and would not, work. In sum, 
the model discussed above suggests that grievances among members of the 
ethnic group would get larger when they keep failing to achieve their goals by 
peaceful means. Let us call this “dynamic grievances,” because it is assumed 
that the grievances increase over time, as members of the ethnic group continue 
their peaceful protest activities. One can thus draw the following hypothesis 
from this model:
Hypothesis 1: The longer members of an ethnic group have been involved in 
peaceful protest activities, the higher the probability that some members 
of the ethnic group decide to take up arms.
Of course, this discounting factor p  cannot be calculated 
mathematically from the empirical analysis. In reality, this factor p  may vary 
across ethnic groups or across individuals within the same ethnic group. Indeed, 
the case study in the following chapter shows that, in the case of Albanians in 
Kosovo, some people gave up peaceful means earlier while other people kept 
sticking to the peaceful means, believing that they were the best option to 
successfully change the status quo. The purpose of the discussion above is 
simply to illustrate the problematic aspect of the assumption of structural 
determination model and to explain and incorporate the effect of the time 
dimension in a simplified manner.
(3) The Effect of the Type of Decision-Makers
As discussed in Chapter 1, the attention to the initial level of rebellion 
raises one question: do the low-intensity rebellion and large-scale rebellion 
have the same causes or not? Because the issue of initial level of rebellion has
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not been addressed much in the existing literature, most analyses on the causes 
of the rebellion ignore the difference between the onset of low-intensity 
rebellion and high-intensity rebellion. Therefore, this chapter will attempt to 
examine whether the onsets of low-intensity rebellions and large-scale ones 
have the different causes or not.
How does this relate to the model discussed above? Recall the 
distinction between the two types of decision-makers -  ethnic leaders and 
non-leaders. As was argued in Chapter 3, the key difference between these two 
types of decision-makers is the amount of resources available to them. One can 
argue that the amount of resources available to them will also affect the 
evaluation of the expected cost of making a rebellion.
As discussed in Chapter 3, non-leaders possess a limited amount of 
resources for the rebellion and often can organise only a low-intensity rebellion. 
Due to the limited amount of resources, non-leaders seem more likely to 
perceive an option of violent rebellion as more costly: if one can only make a 
rebellion of a relatively low intensity, the balance of military powers will be in 
favour of the state authorities, and thus it will be more likely that the state 
authorities can crack down the rebellion and punish its participants harshly. For 
non-leaders, therefore, one can argue that it is more likely that the peaceful 
protest will be perceived as less costly than the violent rebellion, at least at the 
beginning. In other words, if they decide to take up arms, they will do so after 
trying to achieve their goals by peaceful means and realise that the peaceful 
option does not work, as discussed above.
For the ethnic leaders who can mobilise a large amount of resources, 
however, this may not be the case. Because they can mobilise a large amount of 
resources more easily, the procurement cost will be smaller than for the 
non-leaders. In addition, if they can mobilise a large amount of resources and
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make a large-scale rebellion, the balance of powers between the state 
authorities and the rebels could be equal, or even in favour of the rebels. 
Therefore, ethnic leaders may perceive that the violent rebellion is less costly 
than the peaceful protest. The ethnic leaders will then decide immediately to 
take up arms before trying to achieve their objectives by peaceful means.
This difference between leaders and non-leaders affects hypothesis 1 
presented above. Note that hypothesis 1 is based on the assumption that 
members of the ethnic group decided to go to peaceful protests before they 
decide to take up arms. This means that, at least at the beginning of collective 
action, peaceful protest was perceived as less costly than violent rebellion by 
the organisers of collective action. The discussion above on the difference 
between ethnic leaders and non-leaders suggests that the validity of hypothesis 
1 may be limited to the decisions made by non-leaders, because the assumption 
of hypothesis 1 may not be valid for the decisions made by ethnic leaders. 
Because of a large amount of resources available to them, the ethnic leaders 
may decide to go to violent rebellions without making peaceful protests to 
achieve their objectives.
In order to check whether this argument is valid or not, this chapter 
will examine the occurrence of lower-intensity rebellion and large-scale 
rebellion separately.
2. Large-N Analysis
Having drawn a testable hypothesis based on the model, the present 
chapter now conducts large-N analyses to test it. This section firstly presents 
the research design and the operationalisation of variables. It will then present 
the empirical results.
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(1) Research Design and Operationalisation 
Dependent Variable
To test the hypothesis presented above, the dependent variable should 
capture the moment when some members of the ethnic group started to take up 
arms. For the dependent variable of the present analysis, therefore, a dummy 
variable (REBONSET hereafter) was created that takes a value of 1 when some 
members of an ethnic group are involved in violent rebellion activities (of 
whatever level) for the first time in the period of 1945-2000. An ordinal 
measure of “anti-regime rebellion” of the MAR dataset was used to create this 
dummy variable (as for the scale on which this variable is coded, see Appendix 
1). In other words, this dummy variable (REBONSET) takes the value of 0 
while this anti-rebellion index takes the value of 0. When this index takes a 
value more than 1 for the first time during the period from 1945 to 2000, the 
dummy variable takes the value of 1. This dummy variable thus captures the 
“onset” of rebellion, i.e. the moment when some members of the ethnic group 
decided to take up arms against the state for the first time since 1945. The 
period after the “onset” of rebellion is given a missing value and will be 
excluded from the analysis. The unit of analysis is therefore ethnic group-year, 
and the dataset covers all ethnic groups and years from 1945-2000 except for 
the period after the initial onset of rebellion.
Some ethnic groups in the MAR dataset experienced more than two 
rebellions during the period from 1945 to 2000, separated by some continuous 
period of peace. Let us take an example of Tuareg in Mali in the dataset. The 
“anti-regime rebellion” index for Tuareg takes the value of 6 for the first time 
in 1960 (this is the first year of the country as well) but becomes 0 in 1965 
(note that, until 1984, the data is constructed based on 5-year periods). The 
peaceful period continues until 1989, and in 1990 the rebellion index takes the
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value of 4 again and the rebellion continues until 1995. If one sticks to the 
operationalisation above, the dependent variable in all years after the first 
“onset” in 1960 will have a missing value and the second onset of rebellion in 
1990 will not be included in the analysis. In order to avoid this omission of 
later rebellions within the same ethnic group, the alternative operationalisation 
of the dependent variable will also be used, which takes the value of 1 
whenever the rebellion starts (i.e. the rebellion index takes some value more 
than 1 and the value of the previous year is 0 or missing), the value of 0 when 
the ethnic group remains peaceful (i.e. when the “anti-regime rebellion” index 
takes the value of 0), and the missing value during the period of the 
continuation of the rebellion (The dummy variable based on this alternative 
operationalisation will be called REBONSET2 hereafter). The unit of analysis 
is therefore ethnic group-year, and the dataset covers all ethnic groups and 
years from 1945-2000 except for the period of continuation of rebellion. In the 
empirical analyses below, the results for the two operationalisations of the 
dependent variable will be compared.
Explanatory Variables
In order to test hypothesis 1, a variable “duration of peaceful protest 
activities” (PROTDUR hereafter) is created. This variable captures the number 
of years of continuous protest activities that members of the ethnic group had 
been engaged in. In order to create this variable, a variable of “peaceful 
protest” in the MAR dataset was used. This variable takes the values from 1 to 
5 if members of the ethnic group are engaged in some kind of peaceful protest 
activities (such as demonstrations) and the value of 0 if no protest activity is 
reported for that year. The variable PROTDUR takes the value of 1 when some 
kind of peaceful protests (at whatever level) started in that year, and will keep
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increasing by 1 every year as long as the peaceful protest activities continue. 
When the peaceful protests stop in some year (i.e. the value of the “peaceful 
protest” index becomes 0), this variable takes the value of 0, and if the peaceful 
protests start again later, this variable again starts from 1. If hypothesis 1 is true, 
the probability of the onset of rebellion should increase as the duration of the 
peaceful protest activities increases. This variable PROTDUR is the variable of 
key theoretical interest in this chapter.
A number of control variables are included in the empirical analysis 
below in order to control for the structural factors discussed above. As for the 
motivating factors, the present analysis uses variables included in the MAR 
dataset to operationalise discrimination and autonomy grievances. Firstly, there 
are two variables in the MAR dataset -  “political discrimination” (POLDIS) 
and “economic discrimination” (ECDIS) - that measures the role of public 
policy and social practice in maintaining or redressing inequalities. This 
variable is coded on a five-point scale, from 0 (no discrimination) to 4 
(repressive policy / restrictive policies).1 The higher value in this variable 
means the higher level of discrimination against the ethnic group. One would 
thus expect that the probability of the onset of rebellion should increase as the 
level of discrimination gets higher. One disadvantage of using these variables is, 
however, that the data is available only for a limited period (from 1980 
onwards) and the data is missing for a large share of the period covered by the 
present analysis. The inclusion of these two independent variables, therefore, 
will cause an omission of a majority of cases from the dataset (all cases from 
1945 to 1979 are dropped from the analysis automatically). The estimation of 
the effect of other variables may be biased, therefore, by the inclusion of these
1 For the detailed description of the variables, see the codebook of the MAR data (see 
footnote 6 of Chapter 2 for the address of the website).
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two variables that cause an omission of many cases in the dataset. In order to 
check this, the present analysis will conduct an analysis without these two 
variables to check the validity of estimation of the effect of the other 
independent variables.
As for the autonomy grievances, the “Index of Political Autonomy 
Grievances” (AUTLOST) variable in the MAR dataset will be used as a proxy. 
This variable is related to the loss of autonomy of the ethnic group and is a 
composite index for groups who have lost autonomy or undergone a transfer of 
control from one country to another. This is a continuous variable and takes a 
value ranging from 0 to 6, where the value of 0 stands for “no historical 
autonomy,” i.e. the absence of grievances related to the political autonomy, and 
the value of 6 stands for the highest degree of autonomy grievances.2 One 
would expect that the probability of the start of rebellion should increase as this 
variable AUTLOST takes a higher value.
The enabling conditions will be operationalised as follows. As for the 
presence of the highly authoritarian political regime, a dummy variable (DICT 
hereafter) was created, which captures the existence of a highly authoritarian 
regime, using the “polity2” variable in the PolitylV dataset.3 The polity2 
variable in the PolitylV dataset shows the degree to which the political regime 
is autocratic or democratic, taking values ranging from -10 (strongly 
autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic).4 The dummy variable DICT takes the
2 The variable is constructed by adding the weights for “Magnitude of Change” and 
“Group Status Prior to Change,” subtracting one, and dividing by the “Year-of Loss” 
weight. In other words, the coding of this variable considers (1) the degree of 
autonomy/independence the ethnic group had before the change, (2) the degree of loss 
after the change, and (3) the period of change. For the detailed description of the variable, 
see the codebook of the MAR data.
3 The PolitylV dataset is available at the website of the CIDCM, University of Maryland. 
See http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/politv/.
4 For detailed description of the variable and the coding procedure, see the “dataset user’s 
manual of the Polity IV project,” available online at: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/ 
inscr/politv.
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value of 1 when the polity2 variable of the country in which the ethnic group 
live takes the value between -5 and -10. If the argument in this chapter holds, 
this dummy variable must decrease the probability of the onset of ethnic 
rebellion, other conditions being equal.
As for the other enabling conditions, the present thesis again follows 
the operationalisation of Fearon and Laitin. The present analysis thus again 
uses their dummy variables of political instability and new state, which take the 
value of 1 if the country in which the ethnic group live had a three-or-greater 
change in the polity2 index in any of the three years prior to the year in 
question (INSTAB) and in the first and the second years of independence of the 
country in which the ethnic group live (NEWST). The present analysis also 
uses the GDP per capita (GDP) and the proportion of mountainous terrain 
(MONT) of the country in which the ethnic group live, taken from Fearon and 
Laitin dataset (see Chapter 3 for the details of these variables). As for the 
regional concentration of the ethnic group, the present analysis uses a dummy 
variable of the “regional concentration of the minority group” (REGCON) 
constructed by Fearon and Laitin. This variable takes the value of 0 when the 
minority group is either primarily urban or widely dispersed throughout the 
country, and a value of 1 if the group has a rural base somewhere in the country 
(Fearon & Laitin 1999: 16). Fearon and Laitin (1999,2003) have found that all 
of these variables have statistically significant effect on the occurrence of civil 
war or large-scale ethnic violence.
Estimation Method
As for the estimation method, the present chapter uses the 
random-effects logit model. This model is used when observations occur in 
clusters and observations within a cluster (i.e. within the same ethnic group)
136
tend to be more alike than observations from different clusters, because 
ordinary analyses which assume that all observations are independent tend to 
produce invalid standard errors (Agresti 2002: 491). The random-effects logit 
model uses the cluster-level term in the model, which takes the same value for 
each observation in a cluster but different values for different cluster (this term 
is unobserved and treated as varying randomly among clusters). The advantage 
of this estimation method is that it takes into account the panel structure 
(clustered structure) of the dataset and can estimate a more robust standard 
error for coefficients while it will retain the variability needed for estimating 
between-cluster effects of the explanatory variables in the model.5
Based on the construction of the random-effects logit model as a 
special case of the generalised linear mixed model for binary data (Agresti 
2002: 492-502), the fitted model of the present analysis can be summarised as 
follows.
logit ij — /?o + U, + /?;POLDIS,y + frECDlSy + AUTLO ST y + /yDICTy + 
/?5INSTAB/y + ^NEWST/y + /SyGDVij + /?sMONT,y + /^REGCONy + 
AoPROTDURy
where
logit,y= log odds that ethnic group / experience the onset of rebellion in 
the year j
the random effect component {U ,} are independent N (0, a 2) variates.
5 An alternative to the random-effects model for analysing clustered/panel data is to use 
the fixed-effects model. The severe disadvantage of this model, however, is that it will 
remove the source of variability needed for estimating between-cluster effects of the 
explanatory variables. If one is interested in the effects of the explanatory variables on the 
variance across clusters, therefore, one cannot use this model. See Agresti 2002: 496.
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Effect of the Type of Decision-Makers
In order to check whether the low-intensity rebellion and large-scale 
rebellion have the same causes or not, one has to distinguish the onset of these 
two types of rebellions. If the argument presented above is true, the variable 
PROTDUR will have a significant effect on the onset of low-intensity rebellion 
while it will not have a significant effect on the onset of large-scale rebellion. 
In order to check the validity of this argument, the present analysis will 
conduct an additional analysis by splitting the REBONSET cases into two 
categories: LOWONSET, which takes the value of 1 when the REBONSET = 1 
and the actual value of the anti-rebellion index is equal to or less than 5, and 
HIGHONSET, which takes the value of 1 when the REBONSET = 1 and the 
actual value of the anti-rebellion index is equal to or more than 6. In other 
words, LOWONSET captures the onset of rebellions of lower initial intensity, 
while the HIGHONSET captures the onset of rebellions of higher initial 
intensity. If the argument of this chapter is right, the effect of the variable 
PROTDUR will have a significant effect on the onset of lower-intensity 
rebellion while it will not on the onset of higher-intensity rebellion. If it is 
wrong, on the other hand, there will not be such a difference in terms of the 
effect of PROTDUR on the onset of two types of rebellions.
(2) Empirical Results
The results of the empirical analysis with the first operationalisation of 
the dependent variable (REBONSET) are presented in Table 5.1. Model 1 is a 
model with all independent variables. Among ten independent variables, the 
effect of six variables is statistically significant at least at the 0.1 level, while 
the effect of the variables ECDIS, INSTAB, GDP and MONT is not 
statistically significant. The effects of all variables that are statistically
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significant are in accordance with the theoretical expectations presented above. 
The signs o f the coefficients o f PROTDUR, POLDIS, AUTLOST, NEWST and 
REGCON are positive, which means that, other conditions being equal, the 
probability that an ethnic rebellion will occur in that year increases as the 
duration o f the peaceful protest gets longer, as the level o f political 
discrimination and the level o f  autonomy grievances get higher, when the 
country is a newly-born state, and when the ethnic group is regionally 
concentrated and has some rural basis. The sign o f the coefficient o f DICT is 
negative, which means that the probability that an ethnic rebellion will occur in 
that year decreases when the political regime in the country is strongly 
authoritarian. The sign and the statistical significance o f the coefficients hardly 
vary when statistically insignificant variables are omitted from the analysis.6
Table 5.1 Rnndom-Effects Logit Analysis of Determinants of the Onset 
of Rebellion, 1945-2000 (Dependent Variable: REBONSET)
Model 1 Moc el 2
coef. std err coef. std. err.
Political Discrimination 0.513** 0 2
Economic Discrimination ■ IP
 
> ->
 . i t 0 196
Lost Autonomy 0.535* 0318 0.889*** 0.179
Dictatorship -1 291** 0 624 -0.422* 0.241
Political Instability 0 239 0 469 0.395 0 253
New States 1.335* 0C69 1 823*** 0.374
Level of Economic Development -0.141 0 097 -0 08 0.057
Mountainous Terrain -0 144 0.199 -0.039 0 124
Regional Concentration 1 759** p 00 1 "86*** 0.443
Duration of Peaceful Protest 0064*** 0.023 0103*** 0 02
Constant -6 313*** 1.07 -6.740*** 0.652
N 2900 909-
*p< 0.1; **p 0.05; *** p < 0.01
6 Results of the analysis are not shown here due to the lack of space, but are available
from the author upon request. It is the same for the other analyses in this chapter.
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As discussed above, the inclusion o f POLDIS and ECDIS leads to the 
omission o f a large number o f cases in the dataset. In order to check whether 
this omission o f a large number o f cases biases the effect o f other explanatory 
variables, analyses were conducted without these two explanatory variables. 
Model 2 is a model without POLDIS and ECDIS. Note that the number o f  
cases increased from 2900 in Model 1 to 9097 in Model 2. This shows that 
more than 6000 cases (ethnic group-year) were omitted from the analyses due 
to the inclusion o f POLDIS and ECDIS. The results presented in Model 2, 
however, show that this omission does not affect the results concerning the 
other explanatory variables very much. All explanatory variables that were 
found statistically significant in Model 1 remain statistically significant in 
Model 2, and the signs o f the coefficients o f these variables also remain the 
same. In addition, all variables that were statistically insignificant in Model 1 
also remain insignificant in Model 2. Again, the sign and the statistical 
significance o f the coefficients hardly vary when statistically insignificant 
variables are omitted from the analysis.
Table 5.2 Random-Effects Logit Analysis of Determinants of the Onset 
of Rebellion, 1945-2000 (Dependent Variable: REBONSET2)
Model 3 Model 4
coef. std.en coef. std.en.
Political Discrimination 0.245*** 0.093
Economic Discrimination -0.026 0.097
Lost Autonomy 0.306** 0.124 0 406*** 0088
Dictatorship -0.485** 0.235 -0.478*** 0.153
Political Instability 0.225 0 251 0.207 0.183
New States I 224** 0 498 1.947*** 0 276
Level of Economic Development -0070* 0037 -0.072** 0.029
Mountainous Tenain 0.09? 0092 0.062 0.071
Regional Concentration 0.980*** 0.313 0964*** 0.234
Duration ofPeacefi.il Protest 0.015* 0 008 0.033*** 0.006
Constant -5.241*** 0482 -5.168*** 0.323
N 4291 11276
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05, ***p<0 01
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Table 5.2 presents the results of the analyses using the alternative 
operationalisation of the dependent variable (REBONSET2). Model 3 is a 
model using all explanatory variables. These results are mostly in line with the 
results presented in Table 5.1. All the explanatory variables that were found 
statistically significant in Model 1 remain statistically significant at least at the 
0.1 level in Model 3, and the signs of the coefficients of these variables remain 
the same. The only difference from Table 5.1 is that the effect of GDP is now 
statistically significant at the 0.1 level. The sign of the coefficient of GDP is 
negative, which means that the probability that an ethnic rebellion occurs in 
that year decreases as the level of economic development gets higher. This 
result is in line with the theoretical expectations discussed above. These results 
remain intact when variables that were statistically insignificant in Model 3 are 
dropped from the analysis.
Model 4 is a model without POLDIS and ECDIS. The number of 
cases increases from roughly 4300 in Model 3 to more than 11000 in Model 4. 
Again, however, the results are consistent with those of Model 3. All 
explanatory variables statistically significant in Model 3 remain significant in 
Model 4, and the signs of the coefficients of these variables also remain the 
same. These results remain intact when explanatory variables that were 
statistically insignificant in Model 4 are dropped from the analysis. One can 
conclude, therefore, that the results presented above are not biased by the 
omission of a large number of cases caused by the inclusion of POLDIS and 
ECDIS.
Going beyond the sign and significance of the coefficients, one can 
calculate the change of the odds based on the empirical results in order to 
visualise the impact of explanatory variables. To illustrate, let us see the change 
of the odds based on the results of Model 1 of Table 5.1. For example, the
141
coefficient of DICT is -1.291. This means that, other conditions being equal, 
the odds of occurrence of an ethnic rebellion will decrease by 73 percent if the 
political regime of the country is strongly authoritarian. The coefficient of 
REGCON is 1.759, meaning that the odds of occurrence of an ethnic rebellion 
will be 5.8 times more (increase by 480 percent) if the ethnic group is 
regionally concentrated and has some rural base, other conditions being equal. 
The coefficient of PROTDUR is 0.064. This means that, other conditions held 
constant, the odds of occurrence of an ethnic rebellion will increase by 6.6 
percent as the duration of peaceful protest increases one year. Does this mean 
that the effect of PROTDUR is weaker than other variables, such as DICT or 
REGCON? Not necessarily, since the variable PROTDUR can take a value 
from 0 to 55, while DICT and REGCON can only take either 0 or 1. While an 
effect of one-unit increase in the value of PROTDUR is smaller than that of 
DICT or REGCON, an impact of increase by larger units in the value of 
PROTDUR can be equal or even larger. For example, if the duration of 
peaceful protest increases from a minimum value (0) to a maximum value (55), 
the odds of occurrence of an ethnic rebellion will be 33 times larger (increase 
by 3200 percent), other conditions being equal. This increase of the odds is 
obviously much larger than that caused by DICT or REGCON. One can thus 
see that the effect of PROTDUR is no less significant than other variables such 
as DICT or REGCON, even though the latter variables have larger coefficients 
in Table 5.1.
Overall, therefore, one can conclude that the results of the empirical 
analyses in Table 5.1 and 5.2 support the key hypothesis of this chapter 
(hypothesis 1) presented above. While some structural conditions (namely 
political instability and mountainous terrain) are not supported by any of the 
analyses conducted here, most of the structural conditions do have a significant
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effect on the initial onset o f ethnic rebellion, and their effects are all in line 
with the findings in the existing literature.
Finally, let us conduct analyses separately for the occurrence o f  
rebellions o f lower intensity and high intensity. The results o f  the analyses 
using LOWONSET as a dependent variable are presented in Table 5.3. Model 5 
is a model with all explanatory variables. One can see from this table that the 
sign and significance o f coefficients remain the same as Model 1 o f Table 5.1, 
except for DICT which became statistically insignificant. As for the effect o f  
PROTDUR, it remains statistically significant and its coefficient is positive. 
These results are essentially the same when statistically insignificant 
explanatory variables are omitted from the analyses. When one excludes 
POLDIS and ECDIS from the analysis, the results for explanatory variables 
again remain essentially intact except for DICT which again became 
statistically significant at the 0.1 level (see Model 6). These results hardly vary 
when statistically insignificant explanatory variables are omitted.
Table 5.3 Rundoni-Effect.s Logit Ann lysis of Determinants of the Onset 
of Rebellion, 1945-2000 (Dependent Variable: LOWONSET)
Mode . 5 Mode 16
Coef. std. err. coef std.en.
Political Discrimination 0.320* 0 168
Economic Discrimination -0 104 0175
Lost Autonomy 0.497* 0.263 0.647*** 0.186
Dictatorship i o ... 4- Q\ 0 513 -0474* 0 265
Political Instability 0 291 0456 0075 0 304
New States 1 517** 0.675 1.677*** 0 426
Level of Economic Development -0 061 0072 -0 018 0052
Mountainous Terrain -0 217 0 162 -0072 0 133
Regional Concentration 1.070** 0.52 1.458*** 0443
Duration of Peaceful Protest 0.060*** 0021 0 096*** 0.023
Constant -5 868*** 088 -6.580*** 0.7
N 2887 9057
* p • 0.1 • ** p 0 05. *** p < 0.01
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The results of the analyses using HIGHONSET as a dependent 
variable are presented in Table 5.4. Model 7 is a model with all explanatory 
variables. Now one can see that the effects of explanatory variables are very 
different from Model 5. First of all, the effect of PROTDUR is now statistically 
insignificant. This result implies that the argument presented above on the 
effect of type of decision-makers could be true: while the duration of peaceful 
protests does increase the probability of occurrence of lower-intensity rebellion, 
it does not for the higher-intensity rebellion. This means that the organisers of 
collective action may immediately go to rebellion without going to peaceful 
protests when they have a sufficient amount of resources to organise a 
large-scale rebellion, as discussed above. Secondly, the effect of MONT is 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. While there has been no empirical 
evidence so far for this variable, therefore, one can interpret this result as a 
partial empirical evidence for the argument on the effect of rough terrain. 
Thirdly, the effect of ECDIS is now statistically significant. The sign of the 
coefficient is negative, however, contrary to the theoretical expectations 
presented above. In other words, this result suggests that the probability of 
occurrence of higher intensity rebellion decreases as the level of economic 
discrimination against the ethnic group gets higher. This contradictory result 
cannot be explained by the theoretical framework of the present thesis and thus 
remains a small puzzle. One ad-hoc answer to this puzzle could be that this 
factor may relate more to the economic resources of organisers of rebellion 
than to motivation of the organisers of rebellion. In any case, solving this 
puzzle is out of scope of the present thesis and this puzzle should be 
systematically addressed in future research.
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Table 5.4 Random-Effects Logit Analysis of Determinants of the Onset 
of Rebellion, 1945-2000 (Dependent Variable: HIGHONSET)_________
Mode - Mode 18
coef. std.en coef. std.en
Political Discrimination 3.220** 1 257
Economic Discrimination -1.997* 1.157
Lost Autonomy 0.885 1.022 :  317*#* 0 645
Dictatorship -4.363* 2 487 -0.997* 0.546
Political Instability -3.041 2.221 1 247** 0.485
New States 8 349 6.778 2.020** 0.844
Level of Economic Development -7.334*** n --> n -2.086*** 0.595
Mountainous Terrain 2.598** 1.116 -0 362 0.35
Regional Concentration 66.425*** 5.623 6.546*** 'I
Duration of Peaceful Protest -0 024 0189 0.139** 0 061
Constant -S3 006 - -1464*** 3 467
N 2849 8970
*p 01 . ** p 0.05; ***p<0.01
In the case o f HIGHONSET, however, the results discussed above are 
not so definitive, because they do not remain intact when POLDIS and ECDIS 
are excluded from the analysis. Model 8 is a model without POLDIS and 
ECDIS. Here, the effect o f PROTDUR again becomes statistically significant 
at the 0.05 level, and the sign o f the coefficient is positive in line with 
hypothesis 1. Therefore, this result suggests that the duration o f peaceful 
protests may matter even for the onset o f high-intensity rebellions. This implies 
that even ethnic leaders who can mobilise a large amount o f resources for 
rebellion will still think that the peaceful protest is less costly than violent 
rebellion and try to achieve their goals by peaceful means before they go to 
rebellion. Secondly, the effect o f INSTAB is now statistically significant at the
0.05 level. The sign o f the coefficient is positive, in line with the theoretical 
expectations o f this chapter, meaning that the probability o f occurrence o f  
higher-intensity rebellion increases if  a country is in a transition. Note that the 
political instability is now the only variable that has not been empirically
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supported so far. This result thus can be interpreted as a partial empirical 
evidence for the argument on the effect of political instability. These results 
remain intact when statistically insignificant variables are excluded from the 
analysis.
As for the effect of type of decision-makers presented above, therefore, 
the empirical evidence is mixed. On the one hand, when one includes POLDIS 
and ECDIS, the effect of PROTDUR becomes statistically insignificant for the 
onset of higher-intensity rebellions, while it remains statistically significant for 
the onset of lower-intensity rebellions. This suggests, as discussed above, that 
the argument of this chapter could be true: the organisers of collective action 
may immediately go to rebellion without going to peaceful protests, when they 
have a sufficient amount of resources to organise a large-scale rebellion. On the 
other hand, when one excludes POLDIS and ECDIS, the effect of PROTDUR 
is statistically significant for the onset of both lower-intensity and 
higher-intensity rebellions. This suggests that even ethnic leaders who can 
mobilise a large amount of resources will think that the peaceful protest is less 
costly than violent rebellion and try to achieve their goals by peaceful means 
before they go to rebellion. The empirical analyses here cannot provide a 
definitive answer. The following chapter, however, will show qualitatively that 
powerful ethnic leaders decided to go to rebellion without trying seriously to 
achieve their goals by peaceful means, because they thought that violent 
rebellions are not so costly to achieve their objectives.
Conclusion
This chapter attempted to explain the initial onset of ethnic rebellions. 
In order to do so, this chapter presented a simple model that considers both
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structural conditions and a dynamic aspect of grievances. This chapter has 
drawn a key hypothesis on the effect of dynamic grievances based on this 
model and then conducted a series of large-N analyses to test this hypothesis. 
The large-N analyses empirically support this key hypothesis. As for the 
structural conditions, all control variables except for the political instability and 
the mountainous terrain have statistically significant effects on the initial onset 
of rebellion, as shown in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2. In addition, one can find 
partial empirical evidence for these two control variables in Table 5.3 and 5.4 
where the empirical analyses are conducted separately for the onset of 
lower-intensity rebellions and higher-intensity ones.
The findings of this chapter have two theoretical implications. The 
first is the importance of the time dimension for the analysis of ethnic conflict. 
As pointed out in Chapter 1, most theories in the existing literature remain 
structural and static, implicitly assuming that the decisions made by the 
members of ethnic group will be the same as far as the objective or structural 
conditions do not change. The present thesis does not have any intention to 
deny the importance of structural conditions: indeed, the empirical results of 
this chapter confirm the key findings in the exiting literature. This chapter 
pointed out, however, that they alone may not suffice and there may be a 
dynamic aspect of grievances: as members of the ethnic group continue to go 
to peaceful protests, they may get increasingly frustrated by the failure of 
peaceful protests to achieve their goals, even if the structural conditions remain 
the same. The results for PROTDUR are fairly strong in most of the analyses in 
this chapter and thus support this argument. This suggests that it is important to 
take into consideration this time-dimension and to move towards more 
dynamic models.
Secondly, this chapter has argued for the complementary nature of the
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two types of structural conditions, namely the motivating conditions and the 
enabling conditions. As discussed in Chapter 1, some scholars argue that 
“grievances do not matter” and that “opportunities”, or enabling conditions, 
suffice for the explanation of large-scale domestic conflict. However, the 
empirical results presented here support the argument for the complementary 
nature of these two types of structural conditions. In all empirical analyses in 
this chapter, at least one variable from both motivating conditions and enabling 
conditions remain statistically significant. As for the motivating conditions, 
political discrimination and loss of autonomy are found statistically significant 
in most of the analyses. As for the enabling conditions, the newness of the state 
and the regional concentration of the ethnic group are found statistically highly 
significant in almost all analyses. Overall, therefore, these findings support the 
argument for the complementary nature of the motivating conditions and the 
enabling conditions. Given the fact that “no study controlling for GDP and 
geographic concentration has shown that level of economic, cultural and 
political grievances can differentiate cases of high rebellion from cases of low 
or no rebellion” (Laitin 2002: 645), the findings of this chapter constitute an 
important contribution to the understanding of the causes of ethnic rebellion.
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Chapter 6 
Dynamic Grievances and Structural Conditions: Qualitative 
Analysis of the Ex-Yugoslav Countries
Introduction
This chapter conducts a case study of the four cases of rebellions in 
the ex-Yugoslav countries. It again aims to show that the theoretical arguments 
made in the previous chapter are based on some real-life cases and to make 
abstract arguments empirically more convincing. Chapter 5 argued that the 
dynamic aspect of grievances constitutes an important part of the explanation 
of the decisions by the organisers of rebellion to take up arms. This chapter will 
show that this dynamic aspect of grievances was an important factor which 
explains the timing of the decisions made by the KLA and the NLA to take up 
arms in Kosovo and Macedonia. This factor, however, was not so important in 
the case of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia. This difference is due to the type of 
decision-maker as it was argued in Chapter 5: in the case of Serbs in Croatia 
and Bosnia, those who led the rebellion decided to take up arms earlier rather 
than later because they had a large amount of resources at their disposal and 
they thought that it was not so costly to take up arms. In analysing each case, 
this chapter also examines the effect of structural conditions discussed in 
Chapter 5.
This chapter analyses each case systematically. It will firstly examine 
two cases of Albanian rebellions in Kosovo and Macedonia. It will explore the 
effect of the structural conditions in these cases and will show that, while some 
of these conditions are important for explaining the decisions to take up arms, 
the timing of the decisions made by the KLA and the NLA cannot be fully
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explained only by these structural conditions. In both cases, the dynamic aspect 
of grievances was an important factor that explains the timing of the decisions 
to take up arms. It then analyses two cases of Serb rebellions in Croatia and 
Bosnia, examining the effects of the structural conditions. This section 
examines how theoretical arguments in Chapter 5 fit (or do not fit) these two 
cases and will show that the newness of the Croatian and Bosnian state was an 
important factor that affected the perceived cost of taking up arms in the eyes 
of Serb leaders.
1. Albanians in Kosovo
This section firstly examines the structural conditions in Kosovo. It 
will be argued that these factors are important to explain the motivation of 
rebels, but they are not enough for explaining the timing of rebellion: all the 
structural conditions were present since the beginning of 1990s and thus they 
cannot explain why the rebellion started in 1996-97. There were two important 
factors that explain the timing -  dynamic grievances and the availability of 
arms.
(1) Structural Conditions
Let us firstly examine the structural conditions. As for the motivating 
conditions, they do explain the motivation of the rebels. Firstly, Albanians in 
Kosovo started experiencing harsh discriminatory policies implemented by the 
Milosevic regime in the late 1980s, as discussed in Chapter 4. The 
discrimination against Albanians was institutionalised by a series of laws 
adopted in the Parliament of Serbia. Albanians thus experienced a serious level 
of discrimination, such as expulsion of Albanians from the Kosovo government,
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dismissal of Albanian workers in factories and other workplaces, and 
prohibition of education in the Albanian language. Secondly, Albanians 
enjoyed a high degree of autonomy under the 1974 constitutional regime in the 
socialist Yugoslavia, and the Milosevic regime effectively annulled the 
autonomous status of Kosovo. In other words, the Albanians in Kosovo 
experienced a loss of autonomy they once enjoyed under the socialist regime. 
One can thus argue that the grievances were very high among Albanians. For 
example, Ballentine argues that the main drivers of conflict in Kosovo were 
“the grievances and insecurity bred by the systematic exclusion of ethnic 
minorities from political power and an equitable share of economic 
opportunities and benefits.”1 As discussed in Chapter 4, these grievances 
motivated Albanians to make a series of peaceful activities to seek 
independence of Kosovo in the 1990s. Those who led the armed rebellion of 
the KLA shared the purpose, while they disagreed on the means to achieve it. 
For example, Kelmendi told as follows: “if we fail to achieve our goals by 
political means, we are entitled to resort to armed resistance. That’s why we 
took up arms.”2
As for the enabling conditions, their effects are mixed. On the one 
hand, the Albanians were under a quite harsh authoritarian regime (polity2 
value is -5 from 1988 to 1992, -7 from 1993 to 1996, -6 from 1997 to 1999); 
Serbia (Yugoslavia) was not a newly independent state; Serbia (Yugoslavia) 
was not experiencing a political transition before 1999 (according to the 
operationalisation adopted by Fearon and Laitin). Therefore, one can argue that 
the enabling conditions were not so favourable for the rebellion with regard to 
the capabilities of the state authorities. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 4,
1 Ballentine 2003: 260. See also Yannis 2003 for more detailed analysis of the case of 
Kosovo.
2 Interview with Ibrahim Kelmendi, Tetovo, 2006/05/30.
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Albanian political leaders had chosen a non-violent strategy partly because 
they thought that the Serbian military forces were too strong to fight against.3 
These factors thus explain the lack of rebellion until 1996 in Kosovo, but they 
cannot explain the occurrence of rebellion, since these factors did not change 
when the rebellion started in Kosovo.
On the other hand, however, other enabling conditions do seem to 
explain the case of Kosovo. Firstly, the level of economic development of 
Yugoslavia was not high, if not very low like Sub-Saharan countries, at the 
beginning of the 1990s (somewhere around the mean value of 161 countries in 
the dataset of Fearon and Laitin), and furthermore, Kosovo was the least 
developed region in the former Yugoslavia.4 Secondly, Albanians are 
concentrated in Kosovo and they do have a rural base. Indeed, the KLA 
appeared from the rural part of Kosovo, and the members of the KLA were 
mostly from rural areas. For example, Shemsi Syla, who was then a zone 
deputy commander of the KLA in Karadak area, confirmed that most of the 
KLA members came from rural areas and the military operations were 
conducted mainly in rural areas “because the configuration of the terrain was 
more adaptable.” 5 Thirdly, the geographic terrain of Yugoslavia is also 
relatively mountainous (slightly below the mean in the dataset of Fearon and 
Laitin) and the terrain in Kosovo is more mountainous compared to the 
northern part of Serbia. Some argue that the mountainous terrain in the border 
area between Kosovo and Albania helped the guerrilla insurgency of the KLA. 
One report points out, for example, that “in the wild and remote Albanian 
highlands it is virtually impossible to detect all the ancient mule tracks that
See the quote of Rugova’s comment in Chapter 4 (p. 106),
4 For example, GDP per capita in Kosovo was only 27% of the average of Yugoslavia and 
one-eighth of Slovenia in 1988. See Plestina 1992: 180-181.
5 Interview with Shemsi Syla, Prishtina, 2006/05/10.
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snake their way through otherwise impenetrable mountains” and thus it was 
extremely difficult to police the smuggling of the arms into Kosovo (ICG 
1998b: 13). General Bozidar Delic from the Yugoslav Army (Vojska 
Jugoslavije, VJ hereafter), who was a commander of the 549th Motorised 
Brigade stationed in Kosovo during the period of conflict, also emphasised the 
difficulty in defending the border area due to the mountainous terrain 6
(2) Dynamic Grievances and the Availability of Arms
While some of the structural conditions do seem to matter for the 
onset of rebellion in Kosovo, they alone cannot explain the timing of rebellion. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the rebellion organised by the KLA started in 
1996-97. There was, however, almost no change in the structural conditions in 
or around this particular year. The level of discrimination and the loss of 
autonomy had been constant since the late 1980s and the beginning of the 
1990s. There was also no change in the authoritarian nature of the Milosevid 
regime since the beginning of the 1990s. The economy in Kosovo had also 
been collapsed since the beginning of the 1990s. Needless to say, the 
geographic terrain does not change in such a short period. In a word, therefore, 
there seems to be no change in the structural conditions that could explain the 
timing of the onset of rebellion in Kosovo.
What then explains the timing of the decision to take up arms by the 
KLA? In the case of Kosovo, there were two crucial factors that determined the 
timing of the start of rebellion by the KLA. The first factor was what was 
conceptualised as dynamic grievances in Chapter 5: the growing 
disillusionment and frustration among the ethnic group that decreased the 
support for the non-violent strategy and increased the support for the violent
6 ICTY transcript of case IT-02-54 (Slobodan Milosevic): 9339 (2005/06/22).
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means. The second factor was the availability of arms.
The first factor was the growing disillusionment among Albanians on 
the non-violent strategies. In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, an 
overwhelming majority of Kosovo Albanians supported the non-violent 
resistance led by the LDK. In May 1992, for example, the LDK won the 
overwhelming majority of votes (76.44%) and Rugova won 99.5 percent of the 
votes as the only candidate for president. As Clark (2000: 83) pointed out, the 
LDK was “more of a national movement than one party among several.” 
Especially after the 1992 elections, the LDK behaved as “the only true 
representative of the national interest of Kosovo -  as much at a village level as 
the international level” (Clark 2000: 118).
The Albanian political leaders in Kosovo struggled to achieve the 
independence of Kosovo by peaceful means, especially by appealing to major 
powers to recognise the independence of Kosovo. Their efforts, however, could 
not yield any results. While many international conferences were held on the 
Yugoslav crisis since 1991 and the Albanian leaders attempted to put the issue 
of Kosovo on the agenda, their efforts yielded no results. In 1994 and 1995, 
so-called “K+K plan” was popular among Kosovo Albanians, according to 
which Kosovo Albanians would seek what the Krajina Serbs in Croatia would 
receive (Simic 2000: 96), but this plan became unrealistic when the 
self-proclaimed state of Krajina Serbs collapsed in 1995. The Albanian leaders 
lobbied the US government to solve the issue of Kosovo at the Dayton peace 
conference,7 but their efforts failed again. In September 1996, Rugova made 
an agreement with Milosevic on the normalisation of education, brokered by a 
Catholic organisation Comunita di Sant’Egidio,8 but this agreement was never
7 Interview with Edita Tahiri, Prishtina, 2006/05/09.
8 For the details of the agreement, see Simi6 2000: 99-100; Troebst 1998: 81-83.
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implemented.
The successive failures to achieve their goals by peaceful means led to 
the increasing frustrations among Albanians in Kosovo and the growing 
disillusionment with the non-violent resistance. Already by 1993, there was a 
growing resentment at international negotiators for not according the Kosovo 
Albanians full status at Geneva, and this resentment had begun to shift the 
balance within Rugova's movement toward radical militants who preached a 
military solution (Woodward 1995: 359). In March 1994, Bukoshi told that the 
“Kosova government’s pacifist approach was losing credibility within the 
population” (Clark 2000: 118). The Dayton agreement in 1995 was the turning 
point in this regard. The Dayton agreement itself was “an extraordinary trauma 
for the Kosovo Albanians” because it rewarded violent actions taken by Serbs 
with the recognition of Republika Srpska, which “confirmed to them in the 
most dramatic and humiliating way that Rugova’s policy of passive resistance 
had failed” (Judah 2000a: 124-125). Simic (2000: 54) observes that the failure 
of the LDK to put the question of Kosovo on the agenda at the Dayton peace 
conference led to the division within the LDK cadres and the radicalisation of 
Albanian youths and Albanian national movements. Florin Krasniqi, an 
Albanian immigrant who organised the financial assistance for the KLA from 
the US, told as follows: “Dayton made me realize that fighting was the only 
way. Peaceful resistance brought us nothing. Every other disgruntled minority 
in Yugoslavia...fought for independence and got it. The Albanians took the 
peaceful road and were ignored” (Sullivan 2004: 3).
Actions taken by the international actors after Dayton furthered the 
disillusionment among Albanians. The UN embargo imposed on Yugoslavia 
was lifted, and the EU states officially recognised the Federal Republic of
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Yugoslavia.9 Bonn and Belgrade made an agreement and Germany returned
100,000 Albanian refugees to Yugoslavia, and “it appeared as if the last 
international means to put pressure on Belgrade were also lost” (PetriC & Pihler 
2002: 74). Thus the IICK (2000: 59) concluded, for example, that the 
international community sent a message that “Kosovo was definitely off the 
current international agenda” and this demoralised and weakened the 
non-violent movement in Kosovo which “felt betrayed by the international 
community and began to doubt the effectiveness of its own tactics.”
Some argue that the Albanian political leaders led by Rugova and the 
LDK were also responsible for this disillusionment, because they gave an 
impression that the issue of Kosovo would be resolved in the peace process in 
Croatia and Bosnia. For example, a prominent Albanian intellectual in Kosovo, 
Veton Surroi, told that “Rugova personally, and his information apparatus, gave 
the impression that the question of the independence of Kosova was a matter of 
days, and that the entire international community was dealing on a daily basis 
with the question of Kosova. Over a critical period, for instance, prior to the 
Dayton talks, the Democratic League of Kosovo apparatus was basically going 
about saying the question of Kosova would be solved, resolved at Dayton.”10
Rugova’s influence and authority decreased further by the failure of 
the agreement with Milosevic in 1996. The failure of this agreement, which 
offered a short spate of hope for improvement, greatly increased people’s 
frustration, and Rugova was seen as unwise to have trusted that Milosevic 
would follow through on anything that mattered to the Albanians (Trix 2005). 
Trix (2005: 327) points out as follows: “Throughout 1997, the
9 Note, however, that the US maintained so-called “outer wall sanctions” and blocked 
Yugoslavia’s return to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, citing the 
issue of Kosovo as one reason.
10 ICTY transcript of case IT-02-54 (Slobodan Milosevic): 3373-3375 (2002/04/18).
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nonimplementation of the St. Egidio Education Agreement festered, giving fuel 
to the cynics and the extremists. If there could be no agreement on something 
as basic as school buildings, how could there ever be trust for larger issues?”
Disillusionment with the non-violent resistance policy started to 
spread among Albanians both within and outside Kosovo. Within Kosovo, for 
example, students in Prishtina waged protests in August 1997 against the 
failure of the Serbian government to implement the 1996 agreement on 
education. What is important here is the fact that they ignored Rugova when he 
asked them to stop it (Judah 2000a: 135-136). The division grew among the 
LDK members as well and some members who wanted more radical actions 
left the party (Judah 2000a: 136). Hydajet Hyseni, then vice-president of the 
LDK who led the party’s “radical” wing, said in autumn 1997 that the time had 
come to abandon Rugova's policy of non-confrontation, saying “We cannot be 
satisfied with our results or the attitude of the international community... The 
militant tendency among Albanians is the consequence of unproductive 
policies in Kosovo.”11 According to Edita Tahiri, former Foreign Minister of 
the govemment-in-exile of Republic of Kosova, “almost everybody in the 
presidency of the LDK was for the uprising, including Fehmi Agani, by the end 
of 1997. Only Rugova was against the violent uprising.” 12 This 
disillusionment with the non-violent strategies among local elite and ordinary 
Albanians provided an opportunity for recruitment for the KLA. 
Disillusionment among Albanians also grew outside Kosovo, which led not 
only to the increased recruitment abroad but also to the increasing flow of 
money into hard-liners. Salihu and other members of the LPK could tour the 
clubs and meetings of Kosovo immigrants and took advantage of the
11 Financial Times, 1997/11 /04.
12 Interview with Edita Tahiri, Prishtina, 2006/05/09.
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disappointment among them (Judah 2000b: 320). Some Albanian immigrants 
started switching their support from the LDK to the “Homeland Calling” fund 
set up by the KLA (IICK 2000: 52). In the case of Kosovo, therefore, the 
growing disillusionment with the non-violent policy and the growing 
frustrations among the Albanians led to the increased support for the 
hard-liners, which made it possible for the hard-liners to acquire and mobilise 
more human and financial resources for their objective.
The second important factor was the availability of arms. For 
hard-liners, even when they were willing to start uprising, “the simple fact 
remained that there was no way to obtain and import large amount of 
weaponry” (Judah 2000a: 127). This problem was solved by the collapse of the 
neighbouring country, Albania. When the pyramid schemes of the investment 
collapsed in spring 1997, the Albanian government lost control and country fell 
into chaos. With the military dissolved, police running away and the army 
depots thrown open, hundreds of thousands of Kalashnikovs and ammunition 
were looted by local Albanians. The KLA began buying these guns and 
ammunition. While the exact number of arms that flowed into Kosovo is 
unknown, it is suggested that the amount was indeed huge. According to some 
report, for example, about 750,000 weapons were stolen from military depots 
and many of them ended up in the hands of the KLA (ICG 1998b: ii). 
According to General Obrad Stevanovid from the VJ, the number of weapons 
seized by the Serbian authorities by 20 June 1999 amounted to 1045 hand-held 
rocket launchers, total 8320 pieces of machine-guns, semi-automatic rifles, 
automatic rifles and similar rifles, 360 pistols, 4224 mines and other explosive 
devices, and 723,531 ammunition of different types.13 Without this massive 
amount of arms suddenly available for the KLA, the uprising would have been
13 ICTY transcript of case IT-02-54 (Slobodan MiloSevic): 39574 (2005/05/17).
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technically impossible despite the increasing willingness of the KLA members 
to resort to violent means.
2. Albanians in Macedonia
The previous section pointed out that the dynamic aspect of grievances 
was an important factor for the timing of the decision to take up arms in 
Kosovo. The same point can be made in the case of Albanians in Macedonia: 
while the structural conditions explain the motivation of the rebels, they cannot 
explain the timing of the onset of rebellion because there was no change in the 
structural conditions when the rebellion of the NLA started in 2000. This 
section will show that the dynamic grievances and the availability of arms 
again explain the timing of rebellion.
(1) Structural Conditions
Let us firstly examine the structural conditions in Macedonia. As for 
the motivating conditions, Albanians in Macedonia did feel that they were 
discriminated against by the Macedonian authorities on various issues, such as 
the recognition of citizenship, the lack of university education in the Albanian 
language, prohibition of the usage of Albanian symbols in official places, and 
the lack of equal opportunity for employment especially in the public sector 
(see Chapter 4). While the level of discrimination is certainly not as high as in 
Kosovo, one can argue that there was a certain level of discrimination against 
Albanians in Macedonia as well. As for the loss of autonomy, on the other hand, 
Albanians in Macedonia had never enjoyed autonomy and thus one can 
conclude that there was no experience of loss of autonomy or independence 
among the Albanians in Macedonia.
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Even though the level of discrimination was not comparable to 
Kosovo, these discriminations did indeed motivate Albanians to take up arms. 
The fact that these grievances motivated the rebels can be seen in their declared 
demands. By examining the published communiques and other documents, 
Rusi shows that demands of the NLA were highly consistent. Among others, 
the NLA demanded that the constitution of Macedonia should be changed so 
that the following six elements are sanctioned, namely (1) Macedonia will be a 
state of two peoples, Macedonians and Albanians, (2) Albanian becomes an 
official language, (3) each community will be free to use its own national 
symbols, (4) discrimination in the economy and in the state administration will 
be eliminated, (5) discrimination in the political system will be eliminated, and 
(6) all political prisoners will be freed and the right to return will be recognised 
to all the people persecuted for their political beliefs and the people who fled 
Macedonia (Rusi 2004: 2-3). Most of these demands were consistent with the 
demands made by Albanian political leaders in Macedonia throughout the 
1990s. Even ArbSn Xhaferi, an Albanian political leader who criticised the 
NLA and called for the halt of violence, said that “the demands of the fighters 
are the same as ours” (Phillips 2004: 120).
Of course, one might argue that the rebels often justify the recourse to 
violence by grievances and thus it is too naive to believe their words. It is not 
just their words, however, but also their actions that show that they were 
mainly motivated by these grievances: when their demands were mostly met in 
the Ohrid agreement in August 2001, most of the NLA fighters stopped 
fighting and accepted the disarmament. If the rebels were motivated by other 
causes, such as greed, and they used grievances as a mere pretext of using 
violence, they would not have stopped violence even when the Ohrid 
agreement was made. Since it was a result of the concessions, it would have
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been easy for the NLA to claim that the Ohrid agreement does not fully satisfy 
their demands and to continue their armed struggle.
As for the enabling conditions, their effects are again mixed. On the 
one hand, Macedonia became independent in 1992 and its military capacities 
were extremely weak because of the withdrawal of the JNA from Macedonia, 
but no rebellion occurred during the first several years since independence. 
Unlike Serbia, its political regime was not a strongly authoritarian regime 
(polity2 is 6 for all years from 1993 to 2000) and it did not experience any 
political instability (as operationalised by Fearon and Laitin) since 1993. As for 
the geographic terrain, 8.4% of the terrain is estimated to be mountainous in 
Macedonia, which is below the mean in the Fearon and Laitin Dataset. These 
factors, therefore, do not explain the case of Macedonia very well. On the other 
hand, however, the level of economic development of Macedonia has not been 
very high (its value in 1993 is below the mean of the Fearon and Laitin dataset), 
and the Macedonian economy experienced a serious hardship due to the 
transition from the socialist to the capitalist economy, the economic sanctions 
imposed on Yugoslavia by the international community and the economic 
sanctions on Macedonia imposed by Greece. The Albanians are concentrated in 
the western part of Macedonia and they have a rural base. The level of 
economic development and the regional concentration of the ethnic group, 
therefore, may partly explain the onset of rebellion in Macedonia.
In any case, what the structural conditions cannot explain is the timing 
of the rebellion. There was almost no change in the structural conditions 
discussed above in Macedonia. The level of discrimination basically remained 
the same since the beginning of the 1990s, showing no sign of either drastic 
improvement or serious deterioration. The level of economic development was 
indeed rising since 1996 (see Table 6.1). Macedonia did not experience any
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political instability and Macedonia cannot be regarded as a newly-born country 
in 2001, at least according to the operationalisation of Fearon and Laitin. The 
structural conditions, therefore, cannot explain why the rebellion of the NLA 
started in 2001.
Table 6.1 GDP Real Growth Rates in Macedonia, 1991-2000
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
-6.2 -6.6 -7.5 -1.8 -1.1 1.2 1.4 3.4 4.3 4.5
Source: The report of the statistical office of Macedonia, 3.1.5.06, 07/12/2005, 
http://www.stat. gov.mk/pdf/1-2005/3.1.5.06.pdf
(2) Dynamic Grievances and the Availability of Arms
What explains the timing of the rebellion in Macedonia? Two factors 
pointed out above in the case of Kosovo also explain the timing of the rebellion 
in Macedonia, namely (1) the growing frustrations among Albanians (dynamic 
grievances) and (2) the availability of arms.
The first is the accumulation of the frustrations among some Albanians 
caused by the constant delay of the reforms to address their demands. Let us 
take an example of Tetovo University. Albanians in Macedonia demanded the 
recognition of higher education in the Albanian language for many years, and 
the university started functioning illegally in Tetovo as early as in 1995. 
Albanians demanded that the Macedonian government officially recognise the 
degrees from this university. In the summer 1999, the Macedonian government 
started to consider the official recognition of the university in return for the fact 
that Albanians in Macedonia remained calm despite the escalation of Kosovo
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conflict and the influx of Albanian refugees in Macedonia.14 However, the 
recognition did not materialise due to the opposition from Macedonian parties 
and demonstrations by ethnic Macedonian students. The other long-held 
demands by Albanians were in the similar situation: despite the continuous 
participation of Albanian parties in the government, demands made by 
Albanians were not met and their realisation was constantly delayed.
This constant delay of the reforms led to the growing disillusionment 
with the established Albanian political elite. In the case of Macedonia, it was 
the change of the party composition in 1998 that fostered the disillusionment 
with the Albanian political elite. The participation of the Democratic Party of 
Albanians (Demokratska partija na albancite, DPA here after) in the coalition 
government after the 1998 elections seemed to promise rapid reforms, but 
indeed little change was forthcoming thereafter (Pettifer 2001). As a result, 
according to Pettifer (2001: 10), a situation was created “where a classic 
conflict scenario has unfolded, where the promise of reform after a long period 
of repression has not been met, and as a result more radical leaders, in this case 
Mr Ali Ahmeti and the NLA, have begun to replace constitutionalist 
leadership.” The Albanians who were sympathetic towards the NLA stated that 
they lost patience because in the last 10 years the Macedonian authorities did 
nothing regarding their demands.15 One Albanian said: “for 10 years, we tried 
to solve this with politics, but the Macedonians weren’t interested. Now there’s 
no alternative.”16
As the rebels were motivated by the disillusionment with the Albanian 
political leadership, an armed uprising was an action not only against the state
14 See e.g., RFE/RL Balkan Report, 3-28, 1999/07/20; RFE/RL Balkan Report, 3-30, 
1999/08/03.
15 AIM Press, 2001/03/22.
16 Daily Telegraph, 2001/03/26.
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authorities but also against the Albanian party elite in Macedonia. For example, 
in a letter to Kofi Annan and other international figures, the NLA accused, 
albeit vaguely, the Albanian political parties in Macedonia for the failure to 
bring about the positive change for Albanians (Rusi 2004: 6). Those who 
interviewed the NLA members reported that their interviewees were 
consistently critical of Albanian politicians in Macedonia. When Ali Ahmeti 
talked to foreigners, for example, he bluntly described the Albanian politicians 
as “looking after their own interests” (Rusi 2004: 7).
Disappointment with the Albanian parties was caused not only by their 
ineffectiveness in bringing about positive changes but also by corruption. 
According to Glenny, the DPA apparently argued for increased representation 
of Albanians but actually expended most of its energy in enriching itself thanks 
to the symbiotic relationship of corruption that it developed with its coalition 
partner, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization - Democratic 
Party for Macedonian National Unity (Vnatresna Makedonska revolucionema 
organizacija - Demokratska partija za Makedonsko nacionalno edinstvo, 
VMRO-DPMNE hereafter).17 The Prime Minister Georgievski and his 
colleagues became deeply implicated in the process of “asset stripping” 
whereby foreign companies buy up utilities as part of the privatisation process. 
The VMRO-DPMNE could not do this without the collusion of the DPA and 
the deputy President of the DPA, Menduh Thaci, became their ideal partner. 
Glenny (2002) thus argues that the rebellion of the NLA was aimed “clearly at 
the DPA and Thaci's greed” that had excluded the majority of Albanians from 
the fruits of corruption. According to one report, many local Albanians claimed 
that the emergence of the NLA was the result of “corruptness of DPA
17 The argument in this paragraph is based on Glenny 2002.
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representatives” as well as “unkept promises.”18
The second important factor that explains the timing of the NLA 
rebellion is the availability of arms and experienced personnel. Here, the end of 
the Kosovo conflict in 1999 was of critical importance. With the end of the 
Kosovo conflict, Albanians from Macedonia who participated in the rebellion 
in Kosovo returned to Macedonia. For example, two of the principal founders 
of the NLA, Ali Ahmeti and Amrush Xhemajli, were founding members of the 
KLA (ICG 2001: 8). Gezim Ostreni, chief of the NLA Headquarters, was an 
experienced middle aged soldier with an ex-JNA background who until April 
2001 was a deputy commander of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC 
hereafter) that was set up after the war in Kosovo and incorporated many 
former KLA soldiers (Rusi 2004: 13; Pettifer 2001: 12). Other leaders of the 
NLA include Xhavit Hasani, Skender Habibi and Emms Dzemali, long-time 
leaders of the KLA secret services (ICG 2001: Appendix A). According to 
Ordanoski (2004: 20), among the NLA fighters were a few hundred so-called 
“dogs of war,” who had gained experience at the fronts in Croatia, Bosnia and 
Kosovo. Most of them were Albanians from Kosovo, former or active members 
of the KPC, and they were highly mobile and equipped with sophisticated 
western arms. According to Rusi (2004: 12), the NLA members who started 
operations in Macedonia were recruited from Ramush Haradinaj’s former 
fighters in the territory around Prizren.
The degree to which the rebellion in Macedonia was “imported” from 
Kosovo remains, however, contentious. On the one hand, some scholars argue 
that the NLA came from Kosovo, which is understandable given the profile of 
the NLA leaders. For example, Janev (2003: 314) states that the NLA came 
“from training camps in Kosovo and from the ranks of the never-disbanded
18 AIM Press, 2001/03/22.
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Kosovo Liberation Army.” On the other hand, some emphasise the local origins 
of the NLA. The ICG (2001: 9) points out that people who came from Kosovo 
were “so small and fragmented that they cannot plausibly be credited with 
starting single-handedly such an effective insurrection.” Roudometof (2002: 
215) argues that it became apparent that the NLA was not a small gang of 
criminals or some freebooters who sneaked from Kosovo, and the NLA 
rebellion was well organised and supported by many Albanians in Macedonia. 
Pettifer (2004) also emphasises the difference between the KLA and the NLA: 
“compared to the KLA, the NLA was quite a difficult organisation to join: it 
was much better armed and trained and had a different internal paramilitary 
culture and modus operandi.” As pointed out in Chapter 4, major political 
leaders in Kosovo, such as Tha^i and Mahmuti, argued that it was wrong to 
make another rebellion in Macedonia.19 According to one report, no one in 
Kosovo denied that there could be Kosovo Albanians participating in the armed 
movement in Macedonia, but “the idea that the movement was sent in from 
Kosovo is firmly rejected.”20 The neutral judgement is difficult since parties to 
the conflict hold completely opposing views: the Macedonian authorities 
considered the rebels to be from Kosovo or local criminals,21 while the NLA 
claims that all of their soldiers were from Macedonia and they have a “strict 
policy not to accept any soldiers from other Albanian lands in the region” (Rusi 
2004: 6). In any case, however, one can safely conclude that the availability of 
arms and experienced personnel for the rebellion is an important factor that 
explains the timing of rebellion in Macedonia.
19 Interview with Ibrahim Kelmendi, Tetovo, 2006/05/30. See Chapter 4, footnote 38 (p. 
115).
20 AIM Press, 2001/03/22.
21 AIM Press, 2001/3/12. See also Roudometof2002: 215; Qrdanoski 2004: 17.
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3. Serbs in Croatia
This section examines the effects of structural conditions in the case of 
Serbs in Croatia. As for the motivating conditions, the key factors that 
motivated SDS politicians to take up arms were discrimination against Serbs 
after the transition to the multi-party system and the moves for independence 
from the socialist Yugoslavia. Unlike the cases of Albanian rebellions in 
Kosovo and Macedonia, however, the dynamic grievances do not explain the 
case of Serb rebellion well, since the Serb elites in Croatia had chosen to take 
up arms sooner rather than later without trying to achieve their goal by 
peaceful means. By examining the effects of enabling conditions, this section 
will show that it was the newness of the Croatian state that lowered the 
perceived cost of rebellion in the eyes of the Serb leaders in Croatia, even 
though it turned out to be a miscalculation.
(1) Motivating Conditions
Let us firstly examine the effects of motivating conditions. As for 
discrimination, the Serb elite and some analysts argue that the Serbs indeed 
experienced discrimination after the multi-party elections in Croatia in 1990 
and it motivated the Serbs to take up arms.22 For example, after the HDZ took 
power, Serb police officers started to be dismissed and were replaced by Croats 
(Silber & Little 1996: 98-99). In a new Croatian constitution adopted in 
December 1990, “the millennial identity of the Croatian nation and the 
continuity of its statehood” were emphasised at the beginning, and the 
Republic of Croatia was defined as “the national state of the Croatian nation.”23
22 For such arguments made by scholars, see, e.g., Cohen 1993: 126-135; Silber & Little 
1996: 98; Woodward 1995: 134; Glenny 1996: 12.
23 For the original text of this constitution, see Marko & Boric 1991: 437-448. The text is
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There was no specific provision on minority rights, and the Croatian language 
and the Latin script became the official language and script. In sum, it was 
obvious that Croats would be in the hegemonic position in the new state. This 
dominance of Croats after the transition to the multi-party system and the 
increased level of discrimination against Serbs were clearly one of the motives 
of the SDS politicians for taking up arms.
It was not only discrimination, however, but also the moves for 
independence taken by the Croatian authorities that motivated the Serb leaders 
to take up arms. The new government in Croatia started its moves for 
independence immediately after the elections. In June 1990, for example, the 
then vice-president of the Croatian Parliament Vladimir Seks mentioned the 
idea of “confederation” and revealed the idea that each republic should have its 
own embassy and military.24 In October 1990, the governments of Slovenia 
and Croatia announced a plan to transform Yugoslavia into a confederation of 
six sovereign independent republics.25 In February 1991, the Croatian 
Parliament approved an amendment of the constitution of the republic that 
stipulated that the republican constitution precede the federal constitution.26 In 
May 1991, the Croatian government organised a referendum on independence. 
These moves for independence dissatisfied the Serbs in Croatia. In July 1990, 
for example, Babi6 stated in an interview that they would seek regional 
autonomy if Croatia secedes from Yugoslavia.27 When Babic announced the 
establishment of the SAO Krajina in December 1990, he criticised the Tudjman 
government, saying “Croats are attempting to make their own state by a
also available from the website of the Official Gazette of Croatia. See, http://www.nn.hr/ 
sluzbeni-list/sluzbeni/index. asp
24 Politika, 1990/06/29.
25 Borba, 1990/10/08.
26 Borba 1991/02/21.
27 Politika, 1990/07/10.
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majority of the parliament, hegemony, and the tyranny of majority, while the 
most important state organisation for Serbs in Croatia is Yugoslavia.” One 
can argue, therefore, that the moves for Croatian independence motivated the 
Serb leaders to decide to take up arms.
(2) Enabling Conditions
As for the enabling conditions, their effects are again mixed. Croatia 
was a relatively developed country (GDP per capita in 1995 was above the 
mean of the Fearon and Laitin dataset) and more developed within the socialist 
Yugoslavia, ranking 2nd after Slovenia among the six republics and two 
autonomous provinces (Plestina 1992: 180-181). On the other hand, the Knin 
region which became the regional basis for the Serb rebellion was 
characterised by weak economic development and a rural population (Rimac et 
al 1992; Sterc 1992). Croatia’s geographic terrain is not so mountainous (only 
3.6% of the terrain is mountainous in Croatia, which is below the mean of the 
Fearon and Laitin dataset) but the Knin area is more mountainous than other 
regions in Croatia. Croatia experienced a transition from a one-party regime to 
the multi-party regime in 1990, even though this transition is not captured by 
the polity2 dataset since Croatia enters the Polity IV dataset only in 1991 (note 
that, if one assume the same value for all republics in Yugoslavia, the value of 
the polity2 variable for Croatia (Yugoslavia) is -5 since 1980 to 1990 and it is 
-3 for Croatia in 1991, thus the variable of political instability would not take a 
value of 1 in any case). The Serbs had some rural base where they were 
concentrated and the rebellion was indeed organised in these rural areas.
One important variable among the enabling conditions is the newness 
of the Croatian state. Fearon and Laitin argue that the newness of the state
28 Politika, 1990/12/22.
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implies a weakness of the new state authorities and increases the probability 
that the civil war occurs in that country. This logic can be observed in Croatia 
as well. The republics did not have their own army during the period of the 
socialist Yugoslavia29 and Croatia started building up its own army from 
scratch only after the HDZ won the elections in 1990. In addition, as discussed 
in Chapter 4, the Serb leaders had a large amount of resources for the rebellion 
at their disposal. This (perceived) weakness of the Croatian military and the 
strength of the Serb military forces affected the decisions by the SDS leaders to 
take up arms immediately after the declaration of the independence by the 
Croatian authorities. For example, Milan Babic thought that a war against 
Croatia would be easy and urged his more moderate colleagues not to negotiate 
with the Croatian government: according to Jovan Opafcic, one of the founders 
of the SDS in Croatia, Babic was arguing in the summer of 1991 that “it will 
take us only fifteen days to deal with the Croats by force of arms.”30 Such a 
belief was clearly affected by the optimism held by the JNA generals: in 
describing the plan of the JNA against Croatia in his memoir, Kadijevid (1993: 
135-136) stated that it was assumed that “it would require 10-15 days” for the 
mobilisation, the preparation of the mobilised units and their action against 
Croatia. Babic claims that it was Milosevic who assured him that the Serbs in 
Croatia will be protected by the JNA: according to Babic, Milosevic told him 
“the JNA will protect you” when he expressed his fears and anxieties as to
29 While the TO forces were under the leaderships of the republic and autonomous 
provinces in peacetime until 1988, they were put under regional theatre commands of the 
JNA that ignored the borders of republics and autonomous provinces after the 1988 
reorganisation of the army in Yugoslavia. As a result, the presidency of republics lost the 
authority of commanding TO forces either in peace or in war. Spegelj 2001b: 89-93. In 
addition, as discussed in Chapter 4, the JNA forces seized the weapons stored for the TO 
forces in Croatia immediately after the elections in 1990, and thus the Croatian authorities 
could not use the arms of the TO in order to build up the national army. See Chapter 4 of 
this thesis (p. 95).
30 Jovan OpaCic, “Od sveca do izdajnika,” NIN, 1995/08/25: 25, cited in Ciger 2001: 202.
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what would happen to the Serbs in Croatia in his first meeting with Milosevic 
in October 1990.31 Spegelj (2001a: 24), the then Minister of Defence of the 
new Croatian government, pointed out that the “Serb radicals had reckoned that 
they had absolute superiority, which was a delusion. They thought they had the 
JNA under their thumb, and the TO forces of all the republic too via the general 
staff of the supreme command, while the police forces of the republics were 
technically inferior and smaller in number.” Hadzic (2004: 138), an expert on 
military affairs in Serbia, also argued that the strategy of the Serbian 
military-political elites “relied on the illusion of possessing enough power and 
force to impose solutions, i.e. to achieve their goals easily and quickly.”
This optimistic expectation turned out to be a serious miscalculation. 
For example, despite the concentration of the best elite forces of the JNA and 
the tens of thousands of shells bombarded on the town, it took almost three 
months for the JNA forces to conquer Vukovar, which fell on 19 November 
1991.32 While the Serb leaders expected that the military operations would be 
completed fairly quickly, the war in Croatia lasted more than six months and 
the Serbs could not achieve a decisive victory.
Two factors have been pointed out for the failure of the Serb rebels 
and the JNA forces to make a quick and decisive victory. Firstly, the morale 
among the JNA soldiers was low (Simac 2001: 31), and the response rate for 
the call up decreased rapidly. While the response rate to the call-up was very 
high (95-100%) in the first phase of mobilisation for the JNA from April to 
June 1991, it dropped significantly to less than 60% in the third phase of 
mobilisation in September and October the same year (Marijan 2004: 296). The
31 ICTY transcript of case IT-02-54 (Slobodan Milosevic): 13094 (2002/11/20). Babic 
claims that Milosevic repeated this phrase many times thereafter. See, for example, ICTY 
transcript of case IT-02-54 (Slobodan Milosevic): 13056 (2002/11 /19).
32 For die details of the fight in Vukovar, see Marijan 2004.
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Belgrade opposition weekly reported in late September 1991 that only 50% of 
the reservists in Serbia and only 15% in Belgrade had obeyed orders to report 
for duty (Burg & Shoup 1999: 84). Kadijevic (1993: 97) himself admitted that 
“mobilisation became the crucial limiting factor in achieving all plans.” 
Secondly, the Croatian forces performed surprisingly well against the Serb 
rebels and the JNA forces. For example, the Croatian defence forces in 
Vukovar exhibited a stiff resistance against the attacks of the JNA forces. At 
the end of September 1991, the Croatian forces occupied the JNA depots and 
garrisons and seized 250 tanks, 400-500 heavy artillery weapons, about
180,000 firearms and some 2 million tonnes of ammunition and other military 
hardware, which fundamentally altered the balance of military power (Spegelj 
2001a: 34).
Even though it turned out to be a miscalculation, the Serb elite in 
Croatia expected that the war would be over quickly once the JNA started its 
operations against Croatia with the superior firepower and manpower. In other 
words, they thought that the military resources they had at their disposal were 
superior to those of the Croatian government, and this belief significantly 
lowered the perceived cost of rebellion in the eyes of the organisers of the 
rebellion, while the actual cost of rebellion turned out to be much higher than 
expected. Due to the expected low cost of the rebellion, the Serb elite chose to 
take a violent option without trying harder to negotiate with the Croatian 
government and to achieve their objective by peaceful means.
4. Serbs in Bosnia
Finally, this section examines the effects of structural conditions in the 
case of Serbs in Bosnia. As for the motivating conditions, the actual
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discrimination was not so manifest in the case of Bosnia due to the 
participation of the SDS in the coalition government, though some analysts 
point out the importance of fear of future discrimination as a motivator of 
rebellion. In the case of Bosnia, the key factor that motivated SDS politicians 
to take up arms was the moves for Bosnian independence. Here again, the 
dynamic grievances do not explain the occurrence of Serb rebellion well, since 
the Serb elites in Bosnia had chosen to take up arms sooner rather than later 
without trying to achieve their goal by peaceful means. By examining the 
effects of enabling conditions, this section will show that it was the newness of 
the Bosnian state that lowered the perceived cost of rebellion in the eyes of the 
Serb leaders in Bosnia.
(1) Motivating Conditions
Compared to the Serbs in Croatia, the level of discrimination in 
Bosnia was much lower because the SDS-BiH participated in the coalition 
government after the elections in 1990 and thus there was no monopoly of 
power by one ethnic group after the elections. While the exclusion of ethnic 
minorities from the government occurred in some municipalities at the local 
level, the establishment of the three-party coalition government did prevent the 
exclusion of ethnic minorities at the national level. For example, in February 
1991, the SDA and the HDZ-BiH proposed a declaration that stipulates that the 
republican laws precede the federal laws and confirms the right of secession of 
the republic from the federation, but this proposal was rejected due to the 
opposition of the SDS-BiH.33
While the actual discrimination was not so manifest as a motivating 
factor, some point out that the fear of future discrimination motivated the Serbs
33 RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe, 2-27,1991/07/05: 30.
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to take up arms. For example, Jovic (2001: 21-22) argues that “the fear of 
being a minority was, and remains, a major motivator of conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia” and this fear “was created by nationalist members of the 
counter-elite.” Having recognised that the Serb leadership in Bosnia “led an 
effort which victimised countless innocent people,” Plavsic stated that they 
committed such terrible acts because of “a blinding fear” which led to “an 
obsession, especially for those of us for whom the Second World War was 
living memory, that Serbs would never again allow themselves to become 
victims.
In the case of Bosnia, an important motivating factor was again the 
moves for independence. The critical moment in this regard was 15 October 
1991, when the SDA and the HDZ-BiH proposed the “memorandum on the 
sovereignty of Bosnia.” The SDS-BiH members opposed it, but the SDA and 
the HDZ-BiH ignored their opposition and adopted it according to the majority 
principle after the SDS-BiH members withdrew themselves from parliament.35 
Since then, the SDS-BiH rapidly made a series of moves for the division of 
Bosnia, such as the establishment of the “Serb National Parliament of Bosnia” 
in late October, the organisation of the referendum among the Serb population 
in Bosnia to ask whether they wish to remain in Yugoslavia in November, and 
the establishment of the “Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” in 
January 1992.36 When the Bosnian government conducted a referendum on the 
independence of Bosnia at the beginning of 1992, the Serbs boycotted the 
referendum. The moves for Bosnian independence, therefore, were a critical 
motivator for the Serb leaders to take up arms.
34 ICTY transcript of case IT-00-39 & 40/1 (Biljana PlavSic): 609-610 (2002/12/17).
35 As for the original text of the memorandum as well as the counter proposals by die 
opposition parties, see Borba 1991/10/16.
3 Burg & Shoup 1999: 97. For the details of the development after the memorandum, see, 
e.g., Burg & Shoup 1999: 69-120.
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(2) Enabling Conditions
Let us now examine the effects of enabling conditions in Bosnia. In 
the case of Serbs in Bosnia, many of the enabling conditions do seem explain 
the decisions by the SDS-BiH leaders to take up arms. The level of economic 
development was low: while the data of GDP per capita is not available for the 
1990s, Bosnia was a poorer republic in the socialist Yugoslavia, ranking third 
poorest after Kosovo and Macedonia in 1988 (PleStina 1992: 180-181), and 
was experiencing serious economic hardship before the civil war started in 
1992. Its geographic terrain is highly mountainous: 60.5% of its territory is 
coded as mountainous, which is much higher than the mean value of the Fearon 
and Laitin dataset. The Serbs were concentrated in some areas and they also 
had rural bases in Bosnia. Bosnia experienced a transition from the one-party 
regime to the multi-party regime in 1990, even though this transition is not 
captured by the polity2 dataset since Bosnia enters Polity IV dataset only in 
1992 (if one assume the same value for all republics in Yugoslavia, the value of 
the polity2 variable for Bosnia (Yugoslavia) is -5 since 1980 to 1991 and it is 0 
for Bosnia in 1992, thus the variable of political instability would take a value 
of 1).
As in the case of Croatia, one important enabling condition was the 
newness of the Bosnian state. Just like the Croatian government, Bosnia did not 
have its own army and had to build an army from scratch. On the other hand, 
the Serbs had a large and professional army (the JNA) on their side, as well as 
their own police force and a number of paramilitary forces from Serbia. This 
perceived weakness of the Bosnian state, combined with the perceived 
superiority of the military resources of the Serbs, affected the decisions by the 
SDS-BiH politicians to take up arms earlier rather than later. For example,
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Karadzic stated as follows already in October 1991, implying his confidence in 
the superiority of Serbs against the Bosnian government led by Muslims: “Do 
not think that Bosnia would not fall into the hell. Muslims may disappear 
altogether, because they cannot defend themselves in war.”37 In November 
1991, when he made a speech to the Serb mayors in Bosnia during the 
preparation for the referendum, Karadzid said: “Now we have an army, which 
is three times stronger ... This army has weapons, technology, other resources, 
and huge war reserves. It has commanding and leading cadres and has its goal, 
which is identical to your goal” (Ibrahimagid 2001: 250). In a private 
conversation with Gojko Djogo, the then president of the Association of the 
Serbs in Belgrade, Karadzic said “they [Muslims] must know that there are
20,000 armed Serbs around Sarajevo...they will disappear! Sarajevo will be a 
melting pot in which 300,000 Muslims will die.”38 Nikola Koljevic, a Serb 
member of Bosnian presidency, was reported to have suggested that the whole 
military operation would be over within ten days (Burg & Shoup 1999: 130). 
The SDS-BiH politicians believed that they were superior to the Bosnian 
government with regard to military resources, and this belief affected the 
decisions to take up arms earlier without trying harder to achieve their goal by 
peaceful means.
In addition, the hard nature of the international borders also 
encouraged the Serb elite to take up arms earlier. The Serb elite in Bosnia felt 
that they had to take an action quickly to challenge the unity of Bosnia because, 
if they did not do so, the international border of Bosnia would be recognised 
and consolidated, and it would be difficult for them to challenge and change 
the borders later. For example, in the speech made in November 1991
37 NIN, 2002/08/29: 16.
38 ICTY transcript of case IT-02-54 (Slobodan Milosevic): 13074(2002/11/20).
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mentioned above, Karadzic said: “if we wake up one day... in Alija 
[Izetbegovic]’s state, with borders recognised by Europe, we should know that 
such borders could never be changed any more after such recognition” 
(Ibrahimagic 2001: 244). In other words, the Bosnian Serbs took up arms 
immediately after the declaration of independence by the Bosnian government 
not only due to the perceived weakness of the military of the new state (as 
argued by Fearon and Laitin, for example) but also due to strategic calculations 
on the international recognition of borders: the later the rebellion is, the more 
difficult to challenge and change the borders of the state.
Conclusion
This chapter examined why the rebels decided to take up arms in the 
four ex-Yugoslav cases. The present chapter systematically examined 
motivating factors and enabling conditions, as well as the dynamic aspect of 
grievances, based on the theoretical arguments and empirical findings of the 
previous chapter. As for the motivating factors, the presence of discrimination 
was manifest in three out of four cases (Kosovo, Macedonia and Croatia), and 
the loss of autonomy or the issue of stateness was important in three out of four 
cases (Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia). As for the enabling conditions, the 
presence of harsh authoritarian regime was important in one case (Kosovo until 
1996) and the newness of the state was significant in two cases (Croatia and 
Bosnia). While not all countries examined here can be classified as 
“mountainous” country, the area where rebellions occurred was relatively 
mountainous in all four countries (Kosovo in Serbia, Western part of 
Macedonia, Knin area in Croatia, and Bosnia). As for the level of economic 
development, three countries (Serbia, Macedonia and Bosnia) were not so
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highly developed. In addition, while Croatia was relatively more developed, 
the Knin area was a less developed region in Croatia. In all cases, ethnic groups 
were regionally concentrated and had some rural base in the country.
It is not the purpose of this chapter to single out one of these factors as 
a decisive explanatory factor. As discussed in Chapter 5, the present thesis 
argues for the complementary nature of the explanatory factors. The qualitative 
case study in this chapter supports this argument. Both motivating and enabling 
conditions were found important in these four cases, and this finding suggests 
that these two types of explanation are not mutually exclusive. The 
combination of factors that were important for the explanation of the 
occurrence of rebellion varies across the four cases, which implies that there is 
no singular combination of factors that is applicable to all cases of ethnic 
rebellions.
As for the dynamic aspect of grievances, this chapter has shown that it 
was an important factor for explaining the timing of the rebellions in Kosovo 
and Macedonia, where the structural conditions cannot fully explain the timing 
of the rebellion. This factor, however, was not so important in the case of Serbs 
in Croatia and Bosnia, where the Serb leaders chose to take up arms earlier 
rather than later. As discussed in Chapter 5, this difference is due to the type of 
decision-makers. If the organisers of the rebellion have a large amount of 
resources at their disposal, it could lower the perceived cost of the rebellion, 
and as a result, they might choose to rebel before trying to achieve their goal by 
peaceful means. In the case of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, they had a large 
amount of military resources at their disposal while the Croatian and Bosnian 
state authorities were perceived as weak and inferior to the Serbs, and this 
perception led the SDS politicians to take up arms earlier. This observation 
supports the findings of the large-N analysis in Chapter 5 that the dynamic
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aspect of grievances does not have a significant effect on the occurrence of 
large-scale rebellion, while it does have a significant effect on the occurrence 
of small-scale rebellion.
The case study of this chapter pointed out one important factor that 
was not included in the theoretical framework of Chapter 5, namely the 
availability of arms. In the case of Albanian rebellions in Kosovo and 
Macedonia, this was one of the crucial factors which explain the timing of the 
occurrence of rebellion. In the case of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, this factor 
also explains the early decision to take up arms, as discussed above. This factor 
was not included in the discussion of Chapter 5 because it is extremely difficult 
to operationalise and quantitatively measure in a convincing manner. To test 
the validity of the argument for the importance of the availability of arms, 
therefore, remains a task for the future research.
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Part IV: Dynamics of Rebel Escalations
Chapter 7 
State Repression as an Intervening Variable: Quantitative 
Analysis of Rebel Escalations
Introduction
This chapter will examine the dynamics of escalation. As argued in 
Chapter 1, explaining the dynamics of escalation is critically important for the 
theory of large-scale rebellion if the rebellion starts from a low intensity. 
Because of the unitary-actor assumption and the binary coding of the 
occurrence of large-scale conflict, the issue of escalation has not been explored 
fully and systematically in the existing literature. By theorising and empirically 
examining the dynamics of escalation, therefore, this chapter attempts to make 
some contributions to the study of ethnic conflict.
This chapter consists of two parts. The first part presents the 
theoretical argument about the dynamic relations between the occurrence of 
initial low-intensity rebellion, state reactions and the escalation of rebellion. It 
will then discuss some structural factors that are to be included in the statistical 
analyses as control variables. The second part conducts large-N analyses to test 
the hypotheses drawn from the theoretical argument. It will firstly discuss 
research designs, including operationalisation and estimation methods. It will 
finally present and discuss the empirical results of the large-N analyses.
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1. Theoretical Exploration
(1) Dynamics between the Ethnic Group and the State
Why do some ethnic groups experience an escalation of rebellion after 
the onset of low-intensity rebellion, while others do not? One of the answers to 
this question lies in dynamics between the ethnic group and the state authorities. 
In many cases, the occurrence of low-intensity rebellion in the country is 
perceived by the state authorities as a signal that the security and integrity of 
the state is being threatened. Facing such a situation within the state, state 
institutions such as the government, police and military would consider taking 
some measures in order to eliminate the threat to the country. The nature of this 
reaction made by the state authorities against the initial onset of rebellion is of 
critical importance for the escalation or de-escalation of the conflict.
The option often considered by the state authorities facing such 
rebellion is repression. The state authorities try to eliminate the problem by 
suppressing the rebel activities by force or even by physically destroying the 
rebel organisations. If successful, this option will “solve” the problem without 
making any concession to the rebels, however superficial this “solution” is.
When repression by the state authorities is excessive, however, it can 
be counterproductive and radicalise the ethnic group that is targeted by the 
state. Indeed, many authors have pointed to the counterproductive effect of 
state repression. For example, analysing the sources of uprising by Kashmiri 
people against the Indian State, Bose (2003:116) points out that the “regime of 
repression had the effects of further radicalising public opinion and of 
convincing thousands of Kashmiri youths to take up arms to fight the Indian 
state.” In the case of the Kurdish question in Turkey, it was pointed out that the 
security operations and the practice of village burning was fuelling Kurdish
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nationalism and was forcing especially young people to join the ranks of the 
rebels (Kiri§ci & Winrow 1997: 131). In Sri Lanka, the police and military 
responded brutally when the LTTE started its low-intensity rebellion, and the 
military terror and repression directed against the Tamil population played a 
“vital catalytic role” and contributed to the ascendancy of the LTTE.1 The 
counterproductive nature of the coercion is pointed out almost 30 years ago by 
Hibbs (1973: 182), who concluded that “the nearly instantaneous response to 
repression is most often more mass violence” based on the results of his 
large-N analyses.
Why do repressions radicalise the ethnic group rather than lead to 
decisions to give up arms? Firstly, if the repressive policies lead to serious 
casualties or physical damage of properties, they will increase grievances 
among members of the ethnic group. If one loses one’s close friends or family 
members, one can easily be radicalised and may decide to take up arms. They 
can also be radicalised by the fact that the state has killed their “fellow” people 
of the same ethnic group. While these people did not take up arms when the 
initial rebellion occurred, now they may join the rebels and take up arms due to 
the consequences of repressive measures. Secondly, the repressive measures 
would lead to the loss of confidence in the government as their “representative” 
government among the members of the ethnic group. They would start thinking 
that the state authorities would not care and protect them but rather would harm 
them. The loss of confidence in the state authorities and the government 
eventually will lead to the increase in the support for their “own” statehood or 
the establishment of their self-rule.
1 Bose 1994: 91. Bose called this dynamics as “the dialectic of state repression and 
nationalist resistance.” See, Bose 1994: 89. For the further detail of this dialectic, see Bose 
1994: 92-116. The figure of the LTTE membership has grown from mere 30-odd 
individuals in July 1983 to some 4,000 in July 1987 (Bose 1994: 87).
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If the repressive measures taken by the state authorities led to the 
radicalisation of more members of the ethnic group and thus led to the 
escalation of the ethnic conflict, here is a dynamic relationship between the 
onset of lower-intensity conflict, the repressive measures taken by the state 
authorities and the escalation of rebellion: the state authorities take repressive 
measures because of the onset of lower-intensity conflict, and anti-state 
rebellion escalates because of the repressive measures. In other words, the state 
repression is the key intervening factor which explains the occurrence (or 
non-occurrence) of the escalation of rebellion. This relationship is illustrated in 
Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1 Dynamic Relationship between Rebellion and Repression
Repressive
policies
State Authorities
Ethnic
Large-scale
Rebellion
Lower-intensity
Rebellion
Group
This dynamic relationship is the main hypothesis tested in this chapter. 
In order to test it, it is necessary to establish two links: firstly, the onset of 
lower-intensity rebellion leads to more repressive measures of the state 
authorities, and secondly, the repressive measures taken by the state authorities 
lead to the escalation of rebellion. Therefore, one can draw the following
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hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: If a low-intensity rebellion occurs in a country, the state 
authorities are more likely to take more repressive measures against 
rebels.
Hypothesis 2: As the level of state repression becomes higher, the level of 
intensity of rebellion in a country is more likely to increase.
Of course, this argument does not mean that these dynamic relations 
between ethnic groups and state authorities are the only determinants of the 
escalation of rebellion. One can consider some structural factors that are likely 
to affect the repressive policies of the state authorities and the escalation of 
rebellion. These structural factors will be treated as control variables in the 
large-N analyses below. Let us now examine these structural factors.
(2) Structural Factors for State Repression
This section examines some structural factors that might affect state 
repression. Firstly, one can argue that the political regime of the country may 
affect the level of state repression. For example, analysing the determinants of 
the level of political repression (such as suspension of civil rights and liberties), 
King (2000) found that democracy has “pacifying effects” on the behaviour of 
repressors towards dissidents: while the increase of political dissent tends to 
increase the level of political repression when democracy is weak, it does not 
increase the level of political repression so much when democracy is strong. A 
similar argument can be made for the military repression. In other words, the 
level of state repression may be lower in a country under a democratic regime, 
because it would be more difficult to resort to the arbitrary use of
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police/military force against its population if there are strong democratic 
constraints on the actions of the government. Thus, one would expect that it is 
less likely that the state authorities take more repressive measures against the 
rebels as the political regime gets more democratic in a country.
Secondly, one can argue that GDP per capita might affect government 
decisions on military repression. If a country enjoys a higher GDP per capita, 
the government would try to avoid the risk of disturbing the normal economic 
activities and of earning a bad reputation among the international community 
by starting military operations against its population within the country. If a 
country is poor, on the other hand, there will be much less at risk compared to 
rich countries, and in addition, poorer countries lack sufficient resources to 
share with rebelling groups to resolve the conflict more peacefully. Therefore, 
one may expect that the government in poorer countries is more likely to take 
repressive military measures compared to richer countries.
These two factors will be used as control variables in the large-N 
analyses of the level of state repression below.
(3) Structural Factors for the Escalation of Rebellion
Let us now examine some structural factors that might affect the 
escalation of rebellion. Recall that motivational factors and enabling factors 
were used as structural conditions that affect the decisions of those who take up 
arms against the state. As for these structural conditions, one can argue that 
they also might affect the decisions of those who take up arms later. For 
example, if the presence of discriminatory policies motivated those who took 
up arms at the beginning, they may well motivate those who take up arms later, 
causing an escalation of the rebellion. If the weakening of the centre enables 
the organisers of rebellion to take up arms, it will also enable more people to
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take up arms for the same reason, leading to an escalation of rebellion. If the 
structural factors that affected the occurrence of initial rebellion work under the 
same logic, they will have a similar effect for the escalation of rebellion.
However, the automatic application to the escalation of rebellion does 
not sound equally plausible for some factors. Firstly, the variable of the 
dynamic aspect of grievances, operationalised by the duration of the protest 
activities, may not affect the occurrence of escalation, because the peaceful 
protest activities might cease to continue once the rebellion is started by those 
who take up arms against the state. If protest activities cease to continue after 
the occurrence of initial rebellion, the duration of protest activities will be zero 
when the escalation occurs and thus will have no impact on the occurrence of 
escalation. Secondly, variables of new states and political instability at the 
centre may not have a significant effect on the occurrence of escalation. By 
definition, it can only explain the events that happen within a short period: the 
newness of the state variable can only explain the events that happen within 
two years from independence, and the political transition variable can only 
explain the events that occur within three years since the change in the political 
regime indicator takes place. If the escalation takes more than 3-4 years since 
the onset of rebellion, therefore, these variables will naturally take the value of 
zero and will have no impact on the occurrence of escalation.
One should also note that the ethnic groups that have never 
experienced an occurrence of rebellion during the period from 1945 to 2000 
will be excluded from the analysis below, because it attempts to explain the 
variance between the occurrence and non-occurrence of escalation among the 
ethnic groups that experienced the occurrence of initial rebellion. Therefore, 
the mean of the explanatory variables may be skewed among the ethnic groups 
that have experienced an occurrence of initial rebellion, and the variance of
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explanatory variables may be much more limited compared to the overall 
sample. It is not surprising, therefore, if the structural factors used in Chapter 5 
do not have a significant effect on the escalation of rebellion.
Despite these reservations, the structural factors used in Chapter 5 will 
be used in the analysis below. The purpose of the inclusion is twofold. Firstly, 
these structural conditions can be used as control variables in the analysis to 
test the explanatory power of state repression. If state repression has a 
significant effect on escalation even when these structural conditions are 
controlled, one can be more confident in the results of the large-N analysis. 
Secondly, one can check whether these structural conditions have a significant 
effect on the escalation as well. In other words, by including these variables, 
one can see whether it is plausible to assume that the structural factors that 
affect those who take up arms at the beginning will have a similar effect on the 
decision made by the people who take up arms later.
2. Large-N Analysis
This section conducts large-N analyses to test the hypotheses 
presented above. It will firstly discuss research designs, including 
operationalisation and estimation methods, and then present and discuss the 
empirical results of the large-N analyses.
(1) Research Design
Operationalisation of the State Repression
In order to conduct a statistical analysis, there must be some variable 
that indicates the seriousness of the repressive measures taken by the state. In 
the present thesis, some of the “government repression of the group” variables
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in the MAR dataset are used as a proxy for the repressive measures by the state 
authorities. Among 23 variables of “government repression” in the MAR 
dataset phase El, three are directly related to the military operations of the 
government forces against the rebels: REP20 (Military campaigns against 
armed rebels), REP21 (Military targets and destroys rebel areas) and REP22 
(Military massacres of suspected rebel supporters). Each variable is coded on 
the 4-point scale, from 0 to 3 (as for the scale on which this variable is coded, 
see Appendix 2), and the larger value of these variables indicates that the 
harsher and more indiscriminate repressive military operations are conducted 
against the ethnic group by the government forces.
The “repression” by the state authorities covers a various range of 
activities by the government, police and military, and the “government 
repression” variables in the MAR dataset also include other kind of policies 
such as political arrests or confiscation of properties. However, the military 
aspect of repressive policies is used here because it often radicalises members 
of the ethnic group most dramatically. The theoretical argument in this chapter 
assumes that a larger number of members of the ethnic group will be 
radicalised and join the rebels when they are physically attacked by the 
government forces and lose fellows of the same group, their own friends and 
families. The variables of the military repression, therefore, are most suitable to 
test the main hypotheses in this chapter.
One disadvantage of using these variables is that they are included in 
the dataset only in the Phase in  of the MAR project, and thus data exists only 
for the period of 1996-2000. Therefore, any results of the statistical analysis 
using these variables are confined to this period and we cannot make any 
inference on the entire period after the WWII. The results of the statistical 
analysis below are thus preliminary at best. However, it is still worth
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conducting such a statistical analysis for several reasons. Firstly, even when we 
deal with the five-year panel data (the data is coded annually), the dataset still 
contains a sufficiently large N (more than 600) for the statistical analysis to be 
meaningful. Therefore, as far as the size of the dataset is concerned, there is no 
technical reason to stop conducting a statistical analysis. Secondly, the coding 
of the “seriousness” of the state repression against all ethnic groups in the 
dataset (more than 300 groups in 125 countries) requires an enormous amount 
of work, and the variables included in the MAR dataset are significant 
resources for researchers. Therefore, conducting a statistical analysis with the 
available dataset is at least better than throwing out the baby with the bathing 
water.
In order to test the hypotheses set above, two separate statistical 
analyses will be conducted. In both cases, the unit of analysis is again ethnic 
group-year, and the dataset covers all ethnic groups in the MAR dataset and the 
period from 1996 to 2000 (i.e. 5-year panel). Research designs of these 
analyses are discussed below.
Effect of Lower-intensity Rebellion on State Repression
Firstly, a statistical analysis will be conducted to test hypothesis 1 
above. In other words, it analyses whether the occurrence of lower-intensity 
rebellion incites the military repression by the state authorities. Therefore, the 
dependent variable here is an index of military repression (REP20, REP21, or 
REP22) against the ethnic group in a particular year y. Note, however, that the 
value of the military repression index in a particular year y  may simply be a 
continuation of the level of repression in the previous year (y-1). In order to 
distinguish the mere continuation of the repression from the increase of the 
level of repression, the lagged dependent variable (LDV), i.e. the level of
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repression in the previous year, will be included in the analysis as a control 
variable.
The independent variable of theoretical interest here is the occurrence 
of lower-intensity rebellion of the previous year (y-1). The result expected by 
the theoretical argument above is that the occurrence of lower-intensity 
rebellion of the previous year has a statistically significant effect of increasing 
the level of military repression of the subsequent year (i.e. the coefficient is 
positive).
In order to capture the occurrence of lower-intensity rebellion, two 
variables are constructed based on the anti-regime rebellion index. The first 
variable takes the value of the rebellion index of the previous year if it is equal 
to or smaller than 5. It will be coded as zero if the level of rebellion in the 
previous year is 6 or 7 (LOWREB hereafter). This variable thus captures not 
only the occurrence of lower-intensity rebellion but also the level of the 
rebellion in the previous year. The second variable is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 0 when the rebellion of the previous year is zero, and takes 
the value of 1 when the rebellion of the previous year is from 1 to 5 
(LREBDUM hereafter). If the level of rebellion in the previous year is 6 and 7, 
it will also be coded as zero. In other words, this dummy variable captures the 
occurrence of lower-intensity rebellion in the previous year, excluding the 
occurrence of the higher-intensity conflict. These two independent variables 
are used in order to see the effects of the lower-intensity rebellion in the 
previous year on the level of state repression.
One problem for both of these operationalisations is that instances of 
non-occurrence of rebellion (REB = 0) and occurrence of high-level rebellion 
(REB = 6, 7) are confused and cannot be distinguished from each other. In 
order to solve this problem, a dummy variable is constructed that takes the
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value of 1 if the level of rebellion in the previous year is either 6 or 7 and 
included in the analysis as a control variable (HIGHREB hereafter). By 
including this dummy variable, one can evaluate the effects of the instances of 
low-intensity rebellion in a more appropriate manner, without confusing 
instances of non-occurrence of rebellion and large-scale rebellion.
As for the control variables, two variables that were used in Chapter 3 
will be used. The first is POLITY2, an index of political regime of the country 
in which the ethnic group live, taken from the Polity IV dataset. The second is 
the GDP per capita of the country in which the ethnic group live. Based on the 
arguments above, one would expect that the variable POLITY2 has a 
statistically significant effect and its coefficient will have a negative sign (the 
more democratic the regime is, the less likely it is that the level of state 
repression becomes higher). As for the GDP per capita, one would expect that 
the variable GDP has a statistically significant effect and its coefficient will 
have a negative sign (the higher the GDP is, the less likely it is that the level of 
state repression becomes higher).
As for the estimation method, the ordered logit model is used again. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, this estimation method is the most appropriate when 
the response variable is ordinal and categorical (see Chapter 3). The fitted 
model of the present analysis can be summarised as follows:
1 1
Pr (REP20/ = m | x)
1  i (-Tm-1+ X b)l + expv ^  '
where
Pr (REP20/ = m ) = probability that the level of military repression 
against the ethnic group i takes the value of m (m = 0 to 3)
xfi = (fij LDVi + p2 LOWREB/ + p3 HIGHREB/ + p3 POLITY2/ + p4 
GDP/).
In the formula above, REP20 may be replaced by REP21 or REP22 
and LOWREB may be replaced by LREBDUM to use the alternative 
operationalisations, The statistical significance of the coefficients will be 
calculated based on the robust standard error, which takes into account the 
panel structure of the dataset by clustering the observations of the same ethnic 
group. By doing so, one can avoid obtaining an invalid standard error due to 
the invalid assumption that all observations are mutually independent.
Effect of the State Repression on the Escalation of Rebellion
The second analysis will test hypothesis 2 above. This analysis will be 
conducted in order to see whether the higher level of military repression leads 
to the escalation of rebellion. In order to operationalise the escalation of 
rebellion, two methods are used in the present analysis.
Firstly, a dummy variable is constructed that takes the value of 1 
whenever the value of the rebellion index increases from the previous year, and 
takes the value of 0 otherwise (ESC hereafter). This variable thus captures the 
instances of escalation. The advantage of this operationalisation is that it is 
possible to pinpoint the moments of escalation. The disadvantage of this 
operationalisation is, however, that it cannot take into account the degree of 
escalation. For example, the increase of the rebellion index from 1 to 2 
(increase by 1) and that from 1 to 7 (increase by 6) would be treated equally as 
an instance of “escalation.” In other words, one cannot distinguish the 
relatively modest escalation from more serious one.
Secondly, therefore, the value of the rebellion index will be used as a
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dependent variable (REB hereafter). One problem with using the value of the 
rebellion index as a dependent variable, however, is that one cannot distinguish 
the instances of escalation from instances of mere continuation of rebellion. As 
a remedy to this problem, therefore, the lagged dependent variable (LDV, i.e. 
the value of the rebellion index of the previous year) will be used in the 
analysis as a control variable. By including the LDV in the model, one can 
estimate the effects of explanatory variables on the escalation of rebellion more 
properly.
Note that one cannot use the entire data in the MAR dataset here. If 
one conducts an analysis on the “escalation” using the entire data in the dataset, 
the occurrence of initial rebellion will be also included in the dependent 
variable. Since one is interested in the escalation of rebellion that occurs after 
the onset of rebellion, this first “onset” must be excluded from the dependent 
variable. In order to limit the scope of analysis to the observations after the first 
“onset” of rebellion, all observations before the occurrence of initial rebellion 
and instances of initial rebellion are omitted from the dataset This naturally 
leads to the omission of all ethnic groups that remained peaceful throughout the 
period from 1945 to 2000.
The independent variable of key interest here is the level of military 
repression in the same year. The three variables discussed above, REP20, 
REP21 and Rep 22 will be used as independent variables. In addition, the sum 
of these three variables (REP20 + REP21 + REP22) is also used as an 
independent variable (REPTOTAL hereafter) in order to see the effect of the 
overall level of repression on the level of rebellion. If the argument in this 
chapter is right, the higher level of military repression will have an effect of 
increasing the level of the rebellion. The expected sign of the coefficient of the 
military repression is, therefore, positive.
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As discussed above, the variables used in Chapter 5 will be used as 
control variables. The NEWST variable (newness of the state), however, had to 
be dropped from the analysis because of the lack of variance: during the period 
from 1996 to 2000, no country in the dataset became independent and it takes 
the value of zero for all countries and years. All other variables, namely 
PROTDUR (duration of the protest activities), AUTLOST (loss of autonomy), 
POLDIS (political discrimination), ECDIS (economic discrimination), DICT 
(dictatorship), MONT (mountainous terrain), INSTAB (political instability at 
the centre), GDP (GDP per capita) and REGCON (regional concentration of 
the ethnic group) are included in the large-N analyses conducted below.
As for the estimation method, different types of methods are used for 
two dependent variables. For the escalation dummy variable, the 
random-effects logit model is used, because of the binary coding of the 
variable and the panel structure of the dataset (see Chapter 5 for more details 
on this method). For the rebellion index variable, the ordered logit model is 
used because of the ordinal and categorical nature of the variable. Here again, 
the statistical significance of the coefficients will be calculated based on the 
robust standard error, which takes into account the panel structure of the 
dataset by clustering the observations of the same ethnic group. The fitted 
models can be summarised as follows.
For the escalation dummy variable:
logit y — fio + U, + PiREPlQij + /^PROTDURy + /%POLDIS,y + /^ECDISy + 
AAUTLOSTy + fisDlCTij + /?7INSTAB,y + jfcGDP*- + fiMOKTy + 
/foREGCONy
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where
logit jj = log odds that the ethnic group /' experiences the escalation of 
rebellion in the year j
the random effect component { U, } are independent N (0, a 2) variates. 
For the rebellion index variable:
Pr (REB/ = m) = probability that the level of rebellion by the ethnic group 
/ takes the value of m (m = 1 to 7)
xj3 = (fijLDVi + #>REP20z + /TjPROTDURz + /^POLDISz + /?5ECDISz + 
AAUTLOST/ + j37DlCTi + /&INSTAB/ + frGDPi + /?/0MONT/ + 
AyREGCON/).
(2) Empirical Results
Effect of Lower-intensity Rebellion on the State Repression
The results of the analysis on the effect of lower-intensity rebellion are 
shown in Table 7.1. In Model 1 and 2, REP20 is used as a dependent variable. 
Model 1 is a model with LOWREB as an explanatoiy variable. The results 
show that the level of lower-intensity rebellion in the previous year has a 
statistically significant effect on the level of military repression, and its 
coefficient is positive as expected by the theoretical argument. Model 2 is a 
model with LREBDUM as an explanatory variable. The occurrence of 
lower-intensity rebellion in the previous year again has a statistically 
significant effect on the level of military repression, and its coefficient is
1 1
Pr (REB/ = m | x)
where
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positive. These results thus support hypothesis 1. In both models, the level o f  
repression in the previous year (LDV) has a statistically significant effect and 
its coefficient is positive. This means that the level o f repression tends to 
persist: the state authorities that took repressive measures in the previous year 
are more likely to take similar measures in the next year. In both models, the 
occurrence o f high-intensity rebellion in the previous year also has a 
statistically significant effect, and its coefficient is positive. This means that the 
state authorities are more likely to take repressive measures when a large-scale 
rebellion has occurred in the country (which is, o f course, understandable).
Table 7.1 Ordered Logit Analysis of the Determinants of Military 
Repression, 1996-2000 (Dependent Variable: REP20)
mod el 1 mod el 2
Independent Variables coef std err coef std err
Repression of the Previous Year 
(LDV)
4.80*** 0 43 4.62*** 044
Rebellion of the Previous Year 0 28*** 0 1
Low-intensity Rebellion in the 
Previous Year 1.34***
0.37
High-intensity Rebellion in the 
Previous Year
1.71*** 0 48 2.00*** 0 46
Democracy 0.0057 0.02 0.015 0.021
Level of Economic Development
*ooooo1 0045 -0.085* 0.045
Cut Point (1) 3.62 0 3 3.8 0.31
Cut Point (2) 9 65 0.87 9 66 0.81
Cut Point (3) 13.44 1.55 13.33 1.5
N 968 968
*p- 0.1. ** p <0.05; * **p< 0  01
As for the two structural variables, the effect o f the political regime is 
not statistically significant in both models, and thus there is no empirical 
evidence for the argument on the effect o f democracy. The effect o f the level of 
economic development (GDP per capita), however, does have a statistically 
significant effect on the level o f state repression at 0.1 level in both models,
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and the sign of the coefficient is negative as expected by the theoretical 
argument. This means that the state authorities in a more developed country are 
less likely to take repressive military measures against the rebels.
While the results of the analysis using REP21 as a dependent variable 
do not support the hypotheses of this chapter, those using REP22 as a
a
dependent variable also support hypothesis 1. One can conclude, therefore, 
that there is some empirical evidence that the occurrence of lower-intensity 
rebellion affects the level of military repression taken by the state authorities. 
Let us now examine the effect of the state repression on the escalation of 
rebellion.
Effect of the State Repression on the Escalation of Rebellion
The results of the random-effects logit analysis of the occurrence of 
escalation (ESC) are presented in Table 7.2. Model 1 is a model using REP20 
as an independent variable. REP20 has a statistically significant effect on the 
escalation of rebellion, and the sign of the coefficient is positive, as expected. 
In other words, the harsher the military repression is, the more likely that the 
rebellion escalates into the larger-scale one, other conditions being equal. 
While REP21 and REP22 do not have a similar effect on the escalation of 
rebellion,3 the overall level of military repression (REPTOTAL) also has a 
statistically significant effect on the escalation of rebellion, and its coefficient 
is again positive (see Model 2 in Table 7.2). These results support hypothesis 2 
of the present chapter. As for the control variables (structural conditions), most 
of the variables remain statistically insignificant. Only exception here is the
The results of the analyses using REP21 and REP22 are not shown here due to the lack 
of space. See Appendix 3 for the results.
3 The results of the analyses using REP21 or REP22 as an independent variable are not 
shown here due to the lack of space. See Appendix 4 for these results.
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level o f economic development (GDP), which consistently has a statistically 
significant effect on the escalation o f rebellion. Its coefficient is negative, as 
expected by the theoretical argument.
Table 7.2 Random-Effects Logit Analysis of Determinants of the Escalation 
of Rebellion. 1996-2000
Model 1 Model 2
coef std .err. coef std en
Military Repression (REP20) 0.87*** 023
Total Level of Repression 
(REPTOTAL) 020*
o n
Political Discrimination -0019 0 14 0 026 0 13
Economic Discrimination 021 0.15 0.22 015
Lost Autonomy i 0 1 
j
0 16 ■ 0 1 
j 0 16
Duration ofPeacefi.il Protest -0 009 001 -0 007 0.01
Dictatorslup -0 16 0 34 -0 17 0 34
Mountainous Terrain -0 043 0 11 -0024 O il
Political Instability 0.19 0 35 0.15 0 34
Level of Economic Development -0 15** 0 06 -018*** 0 06
Regional Concentration -0 49 0 44 -0 48 044
Constant -1.57** 0.6 -1 40** 059
N 660 659
*p 0 1. ** p < 0 05; ***p<0.01
The results o f the ordered logit analysis using REB as a dependent 
variable are presented in Table 7.3. Model 1 is a model using REP20 as an 
independent variable, and it has a statistically highly significant effect on the 
level o f rebellion, even when the level o f rebellion in the previous year is 
controlled for. REP21 also has a statistically significant effect on the level o f  
rebellion, while REP22 does not.4 Furthermore, here again, the overall level o f  
military repression (REPTOTAL) has a statistically significant effect on the 
level o f rebellion, and its coefficient is positive (see Model 2). These results 
again support hypothesis 2. As for the structural conditions, most o f them
4 The results of the analyses using REP21 or REP22 as an independent variable are not 
shown here due to the lack of space. See Appendix 5 for these results.
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remain statistically insignificant in both models, including the level o f  
economic development. The only exception here is the duration o f peaceful 
protest activities (dynamic grievances): in all models, it consistently has a 
statistically significant effect on the level o f rebellion, and its sign is positive as 
expected.
Table 7.3 Ordered Logit Analysis of the Determinants of Level of
Rebellion, 1996-2000 (Dependent Variable: REB)
Model 1 Model 2
coef. st d err coef std.en.
Level of Rebellion ui the Previous 
Year (LDY) 1.00*** 0 11 1.03*** 0.12
Military Repression (REP20) 1 48*** 0 27
Total Level of Military Repression 0 59*** 0.17
Political Discrimination 0.06 0 11 0.07 011
Economic Discrimination -0 02 0 11 0 0 12
Lost Autonomy -0.07 0 12 -0 07 0 11
Duration of Peaceful Protest 0 012** 0 005 0 012** 0006
Dictatorship P i j 0 26 0 0 29
Mountainous Terrain -0 08 0 1 -0 06 0 08
Political Instability 0 2 0 24 0 12 0 23
Level of Economic Development -0 01 0.03 -0 02 0.03
Regional Concentration 0 22 0.34 0 12 0 39
Cut Point (1) 2 14 045 2 18 0 47
Cut Point (2) 3 23 046 3 21 0 48
Cut Point (3) 3 88 0.51 3 83 0.53
Cut Point (4) 5 01 0 56 49 0.58
Cut Point (5) 6.38 0.65 6 23 0.65
Cut Point (6) 7 38 0.72 ■ i j CO 0.75
Cut Point (7) 857 083 86 087
N 659 658
* p < 0 1 . **p <■ 005: ***p<0.01
In general, most o f the structural conditions remain statistically 
insignificant on the occurrence o f escalation or the level o f rebellion after the 
initial onset. This means that one should not assume that the factors that 
explain the onset o f initial rebellion equally explain the escalation o f rebellion. 
On the other hand, the variables o f military repressions against the rebels have 
a statistically significant effect on the level o f rebellion more consistently
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across different models. The results of these analyses thus suggest that there is 
indeed a dynamic relationship between low-intensity rebellion, state 
repressions and larger-scale rebellion. The occurrence of low-intensity 
rebellion is likely to incite military repressions by the state authorities. These 
military repressions, however, tend to be counterproductive: the higher the 
level of military repressions is, the more likely that the anti-state rebellions 
escalate into the larger one, at least in the short-term.
One can see this counter-productive nature of the military repressions 
vividly when one makes a two-way tabulation of the rebellion index and the 
total level of military repressions against the ethnic group (REPTOTAL), 
which is shown in Table 7.4. The anti-state rebellion tends to be more intense 
and larger-scale as the level of military repressions becomes higher. While 
members of the ethnic group may remain peaceful under relatively modest 
repression (17 groups remain peaceful under the value of 1 of the military 
repression, and one group remain completely peaceful under the value of 2 of 
the military repression), no ethnic group remains peaceful against harsher and 
more indiscriminate military repressions. Under the highest level of military 
repressions observed in the period of 1996-2000, all ethnic groups were 
involved in the large-scale anti-state rebellion (6 or 7 of the rebellion index).
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Table 7.4: Cross-Tabulation of Rebellion Index and the Level 
of Repression (Number of Instances, 1996-2000)
Total Level of Military Repression (REPTOTAL) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
0 411 17 1 0 0 0 0 0 429
1 53 21 0 -> 0 0 0 0 76
o 20 12 1 1 0 0 0 0 34
Rebellion 3 33 11 3 n -> 0 0 0 51
index 4 31 4 1 *7 5 1 0 56
5 0 23 0 3 0 0 0 28
6 16 -> 4 0 3 *■) 31
n 8 13 5 *> 6 3 *) 6 45
Total 534 144 16 12 r)m) 8 6 8 750
It is obvious that state repression is not a necessary condition o f the 
escalation o f the ethnic conflict, since some ethnic groups were involved in 
large-scale rebellion even when the military repressions are virtually absent. 
Table 7.4 implies, however, that harsh and indiscriminate state repressions 
might be a sufficient condition for the escalation o f ethnic rebellion: whenever 
the state authorities take harsh and indiscriminate military repressive measures 
against an ethnic rebellion, it is highly likely to induce an even larger anti-state 
rebellion by the members o f the targeted ethnic group.
In a word, the dynamic relationship between the ethnic group and the 
state is a spiral o f violence, where the degree o f violence o f the ethnic rebellion 
is intensified by the degree o f violence o f the state repressions and vice versa. 
However, this does not mean that the escalation o f violence is an inevitable and 
automatic consequence o f the occurrence o f lower-intensity rebellion. The fact 
that repression is more likely to be harsher when the lower-intensity rebellion 
occurs does not mean that all state authorities will take repressive measures.
Which is chicken and which is egg, if  the argument above holds? One 
may argue that, if  there is a dynamic relationship, it would be difficult to figure
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out which occurs first and which follows. It seems, however, that the onset o f  
lower-intensity rebellion tends to precede the military repressions. As far as the 
MAR dataset is concerned, the military repressions are extremely rare if  the 
ethnic groups have not been engaged in rebellion activities in the past. For all 
three types o f military repressions, 97-100% of the total instances o f military 
repressions by the state authorities were against the ethnic groups that had been 
already involved in rebel activities in the past (see Table 7.5). Surely the data is 
limited to the most recent period from 1996 to 2000. Recall however that 161 
(almost 50%) out o f 338 ethnic groups that are included in the MAR dataset 
remained peaceful throughout the period covered by the dataset. If the state 
repressions simply occur at equal chance for all ethnic groups, nearly half 
repressions would have been directed against the ethnic group that has not been 
involved in the rebellion activities. Given this, the extremely rare occurrence o f  
military repressions against an ethnic group that has not been involved in 
rebellion is quite remarkable.
Table 7.5 Previous Involvement in the Rebel Activities by the Targeted 
Ethnic Group, 1996-2000
No involvement 
in the rebellion 
in the past
The etlinic group 
started the rebellion 
in tins year
Involved in the 
rebellion in the 
past
Total
1 5 0 197 202
Rep 20 2 0 0 18 18
3 0 0 O
Total 5(2 3%) 0 (0°o) 217 (97 7%)
1 0 0 14 14
Rep 21 2 0 0 12 12
3 0 0 16 16
Total 0(0° o) 0(0° o) 42 (100V) 42
1 0 0 1 1
Rep 22 2 1 0 24 25
3 0 0 21 21
Total 1 (2 IV ) 0 (0°o) 46 (97.9V) 47
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It is understandable that military repressions tend to follow the 
occurrence of lower-intensity rebellion. As far as an ethnic group remains 
peaceful, state authorities probably do not find a reason to use military force 
against the ethnic group, because it would be less costly for the state authorities 
to maintain the status quo without military operations than to use military force 
against the ethnic group. The story is different once some members within the 
ethnic group have taken up arms against the state. There are many reasons why 
the state authorities would prefer to use force to repress it even when rebellion 
is not so intense. The state authorities might be afraid of the “demonstration 
effect” of the rebellion to other members of the same ethnic group (or members 
of other ethnic groups, if the state is multi-ethnic): the state authorities may try 
to establish a reputation by using force in the earlier phase of rebellion in order 
to deter potential rebels. The onset of rebellion, in addition, might foster ethnic 
antagonism and mistrust in the country and lead to the increased support within 
the dominant ethnic group for tough measures against the rebels. In this case, 
the state authorities may be encouraged to take tough measures to gain more 
support from the dominant ethnic group. Chapter 9 will show, for example, that 
Milosevic decided to take tough measures against the KLA rebels in order to 
re-establish the legitimacy of his regime, and that some ethnic Macedonians 
were radicalised after the onset of the NLA rebellion and violent 
demonstrations were held against President Trajkovski who took a conciliatory 
stance towards the rebels.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the dynamic relationship between ethnic 
groups and state authorities. The first part of the chapter presented theoretical
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arguments about the dynamic relationship between the lower-intensity 
rebellion, state repressions and large-scale rebellion. It presented the main 
hypothesis that the occurrence of lower-intensity rebellion incites military 
repressions by the state authorities, and in turn, these repressions lead to the 
escalation of rebellion. The second part of this chapter then conducted a series 
of large-N analyses, using the MAR dataset, to test these hypotheses. The 
empirical results support the main hypothesis of this chapter, while there is 
much weaker evidence that structural conditions affect the level of military 
repressions or the escalation of rebellion after the initial onset.
In order to examine the dynamics in real-life situations, the next 
chapter will conduct a comparative case-study of Serbia and Macedonia 
regarding the occurrence of lower-intensity rebellion, state repressions and the 
escalation of rebellion.
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Chapter 8 
Repression or Conciliation? Comparative Case Study of Serbia 
and Macedonia
Introduction
This chapter conducts a comparative case-study of two ex-Yugoslav 
cases, Kosovo (Serbia) and Macedonia. As discussed in Chapter 2, these two 
cases are different in terms of the course of conflict after the onset of initial 
rebellion: while both countries experienced an onset of a low-intensity 
rebellion, Serbia experienced an escalation of rebellion whereas Macedonia did 
not. This chapter attempts to analyse and explain this difference between 
Serbia and Macedonia.
The previous chapter argued that the state repression is the key 
intervening factor which explains the (non-)occurrence of the escalation of 
rebellion. In line with the argument and findings in the previous chapter, this 
chapter will show that the nature of state reactions was indeed a key factor that 
made a difference between Serbia and Macedonia. This chapter firstly 
examines the state reactions in Serbia and their consequences. It then examines 
the reactions by the state authorities and the course of conflict in Macedonia. 
This chapter concludes with a brief recapitulation of the key findings.
1. Case of Serbia: Military Repression and the Escalation
(1) State Reactions to the Initial Rebellion
As discussed in Chapter 6, decisions to take up arms made by the KLA 
leaders were affected by a number of factors, such as a series of discriminatory
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policies, growing disillusionment of the non-violent strategy of the LDK, and 
the availability of a large number of weapons. These factors, however, are not 
sufficient to explain the escalation of rebellion in Kosovo. According to Judah 
(2000a: 129), despite the availability of arms and the general frustration of the 
population, “KLA activists were still finding it hard to win widespread 
acceptance for their idea of a general uprising... Jashar Salihu found that few 
people were prepared to take the guns he was offering them from Albania.” 
Even when the core members of the KLA decided to take up arms and started 
the low-intensity rebellion activities, therefore, the escalation was not an 
automatic consequence of the onset of rebellion.
What, then, explains the escalation of rebellion in Kosovo? Indeed, the 
reactions of state authorities played a critical role here. In face of sporadic 
attacks by the KLA, the Serbian authorities started police operations against 
them. The first-phase operations took place in early 1998, and these operations 
were conducted mainly by the MUP forces for two reasons. Firstly, since the 
security threat posed by the KLA was essentially internal, and there was no 
foreign invasion which would lead to the legal justification of mobilisation of 
the VJ forces, it was easier and more natural to mobilise the MUP forces. 
Secondly, the MUP forces including Special Police Units and Specialist 
Anti-terrorist Units were fully subordinated and loyal to Milosevic, and thus 
Milosevid trusted them more than the VJ forces (Gow 2003: 79-89). There 
were some indications of preparations for the operations. For example, in 
December 1997, the Serbian Supreme Defence Council decided “to set an 
absolute priority on Kosovo” and to strengthen the three army corpses in 
PriStina, Leskovac, and NiS.1 In January 1998, increased activities of Serbian
1 NaSaBorba, 1998/01/13, cited in Troebst 1998: 13.
206
security forces and army were noted in Kosovo.2 According to Gow, the MUP 
forces were deployed in full-combat mode in Kosovo by October 1997, with 
MUP and VJ units in reserve deployed in the field around the border of Kosovo 
inside Serbia proper.3 Despite these indications, however, it seems that 
decisions to go to strong-hand solutions against the KLA were made secretly. 
According to Lukic and Simic (2001: 12), for example, “when the clan leader 
Adem Jashari was liquidated in March 1998, the news came as a thunderbolt to 
many people.”
The police operations started in the Drenica region, where the KLA 
was reported to have a strong presence. According to Troebst (1998: 14), 
heavily armed police units were mobilised in the operations, equipped with 20 
helicopter gunships and 30 armoured personnel carriers. Between 28 February 
and 7 March 1998, Serbian police forces attacked villages of Likoshan, Qirez 
and Prekaz i Poshtem in the Drenica region. One of the main targets was the 
home compound of Adem Jashari, a local strongman who allegedly killed 
Serbian policemen several years ago and was sentenced to 20 years' 
imprisonment for “terrorism” (AI 1998: 78; Judah 2001: 22-23). In Prekaz, the 
Serbian police killed almost all members of the Jashari clan, a total of 59 
people.4 While Albanians seem to have offered some armed resistance against 
the police, many of the killed were civilians: according to Amnesty 
International (1998: 18), “it was clear that many of the victims - who included 
at least 12 women and 11 children - had no involvement in the attacks on
2 Nedeljna NaSa Borba, 1998/01/31-02/01, cited in Troebst 1998: 13.
3 Gow 2003: 201. Gow argues that the decision must have been taken at the political level 
in February 1997 to have reached this level of readiness by October. See Gow 2003: 
201-202.
4 For the list of all people killed in Prekaz during the Serbian police operations, see Tahiri 
2006: 86-88. This event was called “Drenica Massacre” by Albanians, and the site of the 
“massacre,” with ruined buildings of the former Jashari compound, turned into a 
“memorial complex.” For pictures and descriptions of the complex, see Thafi 2004.
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police.” In Likoshan and Qirez, the Serbian forces killed 26 Albanians, using 
machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, helicopters and armoured vehicles in 
the operation. Similar acts followed thereafter: for example, in May 1998, at 
least eight men, two of them over 60 years of age, were extra-judicially 
executed by the Serbian police in the village of Lybeniq, and eight men from 
Paklek near Gllogoc were “disappeared” after being detained by police (AI 
1998).
The events in Lybeniq show how the Serbian authorities responded to 
the guerrilla activities in an excessive manner.5 On 25 May 1998, a civilian car 
was shot at close to the village of Lybeniq, and three men in the car were hit, 
including a police officer and an off-duty reserve police officer. Terrified that 
their village would be attacked in retaliation, some of the ethnic Albanian men 
from Lybeniq reportedly tried to pass a message to the police that there were no 
arms or armed men in the village. There was, however, no chance for any 
message of this kind to be sent, and a large police force arrived at Lybeniq soon, 
firing on the Albanian part of the village with artillery and other weapons. By 
the time the police arrived, most villagers had fled to the nearby woods to 
become internally displaced persons, and the police killed some people who 
were running. This shows that the Serbian authorities responded to actions 
apparently taken by the rebels in an excessive and indiscriminate manner. By 
the end of May, 300 people were estimated to have been killed since the start of 
police operations in February (IICK 2000: 72).
(2) Effect of Repression: Expansion of the KLA
The effect of these police operations was, however, was not to pacify 
but to “electrify” Kosovo (Judah 2001: 23): since the deaths of Jasharis, the
5 The description of the events in this paragraph is taken from AI 1998: 20.
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KLA began to expand, village militias began to form and clan elders decreed 
that now was the time to fight the Serbs. According to Shukri Buja, who 
became a KLA commander in Nerodime Operational Zone in June 1998, about 
30 people of the KLA including him returned from Switzerland to Kosovo via 
Albania with light weaponry after the events in Prekaz and started recruiting 
people for the KLA and transporting arms into Kosovo.6 Baton Haxhiu, who 
was then a journalist of Koha Ditore newspaper in Kosovo, reported that he 
didn't see more than 100 KLA soldiers in 1997, but “following the Prekaz and 
Likoshan massacres, the revolt spread out all over Kosova and everyone 
thought it could find solutions by taking to the mountains and they rallied 
around this armed group which was called KLA.”7 According to Hockenos 
(2003: 247), these “massacre” events became “the rallying cry that would 
radicalize the Albanian population in Kosovo and the diaspora.” Surroi told 
that the events in Prekaz were “fundamental moment” and the war in Kosovo 
started “symbolically” on 5 March 1998, while the KLA emerged publicly 
earlier.8 In June 1998, even a Serbian police official admitted that the police 
operation had increased the support for the KLA in the villages away from the 
main road.9
As a result, the size of the KLA skyrocketed after the events in Prekaz. 
Pleurat Sejdiu recalls, for example, that the events in Prekaz “led to a big influx 
of volunteers” and “it was unstoppable” (Judah 2000a: 141). Shukri Buja told 
that the KLA “didn't have any problem recruiting soldiers, because there was a 
great flood of young people to become members of the KLA.”10 It seems that 
the KLA themselves were surprised by the course of the events. While
6 ICTY transcript of case IT-02-54 (Slobodan Milosevic): 6302 (2002/06/05)
7 ICTY transcript of case IT-02-54 (Slobodan Milosevic): 5428 (2002/05/23).
8 ICTY transcript of case IT-02-54 (Slobodan Milosevic): 3492 (2002/04/19).
9 Observer, 1998/06/14.
10 ICTY transcript of case IT-02-54 (Slobodan Milosevic): 6427-8 (2002/06/06).
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“everyone was shocked by what was happening, no one more so than KLA 
men themselves” (Judah 2000a: 140). According to Sejdiu, the plan of the KLA 
was to start a war in 1999 but they were forced to speed things up due to the 
large influx of volunteers (Judah 2000a: 141). Kelmendi told as follows: “as of 
March 1998, we wanted only partisan-type guerrilla attacks and still did not 
want to make open rebellion, because Serbia was too powerful. After Prekaz, 
however, general uprising started against our will and we had to coordinate.”11 
Volunteers came also from abroad. For example, in April 1999, a political 
representative of the KLA in Tirana told: “Until now, the number of people 
coming from the West, mostly from Germany and Switzerland, has reached 
eight thousand.”12 Serbian scholars cite the information that the KLA had 
about 1,200 members in May 1998, but it had grown to 25,000 members by 
July 1998.13
One should note that the expansion of the KLA took place in a rather 
chaotic manner. Besides the original KLA which started the rebellion, a new 
structure under Bukoshi called the “Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosova 
(FARK)” appeared on the ground, as well as local armed fighters organised by 
youths on a village-by-village level, calling themselves “Rugova’s KLA,” who 
fought till the end of the war under the impression that the KLA was under 
Rugova’s control (Kola 2003: 336-337). Many people also point out that the 
KLA had a de-centralised and localised structure and the “general headquarter” 
was not functioning. For example, according to Kelmendi, “the General 
Headquarter of the KLA was not functioning until very late... it was during the 
Rambouillet conference that the zone commanders sat down and elected 
Sylejman Selimi as the KLA general commander, whom Agim Qeku replaced
11 Interview with Ibrahim Kelmendi, Tetovo, 2006/05/30.
12 AIM Press, 1999/04/20.
13 Mijalkovski & Damjanov 2002: 128.
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in May 1999 when President Tudjman finally allowed him to leave the post in 
Croatia and let him go to Kosovo.”14 Ramush Haradinaj, who was a zone 
commander of Dukagjini area during the conflict, also said that “there was no 
general commander” until the selection of Sylejman Selimi.15 Shemsi Syla, 
who was then a zone deputy commander of the Karadak area, explained as 
follows: “General Headquarters of the KLA did not give orders... they just gave 
‘advices’ and worked on ‘coordination’ between zone commanders because we 
were waging a guerrilla war and decisions had to be made by zone 
commanders according to the specifics of Operative Zones.”16
In any case, the quick expansion of the KLA naturally led to the 
escalation of the intensity of armed conflict in Kosovo. For example, General 
Delid testified that there was a sharp increase in the number of attacks by the 
KLA since March 199817: he stated that in January and February 1998 the 
situation in Kosovo remained as usual with only a few attacks, but then “from 
the month of March onwards, there was a particularly large number of attacks 
against civilians, a large number of attacks against members of the MUP,” and 
as a result, there were only about 70 attacks in 1997 whereas in 1998 there 
were 1470.18 In this way, the KLA quickly expanded. According to the British
14 Interview with Ibrahim Kelmendi, Tetovo, 2006/05/30.
15 Hamzaj 2000: 128. Haradinaj also explains how he was elected as a zone commander in 
a meeting of representatives from all headquarters of villages in Gllogjan. See Hamzaj 
2000: 71-72.
16 Interview with Shemsi Syla, Prishtina, 2006/05/10. According to him, the KLA had 
seven “operative zones (OZs)” in Kosovo, each of which had its zone commander. These 
were as follows: OZ Drenica (zone commander: Sami Lushtaku), OZ Pashtrik (Musa 
Jashari, Ekrem Rexha and Tahir Sinani), OZ Dukagjini (Ramush Haradinaj), OZ Shala 
(Rahman Rama), OZ Llap (Rustem Mustafa), OZ Nerodime (Shukri Buja), and OZ 
Karadak (Ahmet Isufi). See also RS 2003, map 1, for the territorial division of the 
operative zones of the KLA.
1 He did so, of course, without admitting that the sharp increase in the number of KLA 
attacks was a result of the excessive use of force by the Serbian security forces. Indeed, he 
denied any excessive use of force by the Serbian authorities. See ICTY transcript of case 
IT-02-54 (Slobodan Milosevic): 9327-9329 (2005/06/22).
18 ICTY transcript of case IT-02-54 (Slobodan Milosevic): 41242-41243 (2005/06/21).
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colonel John Crosland, who was a defence attache to Belgrade from 1996 to 
1999, the KLA had taken control of three major routes in Kosovo by the 
summer 1998.19
(3) Second-Phase Operations: Serbian Summer Offensive
Some Serbian political leaders were concerned with the escalation of 
the conflict and inappropriate conduct by the police forces. According to Lukic 
and Simic (2001: 12-15), a meeting was held in June 1998 at the Presidential 
Palace of Serbia, where political, military and security elite of the country 
gathered. When the Serbian Minister of Internal Affairs Vlajko Stojiljikovic 
presented his idea that “all Albanians have to be defeated,” Federal Vice-Prime 
Minister Lilic heckled him and said: “because of what some elements of your 
police have done in Kosovo, one day we will be ashamed of being Serb. Our 
children will be ashamed as well, and maybe even children of our children” 
(Luki6 & Simid 2001: 14). However, Stojiljikovic enjoyed support from Mira 
Markovic (Milosevic’s wife) and Lilic’s objection could not change the 
repressive course taken by the Serbian government. On 17 June 1998, based on 
Milosevic’s proposal, the Serbian Supreme Defence Council decided that “if 
the terrorist activity of the Albanian separatist movements escalates, the VJ will 
intervene adequately” (Lukic & Simid 2001: 15-16).
In July 1998, the Serbian authorities started the second-phase 
operations against the KLA. This time, the VJ forces were mobilised and 
participated in the operations with the MUP forces. On 23 July 1998, a 
commandant of the Pristina Corps of the VJ Nebojsa Pavkovic issued a 
document to the commandants of the 3rd army, emphasising the necessity “to 
wipe out terrorism in Kosovo” and telling that “regardless of the activity of
19 ICTY transcript of case IT-02-54 (Slobodan Milo§evic): 7926 (2002/07/10).
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international factors, the VJ has a task and obligation to protect integrity of the 
country which is now most directly threatened.” According to colonel 
Crosland, the participation of the VJ was justified by the expansion of the 
border area for which the VJ forces were responsible: under the constitution of 
Yugoslavia, the sole task of the VJ was to defend the borders of Yugoslavia and 
the VJ was allowed to maintain control over the borders to 500 metres, but that 
was then further enlarged to two kilometres and eventually out to 20 
kilometres.21 Artillery of various calibres, battle tanks and armoured personnel 
carriers of the VJ were mobilised, which provided the heavy indirect and direct 
fire support to the MUP forces.22 Tens of thousands of Albanians fled to hide 
in the hills and the woods, the houses were looted and burned, and the crops 
and cattle were destroyed. By the beginning of August 1998, reports estimated 
that between 200,000 and 300,000 Albanians had been displaced from their 
homes as a result of military operations (13CK 2000: 74).
Some of the top cadre in the security apparatus were against these 
operations. For example, the Chief of the General Staff of the VJ Momcilo 
PeriSic wrote a letter to Milosevic in July 1998, in which he expressed his 
concern about the “negative facts” such as the “constant tendency to use the VJ 
outside the system’s institutions” and “the attempt by unauthorised persons to 
command VJ units.” 23 He publicly expressed his dissatisfaction over 
Milosevic’s policy towards Kosovo in October 1998, telling the Serbian 
newspaper Blic that Yugoslavia was in the impossible position of being at war
20 The entire text of the document is presented in Mijalkovski & Damjanov 2002: 
469-471.
21 ICTY transcript of case IT-02-54 (Slobodan MiloSevic): 7926,7931 (2002/07/10).
22 ICTY transcript of case IT-02-54 (Slobodan MiloSevi6): 7927 (2002/07/10).
23 A photocopy of the letter is presented in Lukic & Simic 2001: 160-164. The content of 
the letter has been presented by the Prosecutor in the trial of Milosevic at the Hague 
tribunal for several times. See, for example, ICTY transcript of case IT-02-54 (Slobodan 
Milosevic): 4936-4942. (2002/05/15).
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against the world and no country can afford to be in that position (Gow 2003: 
73). Perisic’s view was also supported by the head of the Serbian Security 
Service Jovica StaniSic, who had been regarded by many people as the second 
or third most important decision maker in the MiloSevic regime by the 
mid-1990s, and Milorad Vucelic, a politician who was associated with “the 
pragmatic national wing” in the Milosevic’s party, the Socialist Party of Serbia 
(Socijalisticka partija Srbije, SPS hereafter), but both StaniSi6 and VuSelid 
were removed in October 1998 (Cohen 2002: 300-303). General PeriSic was 
also sacked in November 1998 and replaced by General Dragoljub Ojdanic, 
who was a supporter of the leftist party, Yugoslav Left (Jugoslovenska levica, 
JUL hereafter) led by Mira Markovic.24 Due to Milosevic’s determination on 
repressive measures against the rebels and his firm control over the personnel, 
the opposition to repressive measures within the regime could not moderate the 
regime’s reactions against the rebellion.
The Serbian military campaign of the summer of 1998 was “in many 
ways a success” (IICK 2000: 75). The KLA had been effectively uprooted: the 
KLA “simply melted into the woods,” realising that it could not take on the far 
more heavily armed Serbs (Judah 2001: 23). But as more and more people fled 
home to become displaced persons, which was extensively covered by the 
international media, international pressures on Milosevic to halt military 
operations mounted.25 On 23 September 1998 the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1199 calling for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of security forces, and 
cooperation with the international monitoring efforts, and NATO approved an
24 Gow 2003: 72-75. Peri§ic claimed that he was dismissed “in an inadequate and illegal 
way.” See Cohen 2002: 303-304.
55 Hockenos argues that it was a result of the KLA’s strategy. He argues that “part of the 
KLA strategy entailed provoking the Serbs, getting them to lash back with predictable 
ferocity and thus forcing a Western military response” because “the more cruel the 
repression, the more vivid the message that Albanians could not live under Serb 
domination.” See Hockenos 2003: 250.
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“activation warning” for air campaigns against Yugoslavia.26 At the end of 
September 1998, attempting to avoid being attacked by NATO, Serbian Prime 
Minister Mirko Maijanovic in a special session of the parliament said that 
“peace reigns in Kosovo... As of today all anti-terrorist activities have ended. 
They will be renewed only if any new bandit and terrorist activity reappears,” 
even though some operations against rebels were still being conducted.27 In 
any case, these claims did not impress the Western countries and the US special 
envoy Richard Holbrooke was dispatched to Belgrade to negotiate with 
MiloSevic. Threatened with the prospect of NATO air strikes, Milosevic made 
an agreement with Holbrooke on 13 October 1998. By the end of October, 
some 4,000 Serbian special police forces had been withdrawn and the OSCE 
Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), a team of 2000 observers who would 
monitor enforcement of the agreement, was deployed.
(4) From the Holbrooke Agreement to Rambouillet
This agreement did not lead to peace in Kosovo, since the KLA took 
advantage of the withdrawal of Serbian forces and renewed its military actions. 
Haradinaj admitted that the Serbian offensive in the summer had inflicted 
heavy losses on the KLA and called the Holbrooke agreement “life saving for 
the KLA” (Hamzaj 2000: 115). Agim Qeku, who became the KLA Chief of 
Staff during the 1999 war, later said that the ceasefire was very useful for them 
(Sell 2002: 293). During the period with a reduced level of fighting, KLA 
members returned to burnt-out villages easily since Serbs did not have enough 
men to hold on to territories they had seized from the KLA, and the KLA had
26 ICTY transcript of case IT-02-54 (Slobodan Milosevic): 6966-7 (2002/06/13).
27 Guardian, 1998/09/28; Financial Times, 1998/09/29. This claim was also repeated by 
Zivadin Jovanovic, Yugoslav foreign minister, speaking at the UN in New York. See, 
Financial Times, 1998/09/30.
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“the time to train seriously and to consolidate a rather chaotic command 
structure” (Judah 2001: 24). While the UN, NATO and OSCE were alarmed by 
the KLA's actions and called upon the KLA to cease provocative actions, the 
KLA continued its military activities. A series of events in December marked 
serious deterioration. Facing the KLA military activities, the Serbian army 
again moved into Kosovo in large numbers, with tanks and other heavy 
military equipments, establishing permanent positions in various areas in 
Kosovo.
The failure of the KVM to prevent an escalation of conflict left an 
important lesson: in order to control the situation and to prevent escalation, 
mediators must talk to both sides. General Naumann, the chairman of NATO 
Military Committee from 1996 to 1999, admitted that many of the incidents 
were triggered by the KLA while the KVM was operating in Kosovo. 
According to him, NATO was not allowed to talk to any KLA man or 
representative, because NATO initially called them “terrorists” and the iron 
rule was that NATO will never negotiate with terrorists. He said, however, that 
“with hindsight, it was perhaps a mistake,” because “if you are in such a 
conflict, you should presumably talk to both sides and try to influence them to 
the best -  in the best possible way” and they “could have reduced difficulties in 
this area” if they talked to and negotiated with the KLA.28
The final key event took place on 15 January 1999, when Serbian 
forces assaulted Racak village and executed 45 ethnic Albanians. The 
OSCE-KVM investigated the site on the next day and concluded that they 
found “evidence of arbitrary detentions, extra-judicial killings and mutilation 
of unarmed civilians” (IICK 2000: 81), while the Serbian authorities denied 
that any civilians had been killed. Both the Security Council and the OSCE
28 ICTY transcript of case IT-02-54 (Slobodan Milosevic): 6995-7 (2002/06/13).
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strongly condemned the “massacre” at Racak as well as the subsequent Serbian 
refusal to permit the ICTY access to Kosovo, calling for the immediate 
cessation of hostilities and dialogue. Following up on these calls for dialogue, 
the Contact Group composed of six countries, namely the US, Russia, Britain, 
France, Germany and Italy, organised peace negotiations to be held in 
Rambouillet, France. When the peace talks failed due to the refusal of the 
Yugoslav delegation to sign, NATO started air strikes on 24 March, which 
lasted for 78 days. After the NATO bombardment started, Serbian forces 
started even harsher attacks on the ethnic Albanians. During the NATO air 
campaign, it is estimated that almost 90% of the total Albanian population were 
displaced from their homes and the death toll is estimated to be around 10,000, 
with the vast majority of victims being Albanians killed by Serbian forces 
(IICK 2000: 90-91). When Milosevic finally accepted the G8 principles, 
Serbian forces withdrew from Kosovo and the UN administration in Kosovo 
was established, which effectively ended insurrections by the KLA.
2. Case of Macedonia: Peace Process and Prevention of Escalation
Despite the onset of low-intensity rebellion, Macedonia did not see a 
serious escalation of conflict, at least when one considers the number of 
casualties: while around 10,000 people are estimated to have been killed in the 
case of Kosovo, it is estimated that between 150 and 250 people were killed in 
Macedonia in the six months of fighting between the Macedonian security 
forces and ethnic Albanian guerrillas (Phillips 2004: 161). Therefore, it is clear 
that the armed conflict in Macedonia was far short of the level of severity of 
the Kosovo conflict in terms of casualties. As discussed in Chapter 4, if one 
applies a common operationalisation of civil war which takes 1,000 deaths as
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the threshold of the “onset” of civil war, the Macedonian conflict would clearly 
not be classified as a “civil war.” This section will show that one important 
factor that explains the prevention of escalation was the nature of reactions by 
the state authorities: contrary to the case of Serbia, the state authorities in 
Macedonia did not resort to military repression and launched a political process 
to peacefully solve the conflict. The key figure in the state authorities in this 
regard was the then President of Macedonia, Boris Trajkovski.
(1) Trajkovski’s Political Process for the Solution of Conflict
The first effort by Trajkovski in launching a political process for the 
peaceful solution of the conflict was to set up a national unity government in 
which all parties, including the Albanian ones, would participate to foster a 
political dialogue. On 2 April 2001, Trajkovski convened the first meeting of 
representatives of all political parties to address inter-ethnic issues 
(Daskalovski 2005: 91). At the fifth round of the all-party talks, the four major 
parties agreed to form a “government of national unity” (Daskalovski 2005: 
92). It was eventually formed in May 2001.29
This coalition, however, went into deep disarray when two Albanian 
parties and the NLA signed “Prizren Declaration” at the end of May, which 
stated that Albanian leaders, mindful of an historic juncture in Macedonia, 
agreed to act in the national interest towards a common goal (Phillips 2004: 
118; Ordanoski 2004; Rusi 2004: 8). While it was a part of the peace plan 
conceived by Robert Frowick, the former American diplomat and then special 
representative of OSCE in Skopje, it was opposed even by key representatives 
of the international community, such as Mark Dickinson, then British 
Ambassador to Macedonia, who at the time was also representing the EU High
29 Guardian, 2001/05/09; Guardian, 2001/05/14. See also Balalovska et al 2002: 28-30.
218
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policies, Javier Solana (Rusi 
2004: 9). Both Macedonian politicians and the public viewed it as “treason” of 
the Albanian party leaders against Macedonia (Ordanoski 2004: 21). For 
example, the daily newspaper Nova Makedonija wrote that “Xhaferi and Imeni 
signed a document betraying Macedonia.” (Balalovska et al 2002: 31). Both 
Georgievski, the then Prime Minister of Macedonia, and Trajkovski strongly 
opposed such a deal. The dominant feeling in the government was that the 
VMRO-DPMNE had been betrayed by its coalition partner the DPA, and 
Georgievski stated that “the agreement represents a declaration of war by the 
Albanians against the Macedonian nation” (Rusi 2004: 9). Trajkovski also 
stated that “these meetings are unacceptable” (Rusi 2004: 9) and met Xhaferi 
and Imeri to demand that they denounce the deal, while they refused to do so, 
saying it offered the only chance for peace.30 At this point, even Trajkovski 
ruled out negotiation with the rebels.
Trajkovski continued his efforts to peacefully solve the conflict, 
however. On 8 June, Trajkovski presented Parliament with a “crisis resolution 
plan” based on three foundations, namely “the intensifying of political dialogue, 
the establishment of a special militaiy-police force, and amnesty for people that 
were forced or enticed to take up weapons.”31 This plan was adopted by the 
government on 12 June (Daskalovski 2005: 94). Phillips (2004: 121) argues 
that this action was important because the government had previously been 
unwilling to consider taking any concrete steps to induce guerrilla defections. 
When some members of the Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts 
proposed a partition of Macedonia and an exchange of territories and 
population between Macedonia and Albania as the only solution, which
30 Guardian, 2001/05/29.
31 Trajkovski 2005: 53-54. On this peace plan, see also Daskalovski 2005: 94-95; 
Balalovska et al 2002: 34-35.
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Georgievski tacitly supported, Trajkovski's office responded promptly by 
publishing a statement that ‘"the only way to resolve these problems is through 
dialogue with the legitimately elected representatives of the Albanians and their 
parties and by developing life in common” (Phillips 2004: 124). After the 
Macedonian forces failed to retake Aracinovo in June, thousands of enraged 
nationalists chanting anti-Albanian slogans demanded the resignation of 
Trajkovski, stormed the presidential palace, fired shots in the air and attacked 
foreigners (Phillips 2004: 128-129). While some even feared that Trajkovski 
might resign, he insisted that a political solution to meet the demands of 
Albanians was the only viable option. His determination to solve the conflict 
peacefully was of critical importance for the continuation of the peace process 
in Macedonia.
(2) Negotiations at Ohrid
While the political dialogue between Macedonian and Albanian parties 
led by Trajkovski progressed in an inconsistent manner and faced a deadlock, it 
was announced that the political dialogue was back on track at the end of July. 
The venue for dialogue was moved out of Skopje. At first, Trajkovski 
announced that the next round of discussions would take place in Tetovo, the 
second largest city in Macedonia with a large Albanian population, “because 
this town needs peace and we should show that it is a safe town and a symbol 
of coexistence between different ethnic groups” (Popetrevski & LatifI 2004: 
31). This did not materialise due to security concerns, however, and the town of 
Ohrid was chosen. The Ohrid negotiations began on 28 July.
The Ohrid agreement was a result of difficult negotiations and 
compromises from both sides. The issues that caused a deadlock were solved
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one by one.32 Firstly they solved the language issue. Under the terms of 
agreement, the Macedonian language is the official language in Macedonia, 
used for international relations. Any other language spoken by at least 20 
percent of the population is also an official language, and can be used for 
personal documents, civil and criminal proceedings, and so on. Albanian was 
thus granted this recognition, but the recognition came as a function of 
demographics. Secondly, a compromise was reached on police reform. It was 
agreed that the chief of the local police department would be chosen by the 
municipal parliament from a shortlist provided by the minister of interior and 
that the ethnic composition of the police force in each municipality should 
mirror that of the overall population in Macedonia, while Albanians initially 
demanded that it should mirror the ethnic composition of the municipality. The 
third issue was the timing of disarmament. The VMRO-DPMNE demanded 
that rebels disarm before the parliamentary procedure to adopt the 
constitutional changes. However, it was finally agreed that the disarmament 
and parliamentary debate should proceed at the same time.
The final obstacle was the continuing violence on the ground. The 
special anti-terrorist unit of the Ministry of Interior conducted an operation and 
killed five armed Albanians on 7 August. While all parties accepted the peace 
agreement on 8 August, an ambush of the NLA killed 10 Macedonian soldiers 
on the same day and 8 more soldiers were killed when their army vehicle hit an 
anti-tank landmine. Macedonian forces then started a major offensive, fuelling 
a cycle of revenge killings, which led to one of the most serious civilian 
casualties of the Albanian population. The regular and reservist police forces of 
the Ministry of Interior shelled the village of Ljuboten on 10-11 August and
For the details of the negotiation process at Ohrid, see Popetrevski & Latifi 2004. The 
descriptions of the negotiation in this paragraph are based on their work.
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conducted house-to-house attacks in the village on 12 August. According to 
the Human Rights Watch (2001), the Macedonian police forces 
indiscriminately shelled the village, causing the deaths of civilians including a 
six-year-old boy and a sixty-six-year-old man. This shadowed the prospects for 
the peaceful solution of the conflict. For example, one participant in the peace 
negotiations said that “the atmosphere was tense and difficult,” and “everybody 
withdrew to their camps, nobody talked to anybody about anything, let alone 
thought about signing the agreement” (Popetrevski & Latifi 2004: 35). Even 
when all parties finally agreed to sign the document on 13 August, the location 
of the signing ceremony was not disclosed until the very last moment due to 
security concerns.
In the end, the Ohrid Framework Agreement was signed at the 
presidential residence on 13 August 2001. It clearly paved the way for the 
prevention of further escalation. As a part of the Ohrid peace agreement, NATO 
authorised the deployment of their forces to disarm the NLA and started 
“Operation Essential Harvest,” and most of the NLA rebels handed over 
weapons to the NATO forces. Even though some rebels refused to disarm and 
formed the “Albanian National Liberation Army” to continue the armed 
struggle,34 violence largely ceased after the agreement. Vlado Popovski, the 
then defence secretary, said in April 2002 that the atmosphere between 
Macedonians and Albanians was good and they would not fight against each 
other again.35 The NLA leader Ali Ahmeti said that “If the Ohrid Agreement 
had not been signed, a new Bosnia would have unfolded with one or two 
hundred thousand victims” (Popetrevski & Latifi 2004: 36).
33 For the details of the operations, see HRW 2001.
34 For example, a minor clash occurred between former NLA soldiers and the fighters of 
Albanian National Liberation Army in March 2002. See RFE/RL Newsline, 6-57, Part II, 
2002/03/26.
35 RFE/RL Newsline, 6-72,2002/04/17.
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(3) Importance of Trajkovski’s Political Process
How significant was the role of Trajkovski in the prevention of 
conflict escalation in Macedonia? Some local observers suggest, at least 
implicitly, that the results would have been the same even if there was no 
Trajkovski who led and promoted political dialogue between the Macedonian 
and Albanian parties. Professor Biljana Vankovska, for example, argues that 
“Macedonians are not militant...we have no militant heroic history. People 
were not enthusiastic for being mobilised to the army and avoided call-up for 
mobilisation. Otherwise, it would have been another Bosnia.”36 If the presence 
or lack of militant history fully explains the presence or absence of escalation 
into the large-scale conflict, it would mean that results would have been the 
same even if there was no Trajkovski who took an initiative to start the peace 
process.
This thesis argues, however, that the conflict indeed could have been 
escalated into a large-scale one if there had not been a peace process led by 
Trajkovski, because other leading politicians in the government such as Prime 
Minister Georgievski and Minister of Interior BoSkoski showed more radical 
attitudes towards the Albanian rebels. For example, when Trajkovski was 
making his efforts to form a “government of national unity,” Georgievski 
pressed for a declaration of war, arguing that it would lead to a more efficient 
fight against guerrillas (Balalovska et al 2002: 29). When Trajkovski 
announced a peace plan at the beginning of June, the VMRO-DPMNE 
criticised it, saying “we call on some officials to stop misinforming the 
Macedonian public about the difficult security situation by their allegedly 
peaceful initiatives and demands for amnesty of terrorists, whose victims are
36 Interview with Biljana Vankovska, Skopje, 2006/05/29.
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members of the Macedonian security forces” (Balalovska et al 2002: 35). The 
Prime Minister’s spokesman told that the Pardew-Leotard proposal to make 
Albanian the second official language was a “shameless” document which 
would “seal the doom of the Republic of Macedonia” (Balalovska et al 2002: 
37).
BoSkoski was even more radical. For BoSkoski, the elimination of the 
“terrorists” was a “holy task” (Balalovska et al 2002: 29), and he was reported 
to be personally present in Ljuboten during the entire operation on August 12 
when the Macedonian police forces conducted a house-to-house attack.37 He 
created two paramilitary groups, “Tigers” who were aggressive police unit 
technically under the control of the Macedonian police commander, and 
“Lions” who were an unauthorized body of former police and military 
reservists until the autumn 2001, when they became an official police unit.38 In 
January 2002, the independent magazine Forum reported that the Lions 
included members with “renowned criminal history” and that it was created not 
to defeat the Albanian extremists but to help in achieving other political goals, 
namely escalation of military clashes and the elimination of those who oppose 
the radical military solution proposed by BoSkoski (Phillips 2004: 158). The 
case of Ljuboten shows that these radical attitudes were not just a political 
gesture to win popularity among ethnic Macedonians but with real intentions. 
If there had been no leading politician to start and foster the peace process, 
therefore, the cycle of violence between the state authorities and the rebels 
might have escalated into a large-scale conflict.
37 HRW 2001. Boskoski was prosecuted by the Hague Tribunal for “violations of the laws 
or customs of war” in Ljuboten. See the indictment against Ljube Boskoski and Johan 
Tarculovski, Case No. IT-04-82, available at http://www.un.org/ictv/indictment/english/ 
bos-ii050309e.htm
38 Phillips 2004: 157. For details of the Tigers and Lions, see also Ordanoski 2004.
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Conclusion
This chapter examined the responses of the state authorities against 
initial rebellions and their effects on the course of conflict. It firstly analysed 
the case of Kosovo, where the Serbian authorities decided to take harsh 
repressive measures against the KLA. These measures mobilised heavily armed 
police and military forces and led to indiscriminate killings of civilians. These 
repressive measures led to a sharp increase of the members of the KLA, and 
thus led to an escalation of rebellion. This chapter then analysed the case of 
Macedonia, where Trajkovski started a peace process at a relatively early phase 
of the conflict. Despite the difficulties and deadlocks, this peace process 
successfully found a political solution to the demands of the Albanian rebels 
and led to the cessation of armed conflict before the rebellion escalated into a 
large-scale conflict. The different responses by the state authorities explain the 
occurrence or prevention (lack) of escalation of rebellion in Serbia and 
Macedonia. These findings from the comparative case-study in this chapter, 
therefore, confirm the theoretical argument and the empirical findings in the 
previous chapter.
The conclusion in this chapter raises one fundamental question: why, 
then, did the state authorities respond so differently to the onset of initial 
rebellion? What were the factors that affected the choice and decisions made 
by the state authorities? These questions will be addressed in the following 
chapter.
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Chapter 9
Explaining State Reactions: Path Dependency and External 
Pressures in Serbia and Macedonia
Introduction
The previous chapter has shown that the state authorities in Serbia and 
Macedonia reacted to the onset of rebellion in a different manner, which 
determined the occurrence or non-occurrence of escalation. This chapter 
conducts an additional comparative case-study on the determinants of the state 
reactions in the two countries.
This chapter is structured as follows. The first section will argue that 
the factors considered in Chapter 7 are not sufficient to explain the difference 
between Serbia and Macedonia regarding the reactions to the initial rebellion. 
Other factors emphasised in the existing literature also fail to explain it. This 
section will thus introduce two explanatory factors, namely (1) path 
dependency of the policy position taken by key politicians towards ethnic 
minorities and (2) external pressures. The second section will analyse the 
Serbian case and show that the path-dependency of policy position taken by 
Milo§evic towards Albanians, reinforced by the domestic political context, and 
the ambiguous signals from the international community led to a decision by 
the Serbian government to take repressive measures against the KLA. The third 
section then analyses the Macedonian case and shows that Trajkovski was 
fairly moderate since his inauguration and that external actors put pressure 
more effectively on the Macedonian government to restrain its reactions to the 
rebels.
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1. Explanatory Factors: Path Dependency and External Pressures
This chapter uses two explanatory factors that were not used in 
Chapter 7. They are necessary because the factors examined in Chapter 7 are 
not sufficient to explain the difference between Serbia and Macedonia. The key 
explanatory variable that explains state repression in Chapter 7 was the 
occurrence of low-intensity rebellion. However, this factor cannot explain the 
difference since both countries experienced the occurrence of a low-intensity 
rebellion. As for the economic development, the level of economic 
development was 50% higher in Serbia than Macedonia as of 1988 (PleStina 
1992: 180-181). While the lack of data in Yugoslavia hinders the precise 
comparison in the 1990s, the difference between Serbia and Macedonia in 
terms of economic development would not be so large that it could explain the 
different state reactions in Serbia and Macedonia.1 The nature of the political 
regime is one factor that may explain the difference between Serbia and 
Macedonia: while Serbia had an authoritarian regime (polity2 score is -6 for 
Serbia in 1998), the political regime in Macedonia was relatively democratic 
(polity2 score is 6 for Macedonia from 1993 to 2000). This factor, however, 
cannot explain why Trajkovski took a moderate stance towards rebels while 
other politicians, such as Georgievski and Boskoski, took a more radical 
position, since all of them were democratically elected in Macedonia. The 
nature of the political regime, therefore, cannot fully explain the moderate 
position taken by Trajkovski.
Other factors that are used in the existing literature to explain different 
levels of state violence also fail to explain the difference between Serbia and
1 In the Penn World Tables 6 .1 used in the present research, the data of GDP per capita in 
Yugoslavia is missing for the entire period from 1990 to 2000. See Penn World Tables, 
httn://dc2 . chass.utoronto. ca/nwt/alphacountries .html
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Macedonia. For example, Ron (2003) argues that “institutional settings” 
(whether the area is “frontier” or “ghetto” for the state authorities) affect the 
level of violence employed by the state authorities. According to him, Serbia 
resorted to ethnic cleansing (i.e. extremely high level of state violence) because 
Bosnia was “frontier” and external to Serbia’s core, and thus the state 
authorities did not feel a bureaucratic, moral and political sense of 
responsibility for its fate, whereas Israeli state violence in Palestine was more 
restrained because it was “ghetto” and inside the Israeli core, and thus the state 
authorities felt more responsibility (Ron 2003: 8-9, 13-24). Ron argues that the 
restraint shown by the Serbian authorities in the Sandzak area, which is inside 
the Serbian core, also supports his argument. As for Kosovo, he argues that the 
Serbian authorities employed the tactics of ethnic-policing until 1999, and they 
started ethnic cleansing operations because Kosovo’s institutional setting had 
been dramatically transformed: due to the NATO intervention, Kosovo’s ghetto 
status evaporated and became “externalized,” and this led to the ethnic 
cleansing operations by the Serbian authorities (Ron 2003: 87-111).
His argument, however, cannot explain the difference between Serbia 
and Macedonia. According to his own criteria, both Kosovo and north-western 
Macedonia were inside the “core” of the state when the state authorities made 
their reactions to the initial rebellion (note that the Serbian police operations 
started in early 1998, when Kosovo remained inside the “core” of the Serbian 
state according to Ron). Despite the similarity between two cases in terms of 
the “institutional settings” discussed by Ron, the state authorities in the two 
countries showed a remarkable difference in terms of their reactions to the 
initial rebellion.
In order to explain the different policy choices made by Milosevic and 
Trajkovski, this chapter examines two additional factors. The first is the
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path-dependency of policy choices. Widely used in political science as well as 
in economics and other fields, the concept of “path dependency” means that the 
current outcomes depend on the path of previous outcomes, rather than simply 
on current conditions, and thus “history matters.”2 This concept is used to 
explain the policy choices as well. For example, Schmidt (2002) argues that 
one factor that affects public policy besides institutions is the path dependency 
of public policy, i.e. the feedback coming from policy choices and outcomes in 
the past. The present chapter argues that the logic of path dependency explains 
policy choices made by Milosevic and Trajkovski. The second factor is the 
external pressure, which often limits policy choices made by the governments 
and politicians. The present chapter will argue that the Western countries, 
especially the U.S., sent a wrong signal to MiloSevid, which was interpreted as 
a “green-light” for repression, while they put more coherent pressure on the 
Macedonian government not to resort to repressive measures.
2. Case of Serbia
(1) Path-dependency and the Context of Domestic Politics
Why did Milosevic decide to take repressive measures against the 
KLA rather than a more conciliatory stance? In order to explain the policy 
choice made by Milosevic, one needs to go back to the origin of his ascent to 
power in the late 1980s and see what his agenda was. Indeed, it was precisely 
the issue of Kosovo that Milosevic used to foster nationalism as his power-base. 
For example, in April 1987 in Kosovo Polje, Milosevic told the audience: “the 
process of emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins under the economic, political
For the usage of the concept of path dependency in political science, see, e.g., Pierson 
2000; Collier & Collier 1991.
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or constant physical pressures constitutes probably the last tragic exodus of 
European population... You must stay here. This is your land” (Milosevic 1989: 
144). In conclusion, he said: “entire Yugoslavia is with you... Yugoslavia does 
not exist without Kosovo! Yugoslavia disintegrates without Kosovo! 
Yugoslavia and Serbia would not give Kosovo away!” (Milosevic 1989: 146). 
On 28 June 1989, at the Gazimestan shrine which memorialises the 1389 Battle 
of Kosovo, Milosevic made a famous speech to commemorate 600th 
anniversary of the Battle. When Milosevic walked to the platform, he was 
greeted by shouts “Slobo! Slobo!” and “Kosovo is Serbia!” (Cohen 2002: 144). 
In his speech, he criticised the “concessions many Serbian leaders made at the 
expense of their people” as historically and ethically unacceptable, and 
declared that “Serbia is united today and equal to other republics,”3 apparently 
praising the amendments of the Serbian constitution which effectively annulled 
the autonomous status of Kosovo.
Kosovo thus had a critical political importance for Milosevic, which 
made it difficult, or even impossible, for him to make concessions on the issue 
of Kosovo. A number of Western diplomats recalled that Milosevi6 became 
difficult whenever the issue of Kosovo was raised. For example, former US 
ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmermann (1996: 57) wrote: “Kosovo 
was Milosevic's hottest button. He was unyielding, emotional, pugnacious, and 
full of invective for its Albanian inhabitants.” Lord Owen (1995: 137) recalled 
that “[o]ver Kosovo the polite mask sometimes broke and we would be into an 
ugly confrontation. It was as if he [Milosevic] knew this was the area of his 
most indefensible behaviour on which he was personally vulnerable, and he 
would sometimes turn snarling on me or anyone who raised it.” General Clark 
(2001: 65) wrote as follows: “During the shuttle discussions and at Dayton,
3 Borba, 1989/06/29.
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Dick Holbrooke and Chris Hill tried several times to raise the issue of Kosovo 
with Milosevic. No deal. ‘This is internal matter for Serb people and 
Albanians,’ Milosevic said. He stood his ground.” Louis Sell (2002: 281-282), 
a Foreign Service officer of the US Department of State, observed that the 
Serbian control over Kosovo was “virtually all that he had left to show for a 
decade of disastrous rule” by the end of the 1990s and “Milosevic could not 
afford to give up Kosovo voluntarily, even if he had wanted to.” According to 
him, MiloSevi6 told a US diplomat in early 1998 as follows: “Kosovo is not 
Bosnia. Kosovo is my head” (Sell 2002: 281).
Here, one can see the logic of path dependency of policy position. It 
was MiloSevid who raised the issue of Kosovo and called for “unity” as the 
solution of the problem, and the realisation of such “unity” (meaning the 
abolition of autonomy in Kosovo) was loudly publicised as a major 
achievement of his government. Precisely due to this position taken in the past, 
giving up the “unity” of Serbia by granting Kosovo even autonomy, let alone 
full independence, was clearly political suicide for Milosevic. According to 
Sell (2002: 281), this political importance of Kosovo for him was overlooked 
by the US diplomats who attempted to achieve peace through negotiations with 
Milosevic: Washington's response to Kosovo, he observed, was complicated by 
a “lingering nostalgia that the conflict in Kosovo, like Bosnia, could be 
resolved by dealing with Milosevic.” He argued that “Kosovo’s significance to 
his own survival meant that Milosevic was prepared to go to war with the most 
powerful military alliance on the planet, something that few seem to have 
expected” (Sell 2002: 283).
This logic of path dependency was reinforced by the context of 
domestic politics, namely the declining legitimacy of the regime. Cohen (2002: 
267-271) points out that Milosevic and the SPS were condemned by many
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Serbs for having “betrayed” Serbian national interests, and that Milosevic 
could no longer portray himself as a heroic patriot in the second half of the 
1990s. The decreasing support for Milosevic and declining legitimacy of his 
regime in 1996 and 1997 has been well documented. According to Sekelj 
(2000: 72), for example, public opinion polls showed that Milosevic’s 
popularity had dropped from active support of more than half the population in 
1992 to only 12% before the 1997 elections. According to a survey more than 
half of the citizens expressed no-confidence in the political institutions (such as 
President, Government and Parliament) as early as 1996,4 and confidence in 
political institutions dropped further in 1997.5 For example, only 29% 
expressed confidence in President of Serbia (i.e. Milosevic) and 61% expressed 
no-confidence in 1997 (Slavujevid 1999: 33-37). Slavujevic (1999: 100) 
concluded that the Serbian political system enjoyed the support of only 
one-fifth of citizens and was completely de-legitimized in 1997.
As a result, serious challenges were posed to the regime in 1996 and 
1997. Firstly, the reformist coalition Zajedno won in major cities including the 
capital, Belgrade, in the 1996 local elections (Thomas 1999: 285). When the 
election commission refused to recognise the results, the opposition coalition 
waged huge demonstrations, which lasted for more than two months (Thomas 
1999: 285-318). In February 1997, the regime was forced to admit the victory 
of the opposition and the Zajedno coalition assumed power. Secondly, in 
Montenegro, reformist Milo Djukanovic ran as a presidential candidate against 
incumbent Momir Bulatovic, Milosevic’s close ally, in the 1997 presidential 
elections, and the former won (Thomas 1999: 379-386, Goati 2001: 138-148). 
Electoral victories of the Zajedno coalition in Serbia and Djukanovic in
4 As for the details of the survey results, see Slavujevic 1997.
5 As for the details of the survey results, see Slavujevic 1999.
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Montenegro posed serious challenges to the MiloSevic regime.
Furthermore, even nationalists in Serbia, who had been core 
supporters of the Milosevic regime, became unsatisfied with him and started 
shifting their support to the Serbian Radical Party {Srpska radikalna stranka, 
SRS hereafter), led by ultra-nationalist Vojislav Seselj. In the 1997 elections, 
SeSelj was able to “tap the deep sense of national humiliation” (Cohen 2002: 
269) by emphasising his commitment to Serbia's ethno-national aspirations, 
which many Serbs felt Milosevic had betrayed. Helped also by the boycott of 
some opposition parties that constituted the Zajedno coalition, the SRS won 
29.3% of the vote and 82 out of total 250 seats in the Serbian Parliament, and 
SeSelj even defeated the SPS candidate for the Serbian President winning 
49.1% of the votes, even though the overall turnout did not reach 50% and thus 
the election was declared invalid.6 Some local observers argue that the 
growing support for Seselj was not a real threat for Milosevic, because “they 
were the same”7 and “SeSelj was merely a junior partner of Milosevic.”8 The 
growing support for Seselj and the SRS, however, was clearly a signal to 
MiloSevic that even nationalists were not satisfied with his regime any more.9
In this context of declining legitimacy, it was even more dangerous for 
MiloSevic to take a conciliatory stance on Kosovo, which would further 
discredit him in the eyes of nationalists but would not bring him any additional 
support from reformists. Therefore, MiloSevic chose to re-establish his 
legitimacy by taking a firm stance toward Kosovo. For example, on 10 
December 1997, the Yugoslav delegations walked out of the Bonn conference
6 SRS officials protested that the authorities had manipulated the turn-out figures in order 
to deprive SeSelj of his victory. See, Thomas 1999: 352. Eventually another candidate 
from the SPS, Milutinovic, defeated SeSelj in the presidential election in December 1997 
and the SPS managed to remain in power.
7 Interview with Sonja Biserko, Belgrade, 2006/04/06.
8 Interview with Dejan Anastasijevic, Belgrade, 2006/04/26.
9 Interview with Tank Begic, Prishtina, 2006/05/05.
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on the implementation of the Dayton agreement when an attempt was made to 
place Kosovo on the agenda: in the run-up to the 21 December presidential 
elections, the SPS had to appear to be taking a firm line on Kosovo (Simic 
2000: 179; Thomas 1999: 403). Furthermore, Milosevic decided to co-opt 
Seselj into the ruling coalition of the Serbian government exactly when he 
started an offensive against Albanian “terrorists”: on 24 March 1998, a new 
government was formed by a so-called “patriotic coalition” of the SPS, the JUL 
and the SRS (Simic 2000: 103); the SRS received 16 of 36 portfolios, with 
SeSelj taking the post of deputy prime minister. As Thomas (1999:418) argued, 
“the entry of the Radicals into positions of power meant that there would be no 
moderation in the government’s stance on the issue of Kosovo.” Some analysts 
even speculated that Milosevic's decision to launch an offensive in Kosovo 
may have been influenced by his desire to create a psychology of acute threat: 
while any rapprochement between the ruling parties and the SRS had appeared 
impossible after the December 1997 elections, a new atmosphere of crisis over 
Kosovo brought the two camps closer and thus weakened criticism against the 
regime (Thomas 1999: 416). Mihailovic (1999: 145) also argues that the 
Serbian elite invented a legitimacy formula by activating a crisis in Kosovo.
In April 1998, MiloSevic organised a referendum in Serbia, in which 
the voters were asked whether they “accept the participation of foreign 
representatives in the resolution of problem in Kosovo and Metohija,”10 and 
overwhelming majority of voters voted for “no” (Cohen 2002: 286). When he 
announced his proposal of the referendum, MiloSevic said: “we have rejected 
to accept the participation of foreign representatives in the resolution of 
internal question of our country, and especially in the resolution of problem in
10 Politika, 1998/04/03.
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Kosovo and Metohija.”11 This referendum was used to bolster the popular 
support for his regime as well as to “democratically” legitimise his tough 
position against Albanians. His decision to take a firm stance towards Albanian 
“terrorists” and to use force against them was thus clearly a vital component of 
his strategy to re-establish the legitimacy of his regime.
(2) Ambiguous Signals from External Actors
In addition to the path dependency and political context, ambiguous 
signals sent from the external actors also encouraged the Serbian authorities to 
take repressive measures. The behaviour of Robert Gelbard, then US special 
envoy for the Balkans, is often mentioned in this regard. When he made his 
first visit to Kosovo in January 1998, Gelbard was quoted in Serbian 
newspapers as saying that Washington was considering putting the KLA on its 
list of terrorist organisations barred entry to the US.12 Importantly, already in 
January 1998, the US was well aware of the preparations for police operations 
in Kosovo. Madeleine Albright (2004: 380), the then US Secretary of State, 
recalls that “[f]rom sources in the region, we received word in January 1998 
that MiloSevic was preparing to respond with a military crackdown.” This 
awareness notwithstanding, Gelbard apparently did not publicly express his 
opposition to repressive operations. In February 1998, immediately before the 
Serbian police operations in Kosovo, Gelbard condemned attacks carried out 
by the KLA, which he described as a “terrorist organisation.”13 In addition, the 
US even made some concessions toward Yugoslavia at the end of February 
1998: Gelbard told MiloSevic that Washington was prepared to let Yugoslavia 
join the South-east European Co-operative Initiative, a US-backed body
11 Politika, 1998/04/03.
12 Financial limes, 1998/01/09.
13 Financial Times, 1998/02/24; The Times 1998/03/02; Sunday Times 1998/03/01.
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promoting economic development in the region.14 Yugoslavia would also be 
allowed to increase its diplomatic representation to its UN observer mission, to 
open a consulate in the US and to apply for landing rights in the US for charter 
flights by its national airline.15
These actions sent a signal to the Serbian authorities that the 
repressive measures against the KLA were justifiable. For example, General 
Deli6 and Milosevic quoted Gelbard’s remarks to support their claim that the 
KLA was a “terrorist” organisation.16 Cohen (2002: 283) argued that 
“inadvertently perhaps, Gelbard had provided Milosevic with a green light to 
launch his March 1998 offensive in Kosovo. Indeed, Serbian action in Kosovo 
escalated only four days after Gelbard’s remarks.” Simic (2000: 194) observed 
that Gelbard’s condemnation of the KLA as a terrorist organisation was 
interpreted as “signal for action” by the Serbian government circles. Petritsch 
and Pichler also pointed out that “Gelbard indirectly supported Milosevic's 
firm course... It was not by chance that the attack followed immediately after 
the visit of Gelbard...For MiloSevic, Gelbard's signal meant a green light for 
military solution” (PetriC & Pihler 2002: 82).
This does not mean, however, that the US did not attempt at all to send 
a message that it was against the use of force in Kosovo. The US had been 
saying that there must be significant progress on Kosovo before it would lift 
“outer wall” sanctions on Yugoslavia.17 At the end of February, Gelbard urged 
MiloSevic not to launch a military crackdown in Kosovo and to open talks with
14 Financial Times, 1998/02/24.
15 Financial Times, 1998/02/24. Note however that these concessions were made 
primarily in return for the Belgrade’s support for a new pro-Western Bosnian Serb 
government and were not officially linked to any actions related to the situation in 
Kosovo.
16 ICTY transcript of case IT-02-54 (Slobodan Milosevic): 4266 (2002/05/03), 41248
Times, 1998/01/09.
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Rugova.18 After the reports of massacre at the beginning of March 1998, 
Gelbard said that the US will not tolerate violence and that violence will lead to 
the toughest consequences imaginable.19 Gelbard met MiloSevic after the 
Prekaz massacre and told him that “you have done more than anyone to 
increase membership in the KLA. You are acting as if you are their secret 
membership chairman,” which infuriated MiloSevic (Sell 2002: 281). Gelbard 
flew to Kosovo on 10 March and condemned the Serbian violence, which 
helped to restore his standing in Kosovo.20 The US officials thus certainly 
attempted to send a signal to MiloSevic to discourage the use of force against 
Albanians in Kosovo. However, their attempts were blurred by their 
ambivalent attitudes towards the KLA: even after the Prekaz massacre, US 
officials still continued calling the KLA “terrorists.” In May 1998, for example, 
US envoys Holbrooke and Gelbard again condemned the KLA as terrorist and 
attempted to persuade Rugova to do so, even though he refused.21
The attitude of the US clearly changed in June in favour of the KLA, 
apparently due to the continuing atrocities in Kosovo. At the beginning of June, 
it was reported that US officials were against British proposals to seal the 
mountainous border between Kosovo and Albania, because the US was 
concerned that arms may be denied to the KLA.22 In mid-June, NATO started 
an air exercise code-named “Determined Falcon” in Macedonia and Albania to 
“demonstrate NATO’s capability to project power rapidly into the region.”23 
The decisive event occurred at the end of June: Holbrooke talked to the KLA 
members for the first time in the border town of Junik.24 While Holbrooke
18 Financial Times, 1998/03/02.
19 Independent, 1998/03/04.
20 Times, 1998/03/11.
21 Financial Times, 1998/05/11; 1998/05/12; 1998/05/13.
22 Observer, 1998/06/07.
23 Observer, 1998/06/14.
24 Times, 1998/06/25.
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claimed that the meeting was “unplanned” and “unofficial,” this meeting was 
reported as a clear signal to Milosevic that they cannot be dismissed as 
“terrorists” any more.25 Only a few days later, Holbrooke revealed that 
Gelbard had made official contact with the KLA representatives in Geneva,26 
and the US even suggested that the KLA should participate in the peace talks 
with Belgrade.27 Albright (2004: 286) recalls as follows: “By mid June, it had 
become obvious that no political settlement would be possible without the 
rebels, so our diplomats began meeting with the KLA representatives. This 
infuriated MiloSevic and nettled the Europeans, but it was the only way to 
make progress.”
Even after the Western officials stopped condemning the KLA as 
“terrorists,” MiloSevic was not deterred from using force. One may argue that 
the diplomatic pressure from outside generally had a limited effect on the 
Serbian regime, since MiloSevic had “rarely been bothered about international 
criticism before.”28 In addition, however, the division in the major powers also 
made the external pressure ineffective. The most important in this regard was 
the Russian factor : while Russia participated in the Contact Group and 
attempted to broker a peace agreement, it consistently opposed military 
intervention against Serbia. For example, when Western officials started 
discussing military intervention as a “last resort,” Russia emphasised that it 
would strongly oppose any move to invade Yugoslav territory. When NATO 
started the air exercise “Determined Falcon,” Milosevic visited Moscow and
25 Guardian, 1998/06/26.
26 Financial Times, 1998/06/30.
27 Guardian, 1998/06/30.
28 Independent, 1998/03/25.
29 As for the good review of “Russian Factor” in the Balkans since the end of Cold War, 
see Simic 2000: 137-161. For the relationship between NATO and Russia during the 
Kosovo crisis, see also Norris 2005.
30 Sunday Times, 1998/06/07.
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held a meeting with President Boris Yeltsin, where MiloSevic received an 
assurance that Russia would veto NATO’s military intervention in the UN 
Security Council.31 The Western countries were also not always monolithic: 
for example, when the US suggested that the KLA should be included in the 
peace talks, EU foreign ministers were divided over such a suggestion. When 
the US started taking tougher stance against MiloSevid, it was supported by the 
UK and Germany but less so by France and Italy.33 As Wolff (2003: 87) 
pointed out, a “major problem that inhibited the international community’s 
ability to devise and implement effective conflict prevention, management and 
resolution policies resulted from the fact that there was no unified approach to 
the Kosovo crisis.”
3. Case of Macedonia
Contrary to MiloSevic in Serbia, Trajkovski took a conciliatory stance 
towards the rebels and played an important role in achieving a peace agreement 
in August 2001. This section will analyse why he could, and did, play such a 
positive role in Macedonia.
(1) Path Dependency: Election with the Support of Albanians
A crucial difference between Milosevic and Trajkovski was the origin 
of their ascent to power and the paths chosen by the two Presidents at the time 
of their inauguration. MiloSevic gained power in Serbia precisely by waging
31 PetriC & Pihler 2002: 95-96. This Milosevic-Yeltsin agreement led to the establishment 
of KDOM (Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission), which turned into the KVM (Kosovo 
Verification Mission) after the Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement in October 1998. See 
PetriC & Pihler 2002: 96-97.
32 Guardian, 1998/06/30.
33 Financial Times, 1998/04/29. See also Albright 2004: 381-382 for the attitude of France, 
Italy and Russia.
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nationalistic campaigns on Kosovo. On the contrary, Trajkovski was elected 
because he was more moderate towards Albanians, not because he was radical 
and nationalistic.
Table 9.1 Results of the Presidential Elections in Macedonia, 1999
Fust Roimd Second Round
Registered voters 1.613.284
Votes cast 1.050.499 Votes Cast 1.120,087 j
Voter Turnout 65.11% Voter Turnout 69 56%
Invalid Votes 11.013 Invalid Votes: 17.271
Candidates Votes % Candidates Votes 0 o
Tito Petkovski 343,606 32.70% Boris Trajkovski 591,972 52 80%
Boris Trajkovski 219,098 20 90% Tito Petkovski 514,599 45 90%
Vasil Tupurkovski 163.206 15.50%
Muarem Nexipi 155,978 14 80%
Stojan Andov 111,983 10 70%
Muliamed Halili 45,731 4 40%
Source: Website of the Election Commission of Macedonia http \nnv izbori.gov. ink'
The electoral system played a crucial role for the election of 
Trajkovski. In Macedonia, the two-ballot majority system is used for 
presidential elections, in which the second round o f voting is fought only by 
the two leading candidates in the first round vote (assuming that no candidate 
achieved a majority on the first ballot). In the 1999 presidential elections, 
Petkovski was leading in the first round vote while Trajkovski ranked second, 
but Trajkovski won in the second round (Table 9.1). Albanian voters had a 
decisive role in determining the winner: they voted en masse for Trajkovski in 
the second round because his position was more moderate towards Albanians 
than Petkovski. According to Xhaferi, he suggested to Albanian voters that they 
should vote for Trajkovski in the second round “because he was new, atypical
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(Protestant rather than Orthodox), young and moderate,”34 and they followed 
his suggestion in the second round.
One can clearly see the massive shift of votes from Albanian 
candidates to Trajkovski by comparing the number of votes for two Albanian 
candidates in the first round and the increase in the number of votes for 
Trajkovski in the second round (see Appendix 6). The number of votes 
received by the two Albanian candidates is positively correlated with the 
increase of votes received by Trajkovski: Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
between these two figures is extremely high (0.976) and statistically significant 
at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test).35 It is thus clear that votes received by two 
Albanian candidates shifted massively to Trajkovski in the second round. The 
number of votes received by two Albanian candidates exceeded 200,000 in the 
first round, which is more than half of the additional votes received by 
Trajkovski in the second round. Clearly, Trajkovski could not have won the 
elections if there were no support from Albanians in the second round.
It was thus only natural that Trajkovski delivered a moderate message 
regarding inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia. In his inauguration speech, for 
example, he said: “throughout the past decade, the Republic of Macedonia has 
often been taken as an example for interethnic tolerance. I will not allow ethnic 
hatred, jingoism and intolerance to threaten the stability of the country. The 
ethnic groups represent a patrimony and the Republic of Macedonia must have 
a strategic and permanent orientation to preserve, nourish and develop them.”
34 Interview with Arben Xhaferi, Tetovo, 2006/05/30. Xhaferi was then the president of 
the DPA, the largest Albanian party which was in the ruling coalition with die VMRO- 
DPMNE since 1998. Therefore, his recommendation was highly influential with Albanian 
voters.
The multivariate regression analysis confirms that this association remains valid even 
when other factors (change of the total votes cast between two rounds, number of votes for 
Andov and Tupurkovski in the first round vote) are controlled for. Results of the 
multivariate regression analysis are not shown but available from the author upon request.
36 Inauguration speech of President Trajkovski, December 15 1999. For the English
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Did the fact that Albanians voted for him in the presidential elections 
affect the decisions and actions made by Trajkovski in reacting to the 
occurrence of rebellion? At least some people seem to have hoped so in the 
early phase of rebellion. For example, former President of Albania Berisha 
called for moderate reactions of the Macedonian authorities toward Albanians, 
emphasising that he would like “to remind Mr. Trajkovski that the Albanians 
have voted for him.”37 However, those who were close to Trajkovski argue 
that his religious belief was the primary factor: Robert Milcev, a brother-in-law 
of Trajkovski, and Jason Miko, who worked closely with Trajkovski for the 
government’s lobbying activities in the US, both said that it was the “Christian 
perspective that it is better to talk than to fight” that affected his decisions and 
actions during the armed conflict.38
In any case, Trajkovski was moderate since his inauguration, and it 
was natural for him to take an initiative to foster political dialogue between 
Macedonian and Albanian parties, which led to the Ohrid peace agreement and 
de-escalation of the conflict. While some local scholars doubt that Trajkovski 
played an active role in the peace process,39 many people assert that he played 
an active role in making a peace plan. For example, Mark Laity, a NATO press 
officer who was in the cabinet of Trajkovski during the period of conflict, said 
that “the president has created a big plan to end the conflict, a kind of road map 
that combined his instincts and ideas and International Community ideas”
translation of the original text, see http://www.boristraikovski.org/
37 AIM Press, 2001/03/28.
Interview with Robert Milcev and Jason Miko, Skopje, 2006/06/01. Trajkovski was a 
devout Methodist and religiously very active since his youth. For example, in 1978, when 
he was 22 years old, he was elected as president of the Evangelical Methodist Youth of 
Yugoslavia. See Miko 2004.
•5Q
For example, Professor Biljana Vankovska said that “President Trajkovski certainly was 
a nice, decent man, man of peace and very responsive to the international community, but 
he was not of a high intellectual capability... peace plan was made by Americans, because 
it could not go without them.” Interview with Biljana Vankovska, Skopje, 2006/05/29.
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(Phillips 2004: 121). Jason Miko reported that “the idea of the peace plan to 
bring all political parties to talk and negotiate was primarily made by 
Trajkovski and his cabinet, especially his national security advisor, Nikola 
Dimitrov.”40 Muharem Nexhipi, an ethnic Albanian and the then deputy health 
minister, said that he believed that Trajkovski was the only politician who 
could organise the constitutional change long desired by Albanians (Phillips 
2004: 122). The former Foreign Minister Ljubomir Fr5koski, who was an 
advisor of Trajkovski during the conflict and an expert participant at the Ohrid 
negotiations, pointed out that “Trajkovski played a crucial role for the peaceful 
solution of conflict, because he was the only politician who could take the 
responsibility to take care of negotiations. No other Macedonian politicians 
wanted to lead the peace negotiations with Albanian parties, because they 
thought they would lose the elections if they did so.”41
(2) External Pressures from the International Community
The original policy position of Trajkovski is not the sole factor to 
explain the reactions of the Macedonian authorities. International factors also 
played a critically important role. In the case of Macedonia, signals sent from 
the external actors were more coherent. Until the Ohrid agreement, Western 
officials kept putting strong pressure on the Macedonian authorities to restrain 
the use of force against the rebels and to find a political solution to the conflict.
When the NLA rebellion started, external actors such as the EU, the 
US and NATO continuously put pressure on the Macedonian authorities so that 
their reactions would remain proportional to the level of threat and would not 
become excessive. For example, when the Macedonian forces launched an
40 Interview with Jason Miko, Skopje, 2006/06/01.
41 Interview with Ljubomir FrCkoski, Skopje, 2006/06/07.
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offensive against the NLA around Tetovo at the end of March 2001, NATO 
Secretaiy-General George Robertson and the EU High Representative Javier 
Solana arrived in Skopje to put pressure on the Macedonian authorities to halt 
the offensive (Phillips 2004: 97). After the March offensive, international 
monitors complained to the government about the arrest and beating of 
Albanian civilians and the destruction of houses by security forces.42 At the 
end of June, when the Macedonian forces started an offensive against the 
village of Aracinovo, which constituted the strongest action against the NLA 
and mobilised helicopters, tanks and heavy artillery, Robertson called this 
action “sheer madness,” demanded its suspension and visited Skopje to 
persuade the Macedonian state leaders to agree to a ceasefire.43 Eventually, 
NATO and OSCE intervened to implement the pull-out of the NLA rebels, 
together with their arms, and to transfer them to an undisclosed location.44
It was argued above that labelling the KLA as “terrorists” had sent a 
wrong signal to the Serbian authorities. In this regard, Western officials were 
much more careful in the case of Macedonia, probably because they learned 
precisely from their earlier experiences in the Kosovo conflict. When the NLA 
emerged, Solana condemned the violence and urged Albanian leaders to isolate 
“extremists,”45 and NATO also called them an “extremist Albanian group,” 46 
but both avoided the word “terrorist.” When Trajkovski visited the US on 1 
May 2001, expecting President Bush to openly label the NLA as “terrorists,” 
the US Report on Terrorism in the World published by the State Department on 
the same day did not label them as terrorists.47 After the intervention of NATO
42 Guardian, 2001/04/10.
43 AIM Press, 2001/07/01.
44 AIM Press, 2001/07/01.
45 Solana’s statement on the violent incidents in the border region of the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, 2001/03/05, available at http://ue.eu.int/
46 Daily Telegraph, 2001/03/09.
47 AIM Press, 2001/07/23.
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and OSCE at Aracinovo, which led to strong anti-West demonstrations by 
Macedonians, the US prohibited some people connected to the NLA from 
entering the US and banned all financial transactions for the NLA from the US, 
but it was done “just to restore the disturbed balance.”48 Solana used the term 
“terrorist” once to condemn the ambush by the NLA which killed eight 
Macedonian commandos, but he did not forget to emphasise the importance of 
a political solution of the conflict, saying that “by remaining steadfastly on the 
course of dialogue and reform, the responsible political leaders can effectively 
counter the threat of extremist nationalism and help their country advance on 
the road to full participation in a prosperous and stable Europe.”49
The Western countries also attempted to put pressure on the 
Macedonian government to start a political process to make a deal with 
Albanian parties, if not with the rebels directly. At the end of March, for 
example, Solana pressed the Macedonian authorities to move to a political 
solution of the problem, saying that “[grievances cannot be allowed to fester. 
My message to all Macedonians today is that it is in their interests to address 
urgently the root causes of legitimate grievance, through political and 
democratic mechanisms.”50 The European countries also exerted pressure on 
Prime Minister Georgievski to abandon the idea of declaring a state of war and 
to form a government of broad or grand coalition.51 On 18 May 2001, Solana 
appointed Mark Dickinson, Ambassador of the UK in Skopje, as his personal 
representative in Macedonia, aiming at “maintaining a daily channel of 
communication with key players” and assisting “in pushing forward the
48 AIM Press, 2001/07/23.
49 Solana’s statement after the killing of 8 soldiers near Tetovo, 2001/04/29, http://ue.eu. 
int/
Solana’s statement following his visit to Tetovo, 2001/03/27, http://ue.eu.int/
51 AIM Press, 2001/05/21.
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political dialogue.”52
The Western officials intensified pressure for a political solution after 
June 2001. At the beginning of June, Solana again visited Macedonia twice, 
which led to the offer of amnesty by Trajkovski.53 When the peace plan 
created by Trajkovski was made public at the beginning of June, the ministers 
of EU countries approved this plan and Solana visited Skopje again to express 
in person support for the plan.54 When negotiations between the leaders of the 
four major parties started on 14 June based on his peace plan, ambassadors 
from the US and the UK were “closely monitoring” the talks at Trajkovski's 
office.55 At the end of June, when European foreign ministers met in 
Luxemburg, they expressed their dissatisfaction with progress achieved so far 
and made the granting of aid to Macedonia conditional upon progress in 
political dialogue.56 They assessed that the EU mediation in this dialogue was 
necessary and appointed the former French Defence Minister, Francois Lyotard, 
as a full-time special envoy in Macedonia.57 Leotard and James Pardew, US 
President Bush's special envoy, held intensive individual and joint discussions 
with local political leaders to reach a political agreement. When negotiations 
faced a deadlock at the end of July, Solana and Robertson flew to Macedonia to 
provide additional pressure again, saying “95 percent of the agreement has 
been already agreed and only 5 percent remains to be agreed upon, which is not 
worth waging a war.”58 Given such a strong and continuous involvement of the 
EU and the US, one can argue that the Ohrid agreement would not have been
Solana’s statement on the confirmation of the appointment of Ambassador Dickinson as 
his personal representative in fYROM, 2001/05/18, http://ue.eu.int/
53 Guardian, 2001/06/01.
54 AIM Press, 2001/06/14.
55 AIM Press, 2001/06/23.
56 AIM Press, 2001/07/01.
57 AIM Press, 2001/07/01.
58 AIM Press, 2001/08/21.
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achieved without their efforts of mediation. For example, Western diplomats in 
Skopje concurred that Solana’s dedication to the peace process in Macedonia 
turned out to be essential (Phillips 2004: 117).
Why was the pressure from the international community more 
effective in the case of Macedonia? Firstly, some scholars suggest that it was 
effective because it was timely. For example, the former Foreign Minister of 
Macedonia Denko Maleski argues that “the West intervened timely to 
peacefully solve the conflict, and they did so because of their earlier 
experiences in the Balkans.”59 Indeed, the West responded fairly quickly, at a 
very early stage of the conflict, and it certainly increased the effectiveness of 
external pressure. Secondly, external actors were more unified and coherent 
and did not show internal disagreements as they did in the case of Kosovo. The 
third important factor was the dependency of Macedonia on external support. 
The fact that Macedonia was seeking membership of EU and NATO gave them 
leverage on the Macedonian leadership. For example, at the beginning of April 
2001, Macedonia signed Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU, 
and at the signing ceremony, Prime Minister Georgievski promised to meet the 
June deadline for improved relations between Macedonians and Albanians.60 
When Roberson attempted to persuade the Macedonian authorities to halt the 
offensive against Aracinovo, it was rumoured that he achieved it by threatening 
sanctions.61 Macedonian politicians were aware that Macedonia needed 
external assistance and this awareness certainly made them more responsive to 
the demands of the international community.
59 Interview with Denko Maleski, Skopje, 2006/06/01.
60 Guardian, 2001/04/10.
61 AIM P ress ,2 m t0 im .
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Conclusion
This chapter has examined the factors that explain the difference 
between Serbia and Macedonia regarding state reactions to the occurrence of 
initial rebellions. The first section pointed out that neither the factors 
considered in Chapter 7 nor the “institutional settings” emphasised by Ron can 
explain it. It then introduced two additional explanatory factors, namely path 
dependency of the policy position and external pressures. The second section 
showed that the path-dependency of policy position, reinforced by the domestic 
political context, and the ambiguous signals from the international community 
led to the repressive measures in Serbia. The third section pointed out that 
Trajkovski was fairly moderate from his inauguration -  he was elected as 
President precisely because he was perceived as more moderate by Albanians 
in Macedonia -  and the external actors put timely, coherent and strong 
pressures on the Macedonian government to restrain its reactions to the 
rebellion.
What are the theoretical implications of the analysis in this chapter? 
As for the path dependency of policy position, it implies that it would be much 
more difficult to take a moderate and conciliatory stance for politicians who 
had already taken a radical stance on the same issue, even though it does not 
mean that politicians would never change their positions on crucial issues. In 
the case of Serbia, for example, some local politicians seem to have noticed 
this difficulty. Biljana PlavSic, then President of Republika Srpska, told Solana 
and General Clark that “the solution to the problem of Kosovo is democracy in 
Belgrade” (Clark 2001: 113). Clark (2001: 130) interpreted this remark as 
follows: “with a democratic government there, peaceful arrangement could be 
made to address the Albanians’ concerns. With Milosevic [sic] in power, ... a
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solution would never be possible.”
As for external pressure, this chapter’s analysis gives us some lessons 
for the effectiveness of external pressure for the prevention of escalation. 
Firstly, the case of Serbia suggests that external actors should be careful when 
they condemn the rebels, because a strong condemnation of the rebels may be 
interpreted by the state authorities as a “green-light” for repression. External 
actors should be especially careful when they use the term “terrorist,” because 
the usage of this term may be interpreted as a total and unconditional 
de-legitimisation of the rebels, which in turn would be interpreted as 
unconditional and full legitimisation for repression. Of course, this does not 
mean that external actors should not condemn rebels at all. In many cases, the 
rebels should be blamed for their violent actions, and external actors then 
should condemn rebels to discourage them from resorting to violence. Tapping 
a right balance is important, since a condemnation of one side may elicit 
counter-violence from the other side. Secondly, in order to prevent escalation, 
actions made by external actors must be timely and coherent. External 
pressures must be timely because stopping the cycle of violence at an early 
stage is critically important for the prevention of escalation. External pressures 
must be coherent because internal disagreements among external actors will 
decrease the effectiveness by undermining the credibility of possible 
punishment, i.e. by giving an impression that external actors would not be able 
to take coherent actions to punish the state that takes repressive measures.
This chapter's key theoretical arguments are not tested by large-N 
analysis, because it is extremely difficult to operationalise and quantify both 
factors emphasised in this chapter. How to operationalise and measure, for 
example, the “original policy position” taken by the key politicians in the state 
authorities? How to operationalise and measure the “timeliness” or
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“coherence” of the pressures made by external actors? Finding a convincing 
answer to these methodological questions is not an easy task. This chapter is a 
part of the efforts for theory-making rather than for theory-testing. The validity 
of the theoretical arguments of this chapter remains to be checked and tested in 
future research.
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Conclusion
The present thesis has completed its theoretical explorations and 
empirical analyses of the occurrence of ethnic rebellion. It now concludes with 
a summary of key findings and a discussion on the theoretical and 
methodological implications for the study of ethnic conflict as well as the 
policy implications for conflict prevention.
1. Key Findings of the Thesis
Part II analysed the initial level of rebellion. Chapter 3 presented two 
ideal types, rebellion from above and from below, and found that the initial 
level of rebellion is more likely to be higher if politicians are involved in the 
organisation of rebellion. Chapter 4 conducted a comparative analysis of Serb 
and Albanian rebellions in the ex-Yugoslav region and has shown that the 
involvement of politicians, police and army in the rebellion led to the high 
level of the initial intensity of rebellion in Croatia and Bosnia, while Albanian 
rebellions were “from below,” organised by those who did not have a large 
amount of resources, and consequently the initial level of rebellion was low in 
Kosovo and Macedonia.
Part III examined the onset of initial rebellion. Chapter 5 argued that 
structural conditions emphasised in the existing literature may not suffice to 
explain the onset of initial rebellion and argued for the importance of “dynamic 
grievances.” In other words, when members of the ethnic group keep making 
peaceful protests for a long time, people may get increasingly frustrated by the 
fact that they cannot achieve their goals by peaceful means. As a result, some 
people decide to choose a violent option as an alternative to change the status
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quo. Empirically, Chapter 5 found that the probability of the occurrence of 
rebellion increases as the duration of peaceful protest gets longer. In addition, 
some structural conditions associated with the grievances (such as political 
discrimination and loss of autonomy) also had a significant effect on the onset 
of initial rebellion. Chapter 6 conducted a case study of the four rebellions in 
the ex-Yugoslav region and has shown that “dynamic grievances” explain the 
timing of the onset of rebellion in Kosovo and Macedonia, even though 
structural conditions do explain the onset of rebellion as well, while other 
structural conditions, such as the newness of the state, better explain the early 
onset of rebellion in Croatia and Bosnia.
Part IV examined an interaction between the ethnic group and the state. 
Chapter 7 argued that this interaction becomes important when one analyses 
the escalation of rebellion after the onset of initial rebellion and found that the 
state authorities are more likely to take repressive measures when the 
low-intensity rebellion occurs, and the escalation of rebellion is more likely to 
occur when the state authorities take repressive measures. Chapter 8 compared 
the state reactions to the initial rebellion in Serbia and Macedonia and has 
shown that the Serbian authorities took repressive measures against the rebels, 
which led to the escalation of rebellion, while the Macedonian authorities took 
a more conciliatory stance, which led to the de-escalation of rebellion. Chapter 
9 has shown that this difference between Serbia and Macedonia is caused by 
two factors, namely the path dependency of policy position taken by key 
politicians and the nature of the external pressure. The policy position taken by 
Milosevic in the 1980s made it impossible for him to take a conciliatory stance 
towards Albanian rebels in the 1990s, and the external actors, especially the US, 
sent a wrong signal to Milosevic by condemning the KLA as “terrorists,” that 
was interpreted by the Serbian authorities as “green light” for repression. On
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the other hand, Trajkovski was more moderate towards Albanians since his 
inauguration and thus it was natural for him to take a conciliatory stance, and 
the external actors put a coherent and clear pressure to find a political solution 
to the conflict.
2. Implications of the Case Selection
The introductory chapter of this thesis discussed the issues related to 
the case selection and the generalisability of the theoretical arguments derived 
from the case study. This section elaborates on the implications of the case 
selection. After the comparative case study and the large-N analysis, can we 
say that the ex-Yugoslav cases are typical cases of ethnic rebellion? Are they 
rather anomalies or atypical cases? In what sense are they typical or atypical? 
What about the factors excluded from the large-N analysis? This section 
attempts to address these questions.
In what sense are the ex-Yugoslav cases typical or atypical? One can 
use the results of the large-N analyses to answer this question. If these cases 
follow the general pattern in the dataset, the ex-Yugoslav cases can be regarded 
as typical cases, at least regarding the aspect analysed in the thesis, rather than 
anomalies. The results of the large-N analyses in Chapter 3 suggest that all of 
the ex-Yugoslav cases are typical in a sense that the involvement of the elite, 
such as politicians and military officials, led to the high intensity of initial 
rebellion (Serb rebellions in Croatia and Bosnia) while the decisions from 
below (made by non-leaders) led to the low intensity of initial rebellion 
(Albanian rebellions in Kosovo and Macedonia). Based on the empirical 
findings in Chapter 5, one can argue that the cases of Albanian rebellions in 
Kosovo and Macedonia are typical in a sense that the lack of achievements of
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the peaceful protest that lasted for a relatively long period led to the decisions 
to take up arms by some members of the ethnic group. While the Serb leaders 
in Croatia and Bosnia decided to take up arms earlier rather than later, it is not 
certain whether they are typical or atypical, because the large-N analyses in 
Chapter 5 do not give a definitive answer. As for the findings in Chapter 7, they 
suggest that the case of Serbia is typical in that the occurrence of low-intensity 
rebellion led to the harsh police and military operations against the rebels, and 
these operations led to the escalation of rebellion. One can also argue that the 
case of Macedonia is rather atypical because the occurrence of low-intensity 
rebellion did not lead to the repressive operations by the state and the 
conciliatory stance taken by the state authorities led to the de-escalation of 
rebellion.
Overall, the large-N analyses tell us more about the typicality of the 
ex-Yugoslav cases, but not much about their peculiarities. However, what is 
excluded from the large-N analyses does tell us about the peculiarities of the 
ex-Yugoslav cases. These peculiarities are not trivial, but are of importance for 
the further theory-building on ethnic conflict and civil war. This section 
discusses two such factors, namely (1) availability of arms and (2) role of 
external actor.
In Part El, Chapter 6 pointed out that the availability of arms played 
an important role in determining the timing of rebellion in Kosovo and 
Macedonia, but this factor was excluded from the large-N analyses in Chapter 
5. This factor also played an important role in the case of Serb rebellions in 
Croatia and Bosnia in that the availability of a large amount of weapons and 
other resources led to the decisions by the Serb leaders to take up arms earlier 
rather than later. This factor is of enormous importance particularly for the 
conflict prevention: this factor may act as a major limiting factor to prevent a
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large-scale conflict even when the grievances among the population are high 
and all of the “right conditions for insurgency” are met. One should try to 
explore possibilities to incorporate this factor into an explanatory framework 
and operationalise it adequately to include in the large-N analysis.
This factor also tells us about one of the peculiarities of the 
ex-Yugoslav cases. Chapter 4 argued that the local politicians could mobilise a 
large number of military resources to organise a rebellion. This, however, is not 
always the case across the world. In many countries, the local politicians do not 
have any access to the weapons or military resources whatsoever. In the case of 
the ex-Yugoslav region, the Territorial Defence system made it possible even 
for the local politicians to access the weapons: in order to facilitate the guerrilla 
warfare against the foreign invader, a large number of small arms and 
ammunition were stored in every municipality in ex-Yugoslavia (see Chapter 4). 
This kind of institutional setting is obviously not so common in the world. 
While this does not necessarily invalidate the hypotheses drawn from the 
ex-Yugoslav cases because they are supported by the large-N analyses, this 
does suggest that the way in which politicians or elites acquire arms and other 
military resources for a rebellion may vary from case to case.
Chapter 9 pointed out that the external actor (international 
community) played an important role in determining the state reaction against 
the rebels, but this factor was not included in the large-N analyses in Chapter 7. 
This factor is also connected to the availability of arms discussed above: the 
external actors may provide weapons and other resources to the organisers of 
rebellion. In the ex-Yugoslav cases, the Serbian government and the Federal 
military authorities (the JNA leaders) provided a considerable amount of 
political, economic, and military resources for the Serb leaders in Croatia and 
Bosnia. The external actors played an important role in the cases outside
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ex-Yugoslavia as well. During the cold war, many internal conflicts were 
fuelled by two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, who provided a 
considerable amount of financial and military resources for the opposing 
parties in the conflict. Laitin (2001a) concluded that the external actor played a 
decisive role in the onset of secessionist rebellion in the former Soviet Union. 
In the existing literature, the large-N analyses of the onset of rebellion and civil 
war have not adequately modelled this factor. As discussed in Chapter 9, it is 
extremely difficult to quantitatively measure the effect of the actions made by 
the external actors in a methodologically convincing manner. This factor, 
however, needs to be included in the explanatory framework in some way or 
another.
The ex-Yugoslav cases are also quite unique, and probably atypical, 
regarding the role of external actors. The ex-Yugoslav conflict attracted 
considerable attention of the international media and policy makers, which was 
certainly disproportionate to the conflicts that occurred in the other places in 
the 1990s. For example, NATO has never used its military power but against 
Serbia to rescue an ethnic minority from the military repression in the name of 
humanitarian crisis. While the involvement of external actors per se is not 
necessarily rare in the internal conflict as discussed above, its scale and 
magnitude in the ex-Yugoslav conflict may be rather exceptional.
Of course, in order to examine to what extent the ex-Yugoslav cases 
are unique or atypical in a methodologically robust manner, one must conduct a 
comparative analysis across region and period, comparing them with the cases 
from other regions and periods. This is beyond the scope of the present thesis 
and remains a task for future research.
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3. Theoretical and Methodological Implications
As for the theoretical and methodological implications of the present 
thesis, two particularly important issues are discussed here. The first is related 
to the unitary actor assumption of the ethnic group. The second is related to the 
conceptualisation of the onset of civil war as a one-shot event, or the 
operationalisation of the onset of civil war as a binary variable.
(1) Unitary Actor Assumption
The arguments and analyses in Part II have significant implications for 
the unitary actor assumption that is often retained in the game-theoretic 
accounts of ethnic conflict. Ethnic groups do not act as unitary actors in reality, 
and there are often disagreements not only on the objectives of ethnic groups 
but also on the means to achieve such objectives. The present thesis has shown 
that radicals who advocate a violent means to achieve their goals can emerge 
both in the powerful ethnic elite and among non-leaders. Whether radicals 
emerge in the former or the latter will affect the initial intensity of rebellion.
The unitary actor assumption becomes especially problematic in the 
cases of rebellion caused by decisions from below. If radicals emerge among 
non-leaders within the ethnic group and thus the initial intensity of rebellion is 
not so high, the occurrence of large-scale ethnic rebellion cannot be fully 
explained simply by revealing the factors or dynamics that make the radicals 
take up arms. If the rebellion starts from a low level, then there must be a 
process of escalation before it becomes a large-scale rebellion. In this case, 
ethnic groups do not take up arms en masse, but the number of people who take 
up arms increases over time. In these circumstances, the unitary actor 
assumption becomes problematic because any theory based on such an
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assumption cannot explain why an escalation or de-escalation occurs after the 
onset of initial rebellion.
The game-theoretic accounts of ethnic rebellion may encounter fewer 
problems in the cases of rebellion caused by decisions from above. Decisions 
made by powerful leaders often leads immediately to the occurrence of 
large-scale rebellion, and thus a primary task for the theories of ethnic conflict 
is to explain the decisions made by these leaders. Here, the strategic 
calculations of ethnic leaders may suffice as an explanation of the occurrence 
of large-scale rebellion. The empirical analysis of Chapter 3 shows, however, 
that rebellions tend to start from lower levels of intensity than from higher 
levels: more than 100 out of total 177 initial onsets occur at fairly low intensity, 
from 1 to 3 on the rebellion index (see Table 3.5). This implies that the 
usefulness of the game-theoretic accounts based on the unitary actor 
assumption is limited to a small subset of cases, even if one admits that the 
unitary actor assumption is reasonable in the cases of rebellion caused by 
decisions from above.
(2) Conceptualisation and Operationalisation of Civil War
As discussed in Chapter 1, it is a common practice in the existing 
literature to use a binary coding for the occurrence of civil war. The occurrence 
of civil war is thus conceptualised as a one-shot event, and the objective 
conditions observed in the year of the “occurrence” will be associated with the 
onset of civil war and thus be judged as “causes” of civil war in the statistical 
analysis.
The findings of the present thesis suggest that this practice can be 
seriously misleading. In order to illustrate the problem, let us take the example 
of Sri Lanka. In the dataset of Fearon and Laitin, the “onset” of civil war
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between the government and the LTTE is coded in 1983. In their explanatory 
framework, therefore, the structural conditions observed in Sri Lanka in 1983 
are assumed to explain this “onset” of civil war. However, this assumption is 
not quite plausible because the LTTE started its low-intensity rebellion in the 
early 1970s, the state authorities then took severe repressive measures which 
inflicted serious casualties on the Sri Lankan Tamils, including many civilians, 
and this state repression radicalised the Tamils and led to the escalation of 
rebellion in the early 1980s (e.g. Bose 1994). While both the onset of 
low-intensity rebellion and the state repression took place before 1983, these 
factors are not considered in the explanatory framework of Fearon and Laitin. 
The explanatory framework of the present thesis will treat the “onset” of 
large-scale conflict in the 1980s as a joint outcome of the onset of initial 
rebellion in the 1970s and the state repression from the late 1970s to the early 
1980s. It will suggest, therefore, that factors that led to the initial onset of 
rebellion (such as dynamic grievances) and factors that led to the state 
repression (such as the path dependency of policy position) should be 
examined in the analysis of the causes of conflict.
As this example illustrates, the findings of this thesis suggest that it is 
not enough to examine the structural conditions observed in the year of “onset” 
of large-scale conflict. Especially when large-scale conflicts result from the 
onset of low-intensity rebellion, the onset of initial rebellion and the escalation 
of rebellion should be analysed separately, because these two occur at different 
times and may have different causes. The three-step approach proposed in the 
present thesis can offer an alternative, more nuanced explanatory framework 
for the analysis of the causes of ethnic conflict and civil war.
259
4. Policy Implications
This section briefly examines the policy implications of this thesis. 
When the occurrence of ethnic conflict or civil war is conceived as a one-shot 
event, the prescribed recipe for conflict prevention will inevitably be based on 
all-or-nothing assumptions: if it succeeds, no conflict occurs; if it fails, the 
large-scale conflict will occur. The three-step approach of the present thesis 
implies, however, that there are at least two steps to prevent the occurrence of 
large-scale conflict. The first is to prevent the initial onset of rebellion, to 
which most scholars give their attention. The second is to prevent the 
escalation of rebellion, even though this step is available only when the initial 
level of rebellion is low.
The first step is closely related to the controversy in the existing 
literature on the role of grievances. As discussed in Chapter 1, there are 
basically two camps. One emphasises the importance of opportunities and 
argues that “grievances do not matter.” This argument implies that the rebels 
are rational and opportunistic. The other emphasises the importance of 
grievances. This argument implies that the rebels are frustrated. This camp 
argues that the occurrence of rebellion cannot be explained without the 
grievances that frustrate potential rebels and motivate them to take up arms. 
Lickbach (1998) called the former camp “Collective Action (CA) theorists” 
and the latter camp “Deprived Actor (DA) theorists”. The difficult question the 
analysts often face is succinctly summarised by Lichbach (1998: 31): “are CA 
theorists too cynical, or DA theorists too naive?”
The answer to this question affects the policy implications for the 
prevention of ethnic conflict. If rebels are mere opportunists, there is no benefit 
in listening to the demands of members of the ethnic group, and conflict
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prevention is possible only by eliminating the structural conditions that favour 
the rebellion. If rebels are motivated by grievances, on the other hand, it will be 
necessary to address the grievances of the ethnic group for the prevention of 
ethnic conflict. Not surprisingly, political actors who want to suppress the 
rebellion, such as state officials or military officers, tend to make the former 
claim: rebels are mere opportunists and “terrorists,” whose voice does not 
deserve any attention. Rebels tend to claim that they are motivated by the 
grievances and fight for the “just cause.”
The findings of the present thesis reject extreme and simplistic 
answers from both ends. This thesis has found that both opportunities and 
grievances do matter for the initial onset of rebellion. In other words, the 
decision to take up arms is caused neither purely by opportunities nor purely by 
grievances. This implies that, for the prevention of ethnic conflict, it is 
necessary to make efforts in two directions simultaneously, one to address the 
grievances and the other to eliminate opportunities. On the one hand, policies 
that try to address the grievances of the ethnic group will not be effective if not 
accompanied by effective and pragmatic policies that deter potential rebels 
from taking up arms in the future. On the other hand, policies that try to deter 
potential rebels from taking up arms will not be effective if not accompanied 
by some measures to address the grievances of the ethnic group.
As for the second step, the present thesis implies that it is important to 
prevent the state authorities from resorting to excessive repression when the 
level of rebellion is low, because excessive repression tends to be 
counterproductive and lead to the escalation of conflict. Of course, the state 
must take necessary measures against rebels to protect its citizens. However, 
this cannot be a pretext for conducting indiscriminate repression against the 
ethnic group. The external actors, including foreign governments and
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international NGOs, can play an important role in putting pressure upon the 
state authorities not to resort to excessive repression.
Indeed, this is where the conventional recipe for conflict prevention 
can go wrong. Some scholars have argued that the large-scale conflict is caused 
by the weakness of the state. This argument naturally implies that the recipe for 
conflict prevention is to “strengthen” the state. If this leads to the strengthening 
of the military and police of the state, however, it may eventually turn out to be 
counterproductive, because the state authorities may become too confident in 
their military and police capabilities to suppress rebels and thus resort to 
repression. Of course, the military and police capabilities of the state should be 
strong enough to deter potential rebels from taking up arms for mere 
opportunistic purposes. However, this “strengthening” of the state should not 
encourage the state authorities to resort to excessive repression.
5. Tasks for Future Research: Additional Implications and Theoretical 
Extensions
Finally, this section elaborates on some issues that deserve particular 
attention for the further theory-building on ethnic conflict and civil war. This 
thesis questioned the validity of the unitary actor assumption with regard to 
ethnic groups and explored some consequences of relaxing this assumption. 
One possible way to extend this argument further would be to examine the 
intra-rebel dynamics within the rebel organisations. The rebel organisation may 
not be monolithic and may well be divided between militants and moderates. 
This division and the balance between these two forces may affect, for example, 
the timing of the de-escalation of rebellion or the end of civil war: the civil war 
will continue when militants win over moderates, while the civil war will end
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when moderates win over militant rebels. There have been few efforts to 
explore these intra-rebel dynamics and its relationship with the evolution of 
conflict in a systematic manner. Therefore, this topic may deserve particular 
attention in future research on ethnic conflict and civil war.
The findings of the present thesis also suggest that the nature of state 
actions against rebels or ethnic groups is of critical importance for the 
evolution of conflict. The present thesis has shown that repressive measures 
taken by state authorities are likely to be provoked by the onset of 
low-intensity rebellion, but are also affected by other factors, such as 
international pressures and policy positions taken by key politicians in the past. 
However, the validity of these arguments should be checked in more systematic 
analyses of state actions, including large-N analyses. Therefore, further efforts 
are needed to systematically analyse and explain state actions taken against the 
rebels. Most scholars who are interested in the occurrence of large-scale 
conflict have attempted to explain the decisions made by rebels to take up arms, 
but not so many efforts have been made to explain the decisions made by the 
state authorities to take repressive measures to crack-down on rebels rather 
than to take more conciliatory measures. Therefore, it is necessary to “bring the 
state back in” to the analysis of ethnic conflict and civil war.
Here again, it may be useful to relax the unitary actor assumption. 
State authorities are also not always monolithic, and may well be divided 
between militant hard-liners and conciliatory moderates. For example, Chapter 
8 of this thesis shows that there were some conciliatory moderates even in the 
Milo§evic regime in Serbia, and there were some militant hard-liners even in 
Macedonia. What made a crucial difference between these two countries was 
that the militants won over the moderates in Serbia while the moderates won 
over the militants in Macedonia. By theorising these intra-regime dynamics
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within state authorities, therefore, one may be able to create a useful 
explanatory framework that explains the state actions against the rebels.
As discussed in the introductory chapter, this thesis only marks a 
beginning, rather than an end, of the efforts to develop a more dynamic 
theoretical framework to explain the occurrence of ethnic conflict and civil war. 
Further efforts are needed to develop a more comprehensive explanatory 
framework. This is far beyond the scope of this thesis, and is a task for future 
research.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Scale for the Anti-regime rebellion variable (REBEL) of the 
MAR dataset
0 - None reported
1 - Political banditry, sporadic terrorism
2 - Campaigns of terrorism
3 - Local rebellions: Armed attempts to seize power in a locale
4 -Small-scale guerrilla activity: All of the following must exist: 1) fewer 
than 1000 armed fighters; 2) sporadic armed attacks (less than six reported 
per year); and 3) attacks in a small part of the area occupied by the group, or 
in one or two other locales.
5 - Intermediate guerrilla activity: Has one or two of the defining traits of 
large-scale activity and one or two of the defining traits of small-scale 
activity
6 - Large-scale guerrilla activity: All of the following must exist: 1) more 
than 1000 armed fighters; 2) frequent armed attacks (more than 6 per year); 
and 3) attacks affecting a large part of the area occupied by the group
7 - Protracted civil war: Fought by rebel military units with base areas. 
Missing - No basis for judgment
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Appendix 2: Scale for the military repression variables (REP20, REP21, 
Rep22) of the MAR dataset
0 - No repression reported
1 - Tactics used against group members who are engaged in collective 
action participating in marches, preparing for or carrying out armed attacks, 
etc.).
2 - Tactics used against group members in both kinds o f circumstances 
engaged and not engaged in collective action), or in ambiguous situations, 
for example when it is not clear from source materials whether repressive 
action was provoked or not.
3 - Tactics used against group members who are not engaged in collective 
action.
Appendix 3: Ordered Logit Analysis of the Determinants of Military 
Repressions, 1996-2000 (Dependent Variable: REP21 and REP22)
model 3 model 4
Dependent Variable RE P21 RE P21
Independent Variables coef. st d. err coef. std err
Repression of the Previous Year 
(LDV)
1.81*** 0.62 1 85*** 0.57
Rebellion of the Previous Year 0 062 0 43
Low-Intensity Rebellion in the 
Previous Year
-0.15 1.35
High-Inteiisity Rebellion in the 
Previous Year
417*** 0.77 406*** 0.7
Democracy -0.028 0046 -0025 0.042
Level of Economic Development 0068 0 056 0061 0053
Cut Point (1) 5 9 0.64 5 8 061
Cut Point (2) 7 38 1.1 7 29 1 13
Cut Point (3) 8.23 1.36 8 15 1.41
N 967 967
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model 5 model 6
Dependent Variable REP22 r e :
Independent Variables coef. std.en. coef. std.en.
Repression of the Previous Year 
(LDV)
1 96*** 0.33 1.96*** 0.33
Rebellion of the Previous Year 0.43* 0 1 
j
Low-Intensity Rebellion in the 
Previous Year 1.86*
0.97
High-Intensity Rebellion in the 
Previous Year
3.34*** 0.95 3.62*** 1.25
Democracy -0 12** 0.059 -0.09 0 061
Level of Economic Development -0.09" 0.14 -0.2 0.2
Cut Point (1) 5 8? 0.73 5.93 0.9
Cut Point (2) 5 96 0.73
ioV
O 0.93
Cut Point (3) 7.19 11
00 
r ir 1.28
N 968 968
* p < 0. k  ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Appendix 4: Random-Effects Logit Analysis of Determinants of the 
Escalation of Rebellion, 1996-2000
Model 3 Model 4
coef. std.err. coef std.en.
Military Repression (REP21) -0 59 0.54
Military Repression (REP22) 0.15 0.21
Political Discrimination 0.0~8 0.13 0.071 0.13
Economic Discrimination 0.26* 0 1 4 0.23 0.15
Lost Autonomy -0 2 0.15 -0.19 0.15
Duration of Peaceful Protest -0 007 0 011 -0 008 0 011
Dictatorship -0 14 0 33 -0 19 0.33
Mountainous Terrain -0 014 0 11 -0.017 0 11
Political Instability 0.07 0 34 0.08 0.34
Level of Economic Development -0.21*** 0.07 -021*** 007
Regional Concentration -0.69 042 -0 58 0.43
Constant -1.17** P -4 -1 26** 0.57
N 659 660
* p <0.1; ** p < 0.05; ***p<0.01
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Appendix 5: Ordered Logit Analysis of the Determinants of Level of 
Rebellion, 1996-2000 (Dependent Variable: REB)
Model 3 Mod el 4
Independent Variables coef std err coef. std err
Level of Rebellion in the Previous 
Year (LDV)
1 1 -»* * * 0.11 113*** 0.12
Military Repression (REP21) 0  54** 026
Military Repression (REP22) 020 021
Politleal Disci miina t ion 0 10 0 11 0.10 011
Economic Discrimma t ion 0.0^ 0.11 0 06 0.11
Lost Autonomy -o .o s 0.09 -0 09 0.09
Duration ofPeacefi.il Protest 0 014*** 0.0053 0 011** 0005
Dictatorsliip 0 13 0 26 007 027
Moimtamous Terrain -002 007 -0 03 007
Political Instability 0 16 0 22 0 06 0 22
Level of Economic Development -0 04 003 -0 03 003
Regional Concentration 0 11 0 33 0 16 0.34
Cut Point (1) 2 08 042 2 03 0 42
Cut Point (2) 3.07 0 43 3 03 0 42
Cut Point (3) 3.66 049 363 048
Cut Point (4) 467 054 464 0 54
Cut Point (5) 5.93 061 589 0.6
Cut Point (6) 698 0 72 691 0 71
Cut Point (7) 8 32 084 8 17 083
N 658 659
* p 01; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0 01
Appendix 6: Number of Votes cast for Albanian candidates in the first 
round and the increase of votes received by two final candidates in the 
second round, 1999 Presidential Elections in Macedonia
Electoral
Unit
Number of Votes cast for Two 
Albanian Candidates in the 
First Round
Increase of the Votes m the Secound 
Round, received by;
Trajkovski Petkovski
1 18 2104 1181
2 19 726 1137
3 14 2309 1420
4 15 2027 1953
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5 7 2170 1586
6 15 2 1 1 1 2259
7 2 2 2 2 1 0 1826
8 16 2051 1775
9 15 1382 2491
1 0 5 1831 1317
11 1 0 1958 1156
1 2 2 1916 1044
13 3 1855 844
14 1 0 1480 1638
15 874 1726 1406
16 1 0 728 1817
17 1498 2341 1952
18 2817 4138 1773
19 362 1285 2013
2 0 1346 2635 1754
2 1 15081 16313 332
2 2 2 1 1727 1653
23 13 2587 1580
24 23 1819 3131
25 1 2 2147 5003
26 6 2444 4662
27 1545 3322 2251
28 16 1680 2188
29 1 2 0 1799 2034
30 243 1804 3065
31 597 2656 2325
32 28 2230 2333
33 379 1916 2283
34 523 2433 1143
35 23 1790 2682
36 2 2 1742 2384
37 24 1932 2097
38 704 3011 1800
39 858 2703 1551
287
40 1056 2502 1447
41 1178 2806 1241
42 9522 14040 91
43 4612 9833 1241
44 12077 15612 -36
45 3193 5844 1137
46 976 1935 1443
47 461 2335 2272
48 335 2 2 1 1 2113
49 4 1 2 0 0 1402
50 942 1595 1563
51 1249 3055 1942
52 13867 16198 -67
53 9994 15126 353
54 4254 6303 858
55 10774 17890 564
56 18476 19774 283
57 2348 3434 2781
58 8336 11705 727
59 11974 18280 87
60 14716 16376 87
61 2509 6494 517
62 188 1854 3948
63 300 1893 3272
64 6111 9416 1072
65 356 2638 2071
6 6 5555 11376 1023
67 24 1410 4615
6 8 59 1437 4755
69 87 1629 3937
70 47 1410 4457
71 8 8 1741 3490
72 2 2 1016 4179
73 1 2 2 2 2293 2599
74 277 1229 3643
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75 4185 6933 737
76 84 1149 4473
77 183 1115 4021
78 749 2098 3575
79 1179 2783 3217
80 375 1747 2888
81 11139 13367 1 1 0 1
82 2 2 2 2 3682 2560
83 1278 2719 2883
84 3483 5492 1597
85 2327 2861 1995
Source: Made by the Author, based on the election results announced by the 
Election Committee of Macedonia. See its website at 
http://www. izbori. gov.mk/
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Appendix 7: Initial Onset of Rebellion, 177 ethnic groups -  organisation and the involvement of politicians, police and army in 
the rebellion
group country year reb Organisation POLTCIAN POLARM
AFRICAN-AMERICANS USA 1965 3 Black Panthers, etc 0 0
fflSPANICS USA 1950 1 Puerto Rican Nationalist Party 0 0
NATIVE AMERICANS USA 1970 3 American Indian Movement 0 0
QUEBECOIS CANADA 1960 1 Quebec Liberation Front (FLQ) 0 0
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES CANADA 1990 3 Mohawk Warriors 0 0
MAYANS MEXICO 1994 4 Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) 0 0
ZAPOTECS MEXICO 1975 1
Worker-Peasant-Student Coalition of the Isthmus of 
Tehuantepec (COCEI)
0 0
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES GUATEMALA 1975 4 Guatemala National Revolutionary Unit (URNG) 0 0
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES NICARAGUA 1980 6 MISURASATA (Mascot, Rama, and Sandinista United) 0 0
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES PANAMA 1960 3 Kuna Tribesmen in Digir Community 0 0
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES COLOMBIA 1985 1 M-19, Quintin Lame, etc 0 0
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES VENEZUELA 1994 1 Yucpa Tribe 0 0
AMAZONIAN INDIANS BRAZIL 1980 3 Yanomani Indians 0 0
INDIGENOUS HIGHLAND 
PPLS
BOLIVIA 1985 1 Ejercito Guerrillero Tupaj Katari (EGTK) 0 0
LOWLAND INDIGENOUS 
PPLS
BOLIVIA 1985 1
the National Association of Coca Producers 
(ANAPCOCA)
0 0
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES CHILE 1989 1 Mapuche All Lands Council 0 0
CATHOLICS IN N. IRELAND UK 1955 1 Irish Republican Army 0 0
SCOTS UK 1980 1 The Scottish National Liberation Army 0 0
BASQUES FRANCE 1975 1 Iparretarrek 0 0
BRETONS FRANCE 1965 2
Front de Liberation de la Bretagne / Armee 
Revolutionnaire Bretonne
0 0
CORSICANS FRANCE 1975 2 FLNC (Front de la Liberation Nationale de la Corse) 0 0
MUSLIM (NONCITIZENS) FRANCE 1995 1 GIA (Islamic Armed Group) 0 0
JURASSIANS SWITZERLAND 1960 1 Jura Liberation Front (FLJ) 0 0
BASQUES SPAIN 1965 2 Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna (ETA) 0 0
CATALANS SPAIN 1970 1 Terra Lliure 0 0
SOUTH TYROLIANS ITALY 1955 1 Ein Tyrol 0 0
SARDINIANS ITALY 1965 1 Sardinian Autonomy Movement (MAS) 0 0
GREEKS ALBANIA 1994 1 MAVI (Northern Epirus Liberation Front) 0 0
ALBANIANS MACEDONIA 1996 1 Albanian Protesters 0 0
SERBS CROATIA 1992 7 Republika Srpska Krajina 1 1
KOSOVO ALBANIANS YUGOSLAVIA 1945 3 Rebels from Drenica Region 0 0
CROATS A YUGOSLAVIA 1970 1 Terrorists from Usta§a Remnants 0 0
SERBS BOSNIA 1992 7 Republika Srpska 1 1
CROATS BOSNIA 1992 7
Croatian Community of Bosanska Posavina, Herzeg 
Bosna, Central Bosnia
1 1
MUSLIMS BOSNIA 1995 7 Republic of Western Bosnia 1 1
MUSLIMS GREECE 1995 1 Turks of West Thrace 0 0
TURKISH CYPRIOTS CYPRUS 1960 1
Turk Mukavemet Teskilati (TMT - Turkish Resistance 
Organization)
0 0
GAGAUZ MOLDOVA 1991 3
Gagauz Soviet Socialist Republic (declaration of 
independence)
1 0
SLAVS MOLDOVA 1991 4 Trans-Dniester 1 0
CHECHENS RUSSIA 1992 3 Chechen Republic (Declaration of Independence) 1 0
ESTONIANS USSR 1945 4 Metsavennad 0 0
LETTS/LATVIANS USSR 1945 6 Meza braji 0 0
LITHUANIANS USSR 1945 6 Forest Brothers 0 0
UKRAINIANS USSR 1945 6
Ukrayins’ka Povstans’ka Armiya (Ukrainian Insurgent 
Army)
0 0
AVARS RUSSIA 1992 1 Shamil People's Front 0 0
INGUSH RUSSIA 1993 2 Ingush Militias 0 0
RUSSIANS LITHUANIA 1991 1 Russian Activitists 0 0
ABKHAZIANS GEORGIA 1992 7 the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic 1 1
OSSETIANS (SOUTH) GEORGIA 1991 5 The South Ossetia Autonomous Region 1 1
ARMENIANS AZERBAIJAN 1991 7
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast > 
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
1 1
TUAREG MALI 1960 6 Rebels of Adrar NTughas region 0 0
DIOLAS IN CASAMANCE SENEGAL 1985 1
The Movement of Democratic Forces in Casamansais 
(MDFC)
0 0
KEWRI MAURITANIA 1985 4 Forces Liberation Africaine de Mauritanie (FLAM) 0 0
HAUSA NIGER 1960 1 Sawaba Party 0 0
TUAREG NIGER 1985 3 the Front de Liberation de l'Air et 1'Azaouak (FLAA) 0 0
FULANI GUINEA 1960 1 Fulani Tribesmen 0 0
MALINKA GUINEA 1996 3 Coup attempts by dissident soldiers 0 1
MENDE SIERRA LEONE 1965 1 Coup led by army commander Lansana, etc 0 1
TEMNE SIERRA LEONE 1970 3 Coup attempt by John Bangura 0 1
ASHANTI GHANA 1965 1 Coup Attempts 0 0
EWE GHANA 1965 1 General Emmanuel Kotoka (Coup) 0 0
EWE TOGO 1993 2 the Collective of Democratic Opposition-2 (COD-2) 0 0
KABRE TOGO 1960 1
coup led by leaders of the demobilized veterans with the 
support of their Kabrai army allies.
0 1
WESTERNERS CAMEROON 1992 3 Social Democratic Front (SDF) 0 0
m o NIGERIA 1965 7 Independent State of Biafra 1 1
UAW NIGERIA 1995 1
Ijaw National Congress, various Ijaw Youth movements, 
etc
0 0
NORTHERNERS CHAD 1965 6 Front for National Liberation of Chad (FROLINAT) 0 0
SOUTHERNERS CHAD 1980 6 Commandos (codos) 0 1
LARI REP. OF CONGO 1960 3 Coup led by Alphonse Massemba-Debat 0 1
M'BOSHI REP. OF CONGO 1965 3 Coup led by Marien Ngouabi 0 1
LUBA
DEM. REP. 
CONGO
1960 7 Etat Minier du Sud-Kasai 1 0
LUND A, YEKE
DEM. REP. 
CONGO
1960 7 independent State of Katanga 1 0
HUTUS
DEM. REP. 
CONGO
1996 7
Hutu extremists and Interahamwe in north Kivu, merged 
with militias from the Banyarwanda Hutu communities
0 0
TUTSIS
DEM. REP. 
CONGO
1996 7
Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of 
Congo-Zaire (ADFL)
0 0
ACHOLI UGANDA 1970 1 Forces led by Milton Obote 0 0
ANKOLE UGANDA 1980 7 National Resistance Army (NRA) 0 0
BAGANDA UGANDA 1965 3
Baganda Government, led by Kabaka (Threat of 
Secession)
1 0
KAKWA UGANDA 1980 6
Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF), Former Uganda 
National Army (FUNA)
0 0
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KARAMOJONG UGANDA 1965 1 Karamojong Tribesmen 0 0
KONJO/AMBA UGANDA 1965 6 Rwenzururu Kingdom 0 0
LANGI UGANDA 1970 1 Forces led by Milton Obote 0 0
LUGBARA/MADI UGANDA 1980 6 National Resistance Army (NRA) 0 0
ZANZIBARIS TANZANIA 1970 1 Four Gunmen from Military 0 1
HUTUS BURUNDI 1965 1 Hutu Army/Police Officers (Coup attempt) 0 1
TUTSIS BURUNDI 1965 2 Tutsi Gunman (assasination) 0 0
TUTSIS RWANDA 1985 4 Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) 0 0
HUTUS RWANDA 1994 2 Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique (CDR) 0 0
ISSAQ SOMALIA 1960 4 Coup attempt by Somaliland Scouts 0 0
AFARS DJIBOUTI 1991 6
Front pour la Restauration de lTJnite et de la Democratic 
(FRUD)
0 0
AFARS ETHIOPIA 1975 7 The Afar Liberation Front [Party] (ALF/P) 0 0
ERITREANS ETHIOPIA 1960 4 The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) 0 0
NILO-SAHARANS ETHIOPIA 1975 3 Gumuz clan 0 0
OROMO ETHIOPIA 1960 4 The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 0 0
SOMALIS ETHIOPIA 1960 6
the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), the Ogadeni 
National Liberation Front (ONLF)
0 0
TIGREANS ETHIOPIA 1975 6 Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) 0 0
BAKONGO ANGOLA 1975 7 National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) 0 0
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OVTMBUNDU ANGOLA 1975 7
UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola)
0 0
CABINDA ANGOLA 1975 4 Front for the Liberation of Cabinda (FLEC) 0 0
BEMEBE ZAMBIA 1990 3 Coup attempt by a member of the Bemba royal house 0 0
LOZI ZAMBIA 1994 3 Lozi men gathered for the defence of the ruler 0 0
NDEBELE ZIMBABWE 1965 4 Zimbabwean African People's Union (ZAPU) 0 0
BLACK AFRICANS SOUTH AFRICA 1960 2
African National Congress (ANC), Pan Africanist 
Congress (PAC)
0 0
EUROPEANS SOUTH AFRICA 1980 1 Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) 0 0
XHOSA SOUTH AFRICA 1960 2
African National Congress (ANC), Pan Africanist 
Congress (PAC)
0 0
ZULUS SOUTH AFRICA 1994 2 Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 1 0
EAST CAPRIVIANS NAMIBIA 1990 1 Unemployed Soldiers 0 0
MERINA MADAGASCAR 1970 1 Kung-fu vigilante groups 0 0
BERBERS MOROCCO 1970 4
Union Nationale des Forces Populaires, led by Ahmed 
Rami
0 0
SAHARAWIS MOROCCO 1970 4
POLIS ARIO Front (The Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Saguiet el Hamara and Rio de Oro)
0 0
BERBERS ALGERIA 1965 1 Socialist Forces Front (FFS) 0 0
SOUTHERNERS SUDAN 1960 6 Anya Anya movement 0 1
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NUBA SUDAN 1985 4
the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLM/A)
0 0
AZERBAIJANIS IRAN 1945 3
Azerbaijani Democratic Republic / Democratic Party of 
Azerbaijan (declaration of independence)
1 0
BAKHTIARI IRAN 1950 3
Retired Officers' Association, Bakhtiari tribesmen led by 
Abul Qasem
0 0
BALUCHIS IRAN 1975 3 Baluch Tribesmen 0 0
KURDS IRAN 1945 6 Kurdish People's Republic / Kurdistan Democratic Party 1 0
TURKMEN IRAN 1975 4 Turkmen Agrarian workers 0 0
ARABS IRAN 1975 4 The Arab Political Cultural Organization (APCO) 0 0
KURDS TURKEY 1955 1 Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) 0 0
KURDS IRAQ 1945 4 Kurdistan Democratic Party 0 0
SHI'IS IRAQ 1975 2 al-Da‘wa al-Islamiyya (Islamic Call) 0 0
DRUZE LEBANON 1955 3 Militia led by Kamal Jumblatt 0 0
MARONITE CHRISTIANS LEBANON 1975 7 Phalange, Lebanese Forces 1 0
PALESTINIANS LEBANON 1960 3 Palestinian Liberation Organization 0 0
SHI'IS LEBANON 1975 4 Amal Militia, etc 0 0
SUNNIS LEBANON 1955 4 Movement of Independent Nasserites "Al-Murabitun" 0 0
PALESTINIANS JORDAN 1955 2 Fedayeen, etc 0 0
ARABS ISRAEL 1965 1 Islamic Movement, etc 0 0
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PALESTINIANS ISRAEL 1955 2 Fedayeen, etc 0 0
SHI’IS SAUDI ARABIA 1987 1 Shi'ite pilgrims protesteres, Saudi Hezbollah 0 0
SPOTS BAHRAIN 1995 2 Bahrain Hezbollah 0 0
HAZARAS AFGHANISTAN 1980 7 Islamist Groups (Sazman-e-Nasr, Sepah-e-Pasdaran, etc) 0 0
TAJIKS AFGHANISTAN 1980 7 Ethnic Tajik Militia led by Ahmed Shah Masoud, etc 0 0
UZBEKS AFGHANISTAN 1985 7 Ethnic Uzbek Militia 0 0
UZBEKS TAJIKISTAN 1998 5
Rebel Force led by former army colonel Mahmud 
Khudoiberdiev and former premier Abdumalik 
Abdullojonov
0 0
TURKMEN CHINA 1945 7 East Turkistan Republic 0 0
TIBETANS CHINA 1950 6
Tensung Dhanglang Magar (the Voluntary Force for the 
Defense of the Faith)
0 0
HONAMESE S. KOREA 1980 1 Demonstrators (Kwangju Uprising) 0 0
KASHMIRIS INDIA 1960 4 Youth Guerrillas (trained by Pakistan), Pakistani troops 0 0
MUSLIMS INDIA 1997 1 SIMI (Students Islamic Movement of India), etc 0 0
NAGAS INDIA 1950 1 NNC (Naga National Council) 0 0
SANTALS INDIA 1965 4
Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI), Jharkhand 
movement
0 0
SCHEDULED TRIBES INDIA 1960 2 Maoist Peoples' War Group (PWG) 0 0
SIKHS INDIA 1980 2 Sikh militants led by Sant Jamail Bindranwale 0 0
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MIZOS INDIA 1965 4 Mizo National Front (MNF) 0 0
TR1PURAS INDIA 1950 1 Tripura Upajati Juba Samati (TUJS) 0 0
ASSAMESE INDIA 1980 1 United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) 0 0
BODOS INDIA 1989 5
the All-Bodos Students Union (ABSU), the Bodo Security 
Force (BSF)
0 0
LHOTSHAMPAS BHUTAN 1990 3 Bhutan People's Party (BPP) 0 0
BALUCHIS PAKISTAN 1965 3 Zarakzai tribe, led by Nawab Nauroz 0 0
HINDUS PAKISTAN 2 0 0 0 1 Sena Rashtriya Sangh Party 0 0
PASHTUNS (PUSHTUNS) PAKISTAN 1950 1 Afghan-loyal guerrillas 0 0
SINDHIS PAKISTAN 1980 4
Jeay Sindh Qaumi Mahaz (JSQM), 
Sindh National Party (SNP)
0 0
MOHAJIRS PAKISTAN 1990 2
MQM (Mohajir Qaumi Movement, later Muttiheda Qaumi 
Movement)
1 0
CHITTAGONG HILL TRIBES BANGLADESH 1975 6 Shanti Bahini 1 0
ROfflNGYA (ARAKANESE) BURMA 1950 6 North Arakan Muslim League 0 1
ZOMIS (CHINS) BURMA 1985 5 Chin National Front (CNF) 0 0
KACHINS BURMA 1955 4 Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) 0 0
KARENS BURMA 1950 7 Karen National Union (KNU) 0 0
MONS BURMA 1985 5 New Mon State Party (NMSP) 0 0
SHANS BURMA 1960 6 Shan State Army 0 0
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HILL TRIBALS BURMA 1975 7 CPB's army in Shan State, Wa troops 0 0
INDIAN TAMILS SRI LANKA 2 0 0 0 1 Mob's attack on Police 0 0
SRI LANKAN TAMILS SRI LANKA 1970 1 the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 0 0
MALAY-MUSLIMS THAILAND 1945 3 Dusun Nyor Rebellion 0 0
NORTHERN HILL TRIBES THAILAND 1955 6 Red Meo Insurgencies 0 0
VIETNAMESE CAMBODIA 2 0 0 0 1 a group of ethnic Vietnamese fisherman 0 0
HMONG LAOS 1955 4 Irregular army led by General Vang Pao 0 1
MONTAGNARDS VIETNAM 1955 6 Bajaraka Movement 0 0
MONTAGNARDS
SOUTH
VIETNAM
1955 6 Hill Tribes 0 0
IGOROTS PHILIPPINES 1975 4
New People's Army (Communist Party of the Philippines' 
military wing)
0 0
MOROS PHILIPPINES 1970 6 Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 0 0
EAST TIMORESE INDONESIA 1955 3
The Revolutionary Front for East Timor Independence 
(FRETILIN)
0 0
PAPUANS INDONESIA 1960 3 the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Organization) 0 0
ACEHNESE INDONESIA 1950 3 All-Aceh Ulama Association (PUSA) 0 0
BOUGANVILLEAN S PAPUA N.G. 1988 2 Bougainville Revolutionary Army 0 0
FUIANS FUI 1998 1 Group of Extremist Fijians 0 0
